Willard v. Board of Appeals of Orleans

• Decision Date: 26 October 1987
• Citation: 25 Mass.App.Ct. 15,514 N.E.2d 369
• Parties: David B. WILLARD, trustee, v. BOARD OF APPEALS OF ORLEANS.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 369

514 N.E.2d 369

25 Mass.App.Ct. 15

David B. WILLARD, trustee, v. BOARD OF APPEALS OF ORLEANS.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts Barnstable.

Argued Sept. 11, 1987.

Decided Oct. 26, 1987.

Lawrence O. Spaulding, Jr., Orleans, for plaintiff.

Michael D. Ford, Town Counsel, Hyannis, for defendant.

Before GRANT, PERRETTA and SMITH, JJ.

GRANT, Justice.

In 1985 the plaintiff, in his individual capacity, ¹ acquired title to a lot in Orleans with an area of some 0.8 acres and a frontage of more than 100 feet on the northerly side of Cliff Road, a private way. The lot had been in separate ownership from that of any adjoining lot since 1965. A single-family house had been constructed on the lot at least as early as 1964; one corner of the house abutted the northerly sideline of Cliff Road. ² There was no minimum setback requirement in the Orleans zoning by-law until 1972, when a twenty-five foot setback was established in the residential zoning district in which the plaintiff's lot is located.

In 1985, following his acquisition, the plaintiff applied to the local building inspector for a permit to construct an addition to his house which would be located partly within the twenty-five foot setback. The building inspector denied the application for some reason or reasons which do not appear. The plaintiff appealed from that decision to the board of appeals and also applied to the board for a special permit authorizing the construction of the desired addition. The board, after hearing, sustained the decision of the building inspector and denied the application for a special permit. The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court (G.L. c. 40A, § 17), which, in effect, affirmed both aspects of the board's decision. We reverse the judgment of the Superior Court and order the case remanded to the board for further proceedings.

1. The relevant statutory provision. The first question for decision is whether this case is governed by the first ³ or by the fourth ⁴ paragraph of G.L. c. 40A, § 6, as amended through St.1979, c. 106. Town counsel argues for the former; the plaintiff espouses the latter. There is nothing on the face of the fourth paragraph to suggest that it was intended to apply to anything but vacant land. The only reference to a building is found in the last sentence of the paragraph, which sets out one of the circumstances (not applicable here) in which a "lot" may be "built upon." The immediate statutory ancestor of the fourth paragraph (G.L. c. 40A, § 5A, as in effect prior to St.1975, c. 808, § 3) applied to original construction on vacant lots but not to alterations of existing structures which had become nonconforming, such as the one involved in this case. Maynard v. Tomyl, 347 Mass. 397, 400, 198 N.E.2d 291 (1964). There is no support for the plaintiff's position in Sturges v. Chilmark, 380 Mass. 246, 260-261, 402 N.E.2d 1346 (1980), decided under the present fourth paragraph, in which the court was dealing with two vacant lots and the only question for decision was whether those lots were "adjoining" within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of the present § 6. The case of Baldiga v. Board of Appeals of Uxbridge, 395 Mass. 829, 482 N.E.2d 809 (1985), was also concerned with vacant lots.

The portion of the first paragraph of the present § 6 with which we are concerned has no identifiable ancestor in G.L. c. 40A, as in effect prior to St.1975, c. 808, § 3. That portion made its first appearance, without accompanying explanation (see Baldiga v. Board of Appeals of Uxbridge, 395 Mass. at 835, 482 N.E.2d 809), in 1974 House Doc. No. 5864. To be specific, the second "except" clause of the first paragraph of § 6 is addressed to "alteration[s], reconstruction, extension[§ and] structural change[s] to ... single or two-family residential structure[s]," none of which is referred to in the fourth paragraph. The second sentence of the first paragraph is specific in its references to extensions and alterations of "[p]re-existing nonconforming structures" (Fitzsimonds v. Board of Appeals of Chatham, 21 Mass.App.Ct. 53, 55-56, 484 N.E.2d 113 [1985] ⁵). We have no hesitancy in concluding that the portion of the first paragraph of § 6 which commences with the second "except" clause sets out the statutory provisions which govern a case such as the present. Compare Walker v. Board of Appeals of Harwich, 388 Mass. 42, 50-52, 445 N.E.2d 141 (1983).

2. The relevant provision of the zoning by-law. The next question is whether this case is governed by § 1:3-3-1 ⁶ or by § 6:4-3 ⁷ of the Orleans zoning by-law. Section 1:3-3-1 makes specific reference to the present G.L. c. 40A, § 6, and reads almost directly on the language of the second "except" clause of the first paragraph of § 6, as discussed in part 1 hereof. Section 6:4-3 makes no reference to any particular section of c. 40A, but it is clear from a comparison of its language with that of § 9 of c. 40 A that § 6:4-3 was intended to implement the general provisions with respect to the issuance of special permits which are found in § 9 and to apply in special permit situations not specifically covered by other sections of the by-law. ⁸ Compare Walker v. Board of Appeals of Harwich, 388 Mass. at 51-52, 445 N.E.2d 141. Accordingly, we hold that it is § 1:3-3-1 which governs in this case.

3. The proper construction of the statute and the by-law. The first paragraph of G.L. c. 40A, § 6 (note 3, supra ), contains an obscurity of the type which has come to be recognized as one of the hallmarks of the chapter. See, e.g., O'Kane v. Board of Appeals of Hingham, 20 Mass.App.Ct. 162, 478 N.E.2d 962 (1985), and cases cited; Fitzsimonds v. Board of Appeals of Chatham, 21 Mass.App.Ct. at 55-56, 484 N.E.2d 113. The first "except" clause of the statute is concerned with the application of zoning ordinances and by-laws to nonconforming "structures or uses," to any change in or substantial extension of such a "use", and to the alteration of such a "structure." The second "except" clause deals with the alteration, reconstruction, extension or structural change "to [sic] a single or two-family residential structure [which] does not increase the nonconforming nature of [the] structure." The immediately ensuing sentence speaks of not permitting extensions or alterations of "[p]re-existing nonconforming structures or uses" unless there is a finding by the permit or special permit authority that such change, extension or alteration "shall not be substantially more detrimental than the existing nonconforming use to the neighborhood" (emphasis supplied).

It will be noted that all the portions of the statute which have just been summarized or quoted except the portion italicized are expressly directed to nonconforming structures as well as nonconforming uses. In the present case, the existing and proposed nonconformities arise out of the position of a house on a lot of land rather than out of the use which is being or is proposed to be made of the house or of the lot on which the house is and would continue to be located. The italicized portion of the statute makes no sense in these circumstances because, as worded, it appears to contemplate a determination of whether an alteration to an existing structure would be more detrimental to the neighborhood by reference to the existing residential use of the land, which would not change if the structure were altered. ⁹ We are of opinion that this is one of those rare instances in which a court must overcome its reluctance to supply a word or words which were not employed by the Legislature (see, e.g. Murray v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable, 22 Mass.App.Ct. 473, 479, 494 N.E.2d 1364 [1986] ) in order to render a statute intelligible and so effectuate its obvious intent. Compare Chelmsford Trailer Park, Inc. v. Chelmsford, 393 Mass. 186, 196-197, 469 N.E.2d 1259 (1984). Accordingly, we read the concluding portion of the second sentence of the first paragraph of the present G.L. c. 40A, § 6, as follows: "shall not be substantially more detrimental than the existing nonconforming structure or use to the neighborhood" (emphasis supplied).

On a parity of reasoning, we think the concluding portion of the penultimate sentence of § 1:3-3-1 of the by-law (note 6, supra ) is to be read: "will not be substantially more detrimental to the neighborhood than the existing non-conforming structure or use" (emphasis supplied).

There is one more question of construction. As pointed out in Fitzsimonds v. Board of Appeals of Chatham, the second "except" clause of the first paragraph of c. 40A, § 6, requires a board of appeals in a case such as this one to make an initial determination whether a proposed alteration of or addition to a nonconforming structure would "increase the nonconforming nature of said structure" (21 Mass.App.Ct. at 56, 484 N.E.2d 113). This part of the statute is not concerned with the use of the structure or of the land on which it is located. We think the quoted language should be read as requiring a board of appeals to identify the particular respect or respects in which the existing structure does not conform to the requirements of the present by-law and then determine whether the proposed alteration or addition would intensify the existing nonconformities or result in additional ones. If the answer to that question is in the negative, the applicant will be entitled to the issuance of a special permit under the second "except" clause of G.L. c. 40A, § 6, and any implementing by-law. Only if the answer to that question is in the affirmative will there be any occasion for consideration of the additional question illuminated in the Fitzsimonds case (21 Mass.App.Ct. at 56, 484 N.E.2d 113).

4. Shortcomings in the board's and the judge's findings. The board found that the addition proposed in this case "would increase the non-conforming nature of the present structure." That finding is not suspect because there was evidence in ...