Willard v. Huffman
| Decision Date | 10 January 1958 |
| Docket Number | No. 602,602 |
| Parties | , 41 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2620, 34 Lab.Cas. P 71,298 James M. WILLARD v. P. T. HUFFMAN, Individually and P. T. Huffman Transfer, Inc. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Robert S. Cahoon, Greensboro, for plaintiff appellee.
Brooks, McLendon, Brim & Holderness, Greensboro, for defendant appellant.
The defendants assign as error the refusal of the court below to sustain their motion for judgment as of nonsuit made at the close of plaintiff's evidence and renewed at the close of all the evidence.
We think the evidence adduced in the trial below, when considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as it must be on such motion, is sufficient to carry the case to the jury, and we so hold. This assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
In our Right to Work statute, enacted by Chapter 328, Session Laws of 1947, now codified as G.S. §§ 95-78 through 95-84, it was 'declared to be the public policy of North Carolikna that the right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or nonmembership in any labor union or labor organization or association. ' (G.S. § 95-78.) See aslo In re Port Publishing Co., 231 N.C. 395, 57 S.E.2d 366, 14 A.L.R.2d 842.
The plaintiff is relying upon the following provisions of our Right to Work statute as the basis for his right to recover in this action. G.S. 95-81. 'Nonmembership as condition of employment prohibited.--No person shall be required by any employer to abstain or refrain from membership in any labor union or labor organization as a condition of employment or continuation of employment.'
GS 95-83. 'Recovery of damages by persons denied employment.--Any person who may be denied employment or be deprived of continuation of his employment in violation of §§ 95-80, 95-81 and 95-82 or of one or more of such sections, shall be entitled to recover from such employer and from any other person, firm, corporation, or association acting in concert with him by appropriate action in the courts of this State such damages as he may have sustained by reason of such denial or deprivation of employment.'
The defendants' assignment of error No. 4 is to the following portion of the court's charge to the jury: 'Now, if you find * * * by the greater weight of the evidence that on the night of January 17th that this plaintiff, with nine other employees of the defendant company, met at the plaintiff's home and discussed joining a union, and the members there, those ten men, voted to become members and notified Mr. Jones, and you find * * * that the defendant knew that the plaintiff had met with the other members in his employment for the purpose of joining some union, and you find by the greater weight of the evidence that that was the reason, and the sole reason, or one of the reasons why he was discharged by the defendant company and the individual defendant, Mr. Huffman, and you find those facts and all of them by the greater weight of the evidence, then * * * you'd answer this issue yes.'
In other portions of the charge the court likewise instructed the jury to answer the first issue in favor of the plaintiff if it found that the sole reason or one of the reasons for plaintiff's discharge was because he did not abstain or refrain from becoming a member of the union or some labor organization. The defendants excepted to each one of these instructions and assign them as error.
These assigments of error present for determination this question: Is it sufficient to sustain a verdict in favor of a plaintiff in an action based on the alleged violation of the provisions of G.S. § 95-81, if the jury should find that the discharge for such violation was only one of the reasons for such discharge?
This identical question has not been presented heretofore to this Court for determination under the provisions of our Right to Work statute. However, the federal act, involving the same principle in respect to proof, has been interpreted. The federal statute in pertinent part reads as follows: 'It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer * * * by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: * * *'. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a) (3).
In Rubin Bros. Footwear v. National Labor Relations Bd., 5 Cir., 203 F.2d 486, 488, the Court said:
In the case of Stonewall Cotton Mills v. National Labor Relations Bd., 5 Cir., 129 F.2d 629, 632, the court said: '* * * the invoked section (29 U.S. C.A., § 158(a) (3) does not, of course, mean that membershup or office in a union is a guarantee against discharge, layoff, or demotion. An employee, though he belong to or is an officer of a union, may, like any other employee, be discharged for any reason or for no reason at all,...
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