Willard v. State

• Decision Date: 20 March 1889
• Citation: 11 S.W. 453
• Parties: WILLARD <I>v.</I> STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 453

11 S.W. 453

WILLARDv.

STATE.

Court of Appeals of Texas.

March 20, 1889.

Appeal from district court, Eastland county; T. H. CONNER, Judge.

Lon Willard appeals from a conviction for theft. For opinion on former appeal, see 9 S. W. Rep. 358.

B. F. Cotton, J. T. Hammons, and C. F. Clint, for appellant. Asst. Atty. Gen. Davidson, for the State.

WHITE, P. J.

This is a second appeal from conviction in this case. 26 Tex. App. 126, 9 S. W. Rep. 358. After a most thorough reading of the record on this appeal we are of opinion there is but one question raised of sufficient moment to require a discussion at our hands. It is most urgently insisted that there is no evidence of appellant's guilty agency in the alleged theft of the animal save his own confession, or admission amounting to a confession; and that this confession, being uncorroborated, is insufficient in law to warrant his conviction. In other words, it is contended that the corpus delicti of a crime cannot be proved alone by the confession of a party charged with crime. In all criminal prosecutions the rule is elementary that to sustain a conviction two things must be established: (1) A criminal act; and (2) defendant's agency in the production of such act. Whart. Crim. Ev. (8th Ed.) § 325; 3 Greenl. Ev. § 30. In other words, there must be proof of the corpus delicti, and the identity of the prisoner. But, while this is so, there is no one kind of evidence to be always demanded in proof of the corpus delicti, any more than any other fact. It can seldom be proved by direct or positive testimony, and may be lawfully established by circumstantial evidence, provided it be satisfactory to the understanding and conscience of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Brown v. State, 1 Tex. App. 154; Merritt v. State, 2 Tex. App. 177.

With regard to confessions, Mr. Wharton says: "While voluntary confessions of specific charges or of inculpatory facts are always admissible under the conditions above stated, they cannot sustain a conviction unless there be corroborative proof of the corpus delicti;" and he cites a long array of authorities in support of the proposition. Whart. Crim. Ev. (8th Ed.) § 632. "It should be remembered," he says, "that the corpus delicti consists not merely of an objective crime, but of the defendant's agency in the crime, and unless the corpus delicti in both these respects is proved, a confession is not, by itself, enough to sustain a conviction." Id. § 633. Defendant's counsel requested a special instruction upon this point, which the court refused, as stated by the learned judge, "because not the law, as I understand it. A confession, in some cases, uncorroborated, might be insufficient to establish the corpus delicti, but I think certainly in this case the jury may consider defendant's statements in connection with the other proof in determining the matter." There is no doubt of the correctness of the latter proposition stated by the court. We have seen by the authorities that he is mistaken as to the first declaration that such an instruction would not be the law. The question is, if it should occur that the court erred in its opinion as to the correctness of the proposition of law, did the refusal of the instruction materially injure the rights of the defendant in this case? Was the instruction a part of the law applicable to the facts, and necessary to be given, independently of the law as submitted in the general charge? In this case the court plainly, and, as we think, fully, instructed the jury upon all the legitimate phases of the testimony, including an elaborate...