Willenbring v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 09 March 2009
• Docket Number: No. 07-6152.,07-6152.
• Parties: Charles G. WILLENBRING, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

559 F.3d 225

Charles G. WILLENBRING, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 07-6152.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: December 5, 2008.

Decided: March 9, 2009.

ARGUED:

John Cowles Neiman, Jr., Bradley, Arant, Rose & White, L.L.P., Birmingham, Alabama, for Appellant. Patrick Brian Grant, U.S. Army, United States Army Litigation Center, Arlington, Virginia, for Appellee.

ON BRIEF:

George E.B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge KING wrote the opinion, in which Judge Michael and Judge MOTZ joined.

OPINION

KING, Circuit Judge:

Charles G. Willenbring appeals from the district court's dismissal of his habeas corpus petition with respect to a court-martial judgment entered by a military trial court. Willenbring was court-martialed in the late 1990s, while serving in the Army's reserve component, for three rape offenses committed in the late 1980s, when he was serving in the Army's regular component.¹ In pursuing habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Willenbring contends that he was not subject to court-martial prosecution because (1) he had experienced a complete termination of military service by his honorable discharge from the Army's regular component, and only later entered its reserve component; and (2) the Uniform Code of Military Justice (the "UCMJ")² did not otherwise provide court-martial jurisdiction. As explained below, we conclude that Willenbring was subject to court-martial jurisdiction and prosecution, and therefore affirm the district court.

I.

In order to properly assess and resolve this appeal, it is essential to understand the complexity of these proceedings: specifically (1) the background of Willenbring's service in the Army's regular and reserve components; and (2) the underlying rulings made by the military and federal courts. We review these aspects of the proceedings in turn.

A.

On January 13, 1982, Willenbring enlisted in the Army's regular component for a period of four years. He twice extended that enlistment and reenlisted for a six-year period on September 30, 1988. During the latter reenlistment, Willenbring received an attractive private-sector job offer and thrice requested an early separation from the Army's regular component. More specifically, he sought to be discharged from such service in early 1992, thirty months before his reenlistment was to be completed. When his first request— made on January 17, 1992—was denied, Willenbring promptly filed an updated request for an early separation, altering his initial submission and agreeing to serve "the remaining portion of his enlistment contract" in the Army's reserve component, if it "would grant his release from the regular Army in order to take a civilian job." J.A. 12.³ Willenbring's second request was also denied, however, because he had failed to secure the proper recommendation. On March 9, 1992, Willenbring submitted his third request for an early separation, which was identical to the second request except that it was supported by his commanding officer's recommendation. The Army approved his early separation request on March 10, 1992, and Willenbring's discharge from the regular component was fixed for March 31, 1992. Three days after such approval, on March 13, 1992, Willenbring signed a one-year enlistment contract with the Army's reserve component, with his reserve duty to begin on April 1, 1992.

Pursuant to the foregoing, Willenbring was honorably discharged from the Army's regular component on March 31, 1992. His enlistment in the Army's reserve component took effect the next day, and he served as a reservist until 1997, by virtue of three enlistments—his 1992 one-year enlistment, a subsequent one-year reenlistment, and, finally, a three-year reenlistment that began on February 26, 1994. In February 1997, near the end of his final reenlistment as a reservist, Willenbring was ordered to active duty to face court-martial proceedings for the rape offenses that had occurred in 1987 and 1988, during his service in the Army's regular component.⁴ The court-martial specifications⁵ were preferred on February 26, 1997, alleging three violations of Article 120 of the UCMJ, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 920—a single rape offense in September 1987 near Champagne, Illinois, plus two rape offenses in November 1988 at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.⁶

B.

The UCMJ spells out the statutory processes by which a military trial court may exercise court-martial jurisdiction over a member of the reserve component, specified primarily in Article 2 of the UCMJ, and supplemented by Article 3. Article 2, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 802, spells out the general circumstances under which a member of the reserve component may be called to active duty to face court-martial proceedings.⁷ Of relevance here, Article 2(a)(1) identifies those persons subject to court-martial jurisdiction, that is, "[m]embers of a regular component of the armed forces . . . and other persons lawfully called or ordered into, or to duty in or for training in, the armed forces." Additionally, Article 2(d)(1)(B) specifies that a reservist "who is not on active duty and who is made the subject of proceedings" under the UCMJ "may be ordered to active duty involuntarily for the purpose of . . . trial by court-martial." Pursuant to Article 2(d)(2)(A) and (B), however, a military trial court possesses court-martial jurisdiction over an Army reservist only when the alleged offense was committed while the servicemember was "on active duty" or "on inactive-duty training."⁸

In 1997, Willenbring moved to dismiss the specifications lodged in the court-martial proceedings, asserting that the military trial court lacked jurisdiction under both Article 2 and Article 3. He contended, inter alia, that the military trial court lacked such jurisdiction because he had experienced a complete termination of military service between his discharge from the Army's regular component, on March 31, 1992, and his enlistment in the Army's reserve component, effective April 1, 1992. The court declined to dismiss the specifications, however, and Willenbring sought an interlocutory review of that decision in the Army Court of Criminal Appeals (the "Army Appeals Court"). On July 23, 1997, such review was denied without opinion. The Army Appeals Court specified, however, that its denial of interlocutory review was without prejudice to Willenbring's right to pursue his contentions in the regular appellate process. Willenbring then appealed further, to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.

On June 30, 1998, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces affirmed the Army Appeals Court's denial of interlocutory review, but remanded for findings and conclusions on the issue of Willenbring's asserted termination of service. See Willenbring v. Neurauter, 48 M.J. 152, 175 (C.A.A.F.1998) ("Willenbring I") ("During further proceedings in this case, it will be necessary for the military judge to make findings of fact and conclusions of law specifically directed to the issue of termination of service.").⁹ On remand, Willenbring pleaded guilty to the three specifications of rape, and the court-martial judgment was entered on March 5, 1999.¹⁰

The military trial court thereafter made the findings and conclusions mandated in 1998 by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.¹¹ In relevant part, those findings were as follows:

Around February or early March 1992, [Willenbring] received a civilian job offer and requested an exception to policy in the separation regulation, AR 635-200, Chapter 5-3, for a civilian job offer. That request was denied. [Willenbring] on 9 Mar 92 submitted a [Department of the Army] Form 4187 (Personnel Action) requesting reconsideration of his request for release from active duty and stated: "I am willing to serve my remaining time in service in the Active Reserves." His ETS at the time under his then current enlistment was September 1994.... His battalion-level commander recommended approval of that request on 9 Mar 92, and Department of the Army Separations and Appeals Branch on 10 Mar 92 approved that request with a separation date of 10 Mar 92. On 13 Mar 92, [Willenbring] enlisted in the U.S. Army Reserve for a term of 1 year under a "Transition Enlistment." He enlisted for specific assignment to Co D, 2d Bn Tng, Spt Bde, Jones Point, USARC, Alexandria, VA, requesting reserve component assignment orders for assignment to that unit. Those orders were issued that day, 13 Mar 92, assigning him effective 1 Apr 92 to that unit. [Willenbring] in his Request for Component Assignment Orders . . . requested to continue his SGLI coverage. In his enlistment contract of 13 Mar 92, [Willenbring] acknowledged and initialed his understanding that "this enlistment will require that I commence training with a troop program unit immediately. I will be required to maintain satisfactory participation in the Ready Reserve for the entire period of service stipulated in the enlistment document to which this is attached." [Willenbring's Department of Defense (DD) Form] 214 reflected his transfer to his reserve unit—D Co, 2d Bn.... [Willenbring] acknowledged in February 1995 . . . on a retirement points calculation that he had served on active duty until 31 Mar 92 and began his reserve duties on 1 Apr 92. United States v. Willenbring, 56 M.J. 671, 674-75 (A.Ct.Crim.App.2001) ("Willenbring II").¹² On the basis of the foregoing factual recitation, the military trial court concluded that Willenbring "did not have a complete break in service" and that "his military service was continuous." Id. at 675.

On appeal from the court-martial judgment, the Army Appeals Court affirmed Willenbring's convictions and adopted the military trial court's conclusion tha...