Willets v. Emhart Mfg. Co.
| Decision Date | 10 March 1965 |
| Citation | 208 A.2d 546,152 Conn. 487 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Thomas S. WILLETS et al. v. EMHART MANUFACTURING COMPANY. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut |
Charles J. Cole, Hartford, with whom was Thomas C. White, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).
J. Read Murphy, Hartford, with whom were John E. Silliman, Hartford, and, on the brief, James P. Sandler, Hartford, for appellees (plaintiffs).
Before KING. C. J., and MURPHY, ALCORN, COMLEY and SHANNON, JJ.
This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas accepting the report of a state referee in which subordinate facts were found and in which the conclusion was reached that the plaintiffs were entitled to receive separation pay upon the termination of their employment by the defendant.
The facts may be summarized as follows: In May, 1960, the plaintiffs were employed by the defendant in its Maxim division. Each was entitled, as part of his contract of employment, to benefits under a separation pay agreement contained in personnel policy No. 1.4 issued by the defendants on April 23, 1958. The agreement provided that separation pay should be granted to eligible employees according to a schedule based on length of service when laid off (1) for lack of work or (2) because of reorganization. It further provided that the employee should be eligible to receive the pay if: (1) the layoff was for an indefinite period; (2) the employee did not voluntarily terminate his employment; (3) the employee was not discharged for cause.
On May 31, 1960, the defendant sold its Maxim division to American Machine and Foundry Company, hereinafter referred to as A.M.F. The sale had been the subject of discussion during April and May, and the plaintiffs had been informed that A.M.F. would have first call upon the services of the defendant's employees. They also learned that those who transferred to A.M.F. would not receive separation pay. The defendant did not offer employment to those who elected not to go with A.M.F., and it discontinued entirely the types of work for which the plaintiffs were qualified by skill and training. The plaintiffs, being the ones who elected to go with A.M.F., suffered no loss of time or compensation. Some were glad to make the change and were not inconvenienced by it. Others who were required to move from Connecticut to Louisiana accepted the change unwillingly and only because otherwise they would be out of a job. All of them lost their seniority rights with the defendant.
The underlying and determining question is whether these plaintiffs were laid off by the defendant for lack of work. If they were not laid off, or, if the layoff was not due to lack of work, they cannot qualify for separation pay under the terms of the agreement.
There can be no question that the sale of its Maxim division by the defendant involved a permanent release of the plaintiffs. By that sale, the defendant made certain that it could no longer fulfil its part of the employment relationship. Matthews v. Minnesota Tribune Co., 215 Minn. 369, 373, 10 N.W.2d 230, 147 A.L.R. 147. The defendant argues that this release is not a layoff because it is permanent and not temporary in duration. Webster's Third International Dictionary gives as one of the definitions of the verb 'to lay off': 'to cease to employ (a worker) * * * [usually] temporarily because of slack in production and without prejudice to the worker.' That a layoff may usually be temporary does not require that it must be. See International Assn. of Machinists v. State ex rel. Watson, 153 Fla. 672, 681, 15 So.2d 485.
As the state referee cogently pointed out, the defendant itself has given the contract a construction which is inconsistent with its present position, since in the case of five employees who are not plaintiffs, who did not transfer to A.M.F., who refused positions offered by the defendant...
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...(awarding severance pay to employees of predecessor corporation despite continued employment with successor); Willets v. Emhart Mfg. Co., 152 Conn. 487, 208 A.2d 546 (1965) (corporate personnel policy on severance pay deemed to have become part of understood employment agreement); Chapin v.......
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