Willett v. Willett

• Decision Date: 07 December 1955
• Citation: 333 Mass. 323,130 N.E.2d 582
• Parties: Francis W. WILLETT and another v. George F. WILLETT.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 582

130 N.E.2d 582

333 Mass. 323

Francis W. WILLETT and another v. George F. WILLETT.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk.

Argued Dec. 7, 1954.

Decided Dec. 7, 1955.

John M. Bashaw, Boston (Guy Newhall, Lynn and Alvin J. Slater, Boston, with him), for petitioners.

Philip B. Buzzell, Boston, for respondent.

Before QUA, C. J., and RONAN, WILKINS, SPALDING and WILLIAMS, JJ.

RONAN, Justice.

This is an appeal from a final decree adjudging the respondent to be an insane person, incapable of taking care of himself, and appointing his two children his guardians.

When this case was previously here, Bashaw v. Willett, 327 Mass. 369, 99 N.E.2d 42, on an appeal by the respondent from a decree appointing a temporary guardian and denying his motion for jury issues, it was held there was no error. The case has since been fully tried upon the merits on a petition filed by the respondent's daughter and son for the appointment of a permanent guardian. Experts in mental diseases testified on behalf of each side. The daughter also testified. The respondent occupied the witness stand for several days. Persons who resided with him at the same club and who frequently saw and talked with him testified in his behalf. We have a transcript of the evidence together with numerous exhibits and a report of the material facts found by the judge.

An appeal in equity with a report of the evidence and a report of the material facts opens up for our decision all questions of law, fact, and discretion. It is our duty to examine the evidence. We can find facts not expressly found by the judge and we can reverse the conclusion reached by him if found to be tainted by some error of law, but the findings of fact made by him are to stand unless we are satisfied that they are plainly wrong. Trade Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Peters, 291 Mass. 79, 83-84, 195 N.E. 900; Lowell Bar Association v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 178, 52 N.E.2d 27. The basis of our determination of the facts which must necessarily rest upon a perusal of the printed record is not as broad as that of the judge who saw and heard the witnesses. The question for our decision is not what our opinion might be as to the sanity of the respondent--an issue of fact, with the burden of proof upon the petitioners, Richardson v. Bly, 181 Mass. 97, 99, 63 N.E. 3; Clifford v. Taylor, 204 Mass. 358, 361, 90 N.E. 862; Commonwealth v. Spencer, 212 Mass. 438, 453, 99 N.E. 266; Payne v. R. H. White Co., 314 Mass. 63, 65-66, 49 N.E.2d 425--but whether it can be said that the judge who observed and listened to all the witnesses and especially the respondent was plainly wrong in deciding that he was insane. Berman v. Coakley, 257 Mass. 159, 162, 153 N.E. 463; Murphy v. Hanlon, 322 Mass. 683, 685, 79 N.E.2d 292; Allied Freightways, Inc., v. Cholfin, 325 Mass. 630, 636, 91 N.E.2d 765; Ross & Roberts, Inc., v. Simon, 326 Mass. 12, 17, 92 N.E.2d 570; Armco Drainage & Metal Products, Inc., v. Framingham, 332 Mass. 129, 133, 123 N.E.2d 471.

From his life history which he narrated in considerable detail, and to which we can refer only with respect to some of the salient points in order to avoid an opinion of inordinate length, it appears that he was eighty-two years of age, alert and courteous, endowed with a fine memory, and possessed of a good power of persuasion. In his earlier years he had amassed a fortune from the wool and leather business. He organized a local bank of which he became president. He was civic minded and made gifts to the town in which he resided which the town recognized by official action. A verdict of approximately $10,500,000 in his favor was set aside by this court in 1927 upon the ground that he had executed a general release discharging the defendants. See Willett v. Herrick, 258 Mass. 585, 155 N.E. 589. The respondent has become interested about 1906 in acquiring large areas of land for the purpose of developing them into beautiful model villages, containing hundreds of homes of diverse types of construction, some to be constructed at a cost within the reach of ordinary workers and others at a greater cost for those who could afford to purchase them. After the decision in the Willett case, the activities of the respondent were mainly confined to seeking financial assistance in developing these areas. He has sold various lots of land located where they would not materially interfere with the areas he hoped to develop, retaining as best he could these areas much of which is vacant land and encumbered by mortgages and unpaid taxes. Title to some of the lots has been lost by foreclosure of mortgages, and title to others is held by the town through tax foreclosures. The respondent has been especially interested in retaining the possession of and control over a large area known as Westover, but the affairs of the title holder of this tract are subject to pending reorganization proceedings in the Federal court. After the death of his wife he has resided at a club where he has been maintained by income from his wife's estate and contributions from his daughter, but he has never given up his ambition, after more than thirty years of unsuccessful attempts, to convert the areas into model villages.

A few years before the turn of the century, the respondent secured employment at the respondent's tannery for one Frank C. Allen who was then courting the respondent's sister-in-law and subsequently married her. When the respondent sold out his interest in this tannery in 1915, he made arrangements with the purchaser to distribute certain amounts of capital stock payable out of dividends to some of the executives including Allen, and the latter received stock worth $500,000 without paying a dollar for it. Allen became the controlling factor in the local bank which the respondent had organized. The respondent in 1911 formed a partnership with one Sears for the purpose of taking over and managing manufacturing businesses. The firm needed money for two of its subsidiaries for the purchase of raw materials the price of which had greatly increased on account of the first World War. The terms of the loan were agreed upon between the firm and the defendants named in the Willett case. Willett had entrusted the affairs of the firm to a committee comprising Allen and two others. It was on the advice of Allen that he executed the release that discharged the defendants in that action. The respondent frequently referred to this action of Allen as a betrayal of a trust. Allen had purchased for $3,000 three notes of Norwood Housing Association, each for $100,000, which the respondent had indorsed. A suit brought against Allen was settled and he surrendered the notes. A fourth note similar to the other three and held by a bank was eventually discharged upon the payment of approximately its face amount. After the adverse decision in the Willett case, the respondent entertained bitter feelings against Allen which seemed to increase as time went on. He opposed Allen's selection as a trustee of one of our large universities. He objected to the elimination in its official publication of a part of a speech, made at the dedication of one of its buildings, containing a commendatory reference to the respondent. He accused his father-in-law and his daughter of being influenced by Allen. He warned his wife to beware of such influence. He charged Allen, who he asserted was the largest stockholder of a trust company having various branches in Norfolk County, with being responsible for the failure, for more than thirty years, of the respondent to obtain adequate funds to develop his housing projects. The respondent hired experts to determine the amount of water withdrawn by the tannery and accused Allen of withdrawing excessive amounts for the purpose of interfering with the development of the land...