William Crozier v. Fried Krupp Aktiengesellschaft

Decision Date08 April 1912
Docket NumberNo. 8,8
Citation224 U.S. 290,32 S.Ct. 488,56 L.Ed. 771
PartiesWILLIAM CROZIER, Petitioner, v. FRIED. KRUPP AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Attorney General Wickersham and Mr. Stuart McNamara, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, for petitioner.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 291-295 intentionally omitted] Mr. William A. Jenner for respondent.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 295-297 intentionally omitted] Mr. Chief Justice White delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant, a corporation organized under the laws of the German Empire, commenced this suit on June 8, 1907, in the supreme court of the District of Columbia. Relief was sought because of alleged infringements of three described letters patent of the United States, originally issued in the name of Fried. Krupp and assigned to the corporation. Two of the patents, numbered 722,724 and 722,725, were granted in 1903, and the third, issued in 1905, was numbered 791,347. The patents related to improvements in guns and gun carriages. The petitioner here, William Crozier, was named as sole defendant in the bill.

After full averments as to the issue of the patents and the assignments by which the plaintiff had become the owner thereof, it was charged that the defendant Crozier, well knowing of the existence of the patents, 'in violation and infringement of said letters patent and of the exclusive rights granted and secured under said letters patent . . . since the 17th day of March 1903, and within the period of six (6) years prior to the filing of this bill of complaint, in the city of Bridgeport, state of Connecticut, and in the Watervliet Arsenal in the state of New York, and in the Rock Island Arsenal in the state of Illinois, . . . and elsewhere in the United States,' has 'made and used, or caused to be made and used, is now making and causing to be made and used, and threatens and intends to continue to make or cause to be made, and to use and cause to be used,' guns and recoil-brake apparatus and guns and gun carriages embodying the inventions owned by the complainant, in violation of the rights secured by the patents.

The prayer was for a preliminary and a permanent writ enjoining the defendant, 'his agents and employees, from making or using or causing to be made or used any guns or gun carriages or other devices which shall contain or employ the inventions or any of the inventions covered and secured by said letters patent or any of said letters patent.' There was also a prayer that the defendant 'may be compelled to account for and pay over to your orator all the profits which the defendant has or had derived from any making or using of any gun or any specimen or device covered and secured by said letters patent or any of said letters patent, and that also the defendant be decreed to pay all damages which your orator has incurred or shall incur upon account of defendant's infringement of any of said letters patent, with such increase thereof as shall be meet. . . . '

A stipulation was filed in the cause, in which, while expressly reserving the right of the defendant 'to demur or otherwise plead to the bill of complaint, because of lack of jurisdiction on any ground,' it was agreed as follows:

'The complainant stipulates that no pecuniary benefit has accrued to the defendant, William Crozier, by reason of the acts set forth in the bill, and complainant waives any claim against said defendant for an accounting of the profits or for damages, if any, arising out of or suffered by the complainant by reason of the acts and things set forth in the bill. Defendant stipulates and agrees that the government of the United States of America and the Ordnance Department of said government have manufactured, are now manufacturing, and intend to continue the manufacture and use, or to cause to be manufactured for their use, field guns and carriages made after the so-called 'Model of 1902' referred to in the bill of complaint, the claim or claims of complainant being in nowise admitted; that the defendant, William Crozier, sued in this suit, is an officer in the United States Army and Chief of the Ordnance of the United States Army, and is the officer in the service of the United States who directs and is in charge of such manufacture of said field guns and carriages for the United States. The complainant concedes that the defendant, William Crozier, is such officer. The defendant further stipulates and agrees that the complainant is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Empire of Germany and a citizen of said Empire and a subject of the Emperor of Germany.

'Further, complainant desires to amend its bill in certain particulars, and the defendant desires to consent thereto. It is therefore stipulated that the bill of complaint herein be amended to read as follows: In paragraph 32 of said bill shall be eliminated and expunged the words 'a preliminary and also,' and also the words 'or using' and the words 'or used,' so that the said 32d paragraph of said bill of complaint shall, when so amended, read as follows:

"And your orator therefore prays your honors to grant unto your orator a permanent writ of injunction issuing out of and under the seal of this honorable court, directed to the said defendant, William Crozier, and strictly enjoining him, his agents and employees, from making or causing to be made any guns or gun carriages or other devices which shall contain or employ the inventions or any of the inventions covered and secured by said letters patent or any of said letters patent.'

'Paragraph 33 of said bill of complaint shall be amended so as to eliminate and expunge from said paragraph the following words:

"by a decree of this court may be compelled to account for and pay over to your orator all the profits which the defendant has or had derived from any making or using of any gun or any specimen or device covered and secured by said letters patent or any of said letters patent, and that also the defendant be decreed to pay all damages which your orator has incurred or shall incur upon account of defendant's infringement of any of such letters patent, with such increase thereof as shall seem meet, and that also the defendant.'

'So that the paragraph marked 33, when so amended, shall read as follows:

"And your orator further prays that the defendant be decreed to pay the costs of this suit, and that your orator may have such other and further relief as the equity of the cause or the statutes of the United States may require and to this court may seem just."

The defendant demurred to the amended bill on various grounds, all of which, in substance, challenged the jurisdiction of the court over the cause on the ground that the suit was really against the United States.

The demurrer was sustained and the bill dismissed. The court of appeals reversed, and remanded the cause for further proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion. 32 App. D. C. 1, L.R.A.(N.S.) ——, 15 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 1108.

The court held that there was a broad distinction between interfering by injunction with the use by the United States of its property and the granting of a writ of injunction for the purpose of preventing the wrongful taking of private property, even although the individual who was enjoined from such taking was an officer of the government, and although the purpose of the proposed taking was to appropriate the private property when taken to a governmental purpose. The cases of Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10, 40 L. ed. 599, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 443, and International Postal Supply Co. v. Bruce, 194 U. S. 601, 48 L. ed. 1134, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 820, were analyzed and held to be apposite solely to the first proposition; that is, the want of authority to interfere with the property of the United States used for a governmental purpose. The court said:

'It will thus be seen that in the Belknap and Bruce Cases the subject-matter involved was property of the United States, and that therefore the United States was necessarily a party. In the present case it is not sought to disturb the United States in the possession and use of the guns already manufactured. The court is not asked to deal with property of the United States. The plaintiff simply asks that an officer of the United States be restrained from invading rights granted by the government itself. The acts complained of are not only not sanctioned by any law, but are inconsistent with the patent laws of the United States.'

A writ of certiorari was thereupon allowed.

The arguments at bar ultimately considered but affirm on the one hand and deny on the other the ground of distinction upon which the court below placed its ruling and by which the decisions in Belknap v. Schild and International Postal Supply Co. v. Bruce were held to be distinguishable from the case in hand, and therefore not to be controlling. Thus the government insists that although, under the stipulation and the bill as amended, it resulted that no damages were sought in respect to use by the government of the patented inventions, and no interference of any kind was asked with property belonging to the government, nevertheless the suit was against the United States, because the defendant was conceded to be an officer of the Army of the United States, engaged in the duty of making or causing to be made guns or gun carriages for the Army of the United States. This, it is contended, is demonstrated to be the case by considering that the right to enjoin the officer of the United States, which the court below upheld, virtually asserts the existence of a judicial power to close every arsenal of the United States. On the other hand, the plaintiff insists that the act of the officer in wrongfully attempting to take its property cannot be assumed to be a governmental act, but must be treated as an individual wrong which the courts have the authority to prevent. The exertion of the power to enjoin a...

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