William James Sons Co. v. Hutchinson

Decision Date14 January 1914
Citation80 S.E. 768,73 W.Va. 488
PartiesWILLIAM JAMES SONS CO. v. HUTCHINSON ET AL.
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court

Submitted January 6, 1914.

Syllabus by the Court.

For a plaintiff in ejectment to rely on common source of title, it must appear that the defendant's claim of title somewhere connects with a party under whom the plaintiff claims.

The mere execution of a lease does not estop the lessee from denying the title of the lessor. The estoppel only arises by possession under the lease.

One through whom a plaintiff in ejectment derives his title is incompetent to testify on the trial of the action against the defendant grantee of a person then deceased, in regard to a personal transaction with the deceased in his life time.

Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.

Plaintiff in ejectment must stand on his own title, and not on the weakness of that of his adversary.

Where plaintiff in ejectment relied on a common source of title, or estoppel of defendant to deny his title, defendant's evidence to show failure of plaintiff's title back of the alleged common source, and plaintiff's evidence in rebuttal thereof being immaterial, was improperly admitted.

The word "assignee," as used in Code 1906, c. 130, § 23, limiting the right of a person to testify against the assignee of a deceased person with whom he has had the personal transaction as to which he proposed to testify includes a "grantee."

Error to Circuit Court, Raleigh County.

Action by the William James Sons Company against L. H. Hutchinson and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error. Reversed and remanded.

A. A Lilly, of Charleston, J. H. Hatcher, of Beckley, and Dillon & Nuckolls, of Fayetteville, for plaintiffs in error.

McCreery & Patterson, of Beckley, and T. N. Read, of Hinton, for defendant in error.

ROBINSON J.

In this action of ejectment, plaintiff, a corporation, sought to recover the land in controversy without tracing its title to the Commonwealth, by showing that defendants, each in possession of a separate parcel of the land, claimed title from a source common to that of plaintiff, and further, as an alternative, by showing that defendants held in subordination to the title of plaintiff and were estopped to deny that title. Upon writ of error to a judgment for plaintiff through the verdict of a jury, defendants claim that a common source of title was not proved, that no relation estopping them to deny plaintiff's title was established, that incompetent testimony was admitted, and that the jury were misdirected. An examination of the record leads to the conclusion that plaintiff did not make out a case entitling it to recover, and that there are other errors warranting a reversal of the judgment. As briefly as may be we shall discuss the pertinent phases of the case.

Plaintiff proved title from one Granger, but its evidence does not connect defendants' claims of title with Granger or with any other source common to plaintiff. It appears that defendants claim from Alfred Beckley, through possession under a written contract of sale made by him to James A. Hutchinson in 1873. There is parol testimony that Beckley was an agent of Granger for the sale of lands. Yet the written contract of sale from Beckley, back to which run the claims of defendants to the land, evidences nothing but a sale by him in his own behalf. For all it shows, Beckley claimed the land as his own, and contracted to sell the same as his individually. There is not a word in the record to show that Beckley made this particular sale of land for Granger. No authority for Beckley to sell for Granger the particular land now in controversy is shown. Plaintiff only proved that defendants' claims of title arose from Beckley, not Granger.

The Granger title passed to Azel Ford. At that time James A. Hutchinson was in possession of the land under the contract from Beckley, and had been in such possession for many years. Ford went to Hutchinson for an adjustment of their respective claims to the land. He made a deed to Hutchinson for a part of the land, 126 acres, describing the same therein by metes and bounds. Plaintiff at the trial introduced a writing dated soon after the date of the deed, whereby Ford leased to Hutchinson all the residue of the land, together with testimony tending to prove that the lease was agreed upon contemporaneously with the conveyance by the deed. The lease was dated April 28, 1890, and was conditioned to expire April 1, 1892, with right to Hutchinson to hold one year more if not notified to quit at the expiration date. It recited that for the use and occupation of the land Hutchinson was to take good care of the premises. Defendants introduced evidence tending to prove the signature of Hutchinson to the lease to be a forgery. For the purposes of present consideration, the lease may be considered as genuine. The jury so found. The lease was for "all that parcel of land containing 213 acres upon which one of the sons and a son-in-law of the said Hutchinson now reside." This is the land now in controversy. Plaintiff maintains that since defendants claim under James A. Hutchinson this lease estops them to deny the title of Ford under whom plaintiff claims. The lease is undoubtedly evidence of an admission of Ford's title on the part of Hutchinson. But simply because it is that it does not necessarily operate to estop Hutchinson, or defendants holding under him, from denying and contesting the title of Ford and those who hold under him.

No possession by James A. Hutchinson...

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