William M. Rader v. Don Carroll
| Decision Date | 21 December 1992 |
| Docket Number | CA92-06-011,92-LW-6079 |
| Parties | WILLIAM M. RADER, Plaintiff-Appellant v. DON CARROLL, et al., Defendants-Appellees CASE |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Landen and Eagle, Thomas G. Eagle, 3737 South Dixie Highway Franklin, Ohio 45005, for plaintiff-appellant.
Roderer Zimmers & Leppla, Paul B. Roderer, 1600 First National Plaza Dayton, Ohio 45402, for defendant-appellee, Allstate Insurance Company.
This case originated with the filing of a civil suit by plaintiff-appellants William M. Rader, for damages in the Preble County Court of Common Pleas. The suit was filed as a result of a vehicular accident between Rader and defendant-appellee, Don Carroll. Rader sustained a fractured left wrist as well as various minor injuries. A trial ensued and judgment was entered against Carroll in the amount of $200,000 on November 16, 1990. This court subsequently affirmed the jury verdict on January 27, 1992. At the time of the vehicular accident, Carroll was insured by an automobile liability insurance policy with defendant-appellee, Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate"), which provided coverage limits of $50,000 for bodily injury liability per person and $100,000 for bodily injury liability per occurrence.
By letter dated February 5, 1991, Allstate extended to Rader an offer to pay "the policy limit of $50,000, plus proper interest from the date of the judgment." However attached to the letter was a condition that "this [offer] is being tendered for a full release of Donald Carroll and Allstate Insurance Company." Allstate contends that this offer constituted a formal offer as contemplated by the terms of the policy. Counsel for Rader rejected the offer, contending that the condition of having Rader release all claims against Carroll in exchange for the insurance proceeds was inappropriate and legally unsupportable.
After this court's decision on January 27, 1992 affirming the November 16, 1990 jury verdict, Allstate extended a second offer to Rader. In its February 3, 1992 letter to Rader, Allstate reiterated its belief that the February 5, 1991 offer constituted the formal offer contemplated by the terms of the policy. The February 3 letter provided that Allstate would pay Rader $50,000 plus interest at ten percent per annum from the date of judgment to February 8, 1991 (allowing three days mailing time), as well as appropriate court costs. Once again, the offer was conditioned upon Rader's willingness to execute a full release in favor of All- state for any future claims or liability pertaining to the action, excluding the issue of prejudgment interest that was pending with this court at that time. Allstate, however, did not request or require that Rader sign a release in favor of Carroll. Rader refused Allstate's offer. Rader maintained that he would not accept any payments that were conditioned upon releasing any party from all present and future claims and liability.
As a result of the impasse, Allstate moved for summary judgment on April 9, 1992. Allstate argued that since there were no genuine issues of material fact with respect to its willingness to pay the proceeds of its insurance policy to Rader, it was entitled to a final judgment in the civil suit filed by Rader. On April 17, 1992, Rader responded with his own motion for summary judgment and a memoranda in opposition to Allstate's motion for summary judgment. Rader submitted that Allstate's own insurance policy requires Allstate to pay interest from the date of judgment to the date such payment is formally and unconditionally offered or deposited with the court. Thus, Rader argued that Allstate's obligation to pay interest in this action did not stop upon the conditional offer of payment that was made by Allstate in 1991 and 1992. Moreover, Rader insisted that the interest accrued on the entire $200,000 judgment and not merely on the $50,000 policy limitation.
In a decision rendered May 11, 1992, the trial court held that the language found in Allstate's insurance policy clearly and unambiguously provides that Allstate's post-judgment interest liability is to be limited to its limits of liability ($50,000) and not on the judgment amount ($200,000). The court also determined that the policy language tolls the running of interest when an insurer makes a formal offer that is based upon reasonable con-ditions. The court held that Allstate's letter of February 3, 1992 constituted a formal offer (an offer that no longer required Rader to release Carroll from liability), and that post-judgment interest was tolled as of that date.[1] Accordingly, the court ordered Allstate to pay Rader $50,000 plus interest at ten percent from the date of judgment to February 3, 1992. Upon said payment, the court also ordered Rader to tender a release releasing Allstate from all present and future claims and liability pertaining to the accident in question. On June 8, 1992, Allstate deposited the sum of $56,082.30 with the clerk of courts. The payment included interest from the judgment date (November 16, 1990) to February 3, 1992, as mandated by the trial court's decision and entry of May 11, 1992.
From that decision, Rader has filed this timely appeal asserting that the trial court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment. Rader raises two issues in his sole assignment of error. First, Rader contends that the trial court erred in holding that Allstate's offer to Rader on February 3, 1992, tolled the accruing of interest that it had to pay on the $50,000 judgment. Rader argues that the running of interest on the judgment should not have been tolled because Allstate neither made an unconditional offer nor did Allstate tender payment of the judgment. Rader submits that such action was required by Allstate's insurance policy.
The policy in question provides that Allstate will pay for:
Interest accruing on damages awarded, until such time as we [Allstate] have paid, formally offered, or deposited in court the amount for which we [Allstate] are liable under this policy. Interest will be paid only on damages which do not exceed our [Allstate's] limits of liability.
Pursuant to the language found in the insurance policy, Allstate had three options in which to toll the running of post-judgment interest -- tender of payment to Rader, tender of payment to the court or a formal offer to Rader.
It is undisputed that tender of payment was not made to the court until June 8, 1992, some four months after its second offer was made to Rader. Thus, the issue before us is whether or not the February 3, 1992 offer constituted a formal offer. If so, the offer would have tolled the running of interest on the judgment rendered...
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