William T., Matter of

• Decision Date: 20 April 1992
• Citation: 582 N.Y.S.2d 759,182 A.D.2d 766
• Parties: In the Matter of WILLIAM T. (Anonymous), Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 759

582 N.Y.S.2d 759

182 A.D.2d 766

In the Matter of WILLIAM T. (Anonymous), Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Second Department.

April 20, 1992.

Bertram S. Futterman, Levittown, for appellant.

Robert W. Schmidt, County Atty., Mineola (Gerald R. Podlesak, of counsel), for respondent.

Before SULLIVAN, J.P., and LAWRENCE, EIBER and PIZZUTO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Nassau County (Medowar, J.), entered November 30, 1989, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court, dated June 27, 1989, made after a hearing, finding that the appellant had committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of sexual abuse in the second degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him on probation for a period of two years. The appeal brings up for review the fact-finding order dated June 27, 1989.

ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the petitioner (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The complainant's hearing testimony was generally logical and consistent and sufficed to establish the appellant's commission of acts which constituted the elements of the crime of sexual abuse in the second degree (see, Penal Law § 130.60[2]. With respect to the appellant's challenge to the credibility of the complainant's testimony, we note that the resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the trier of fact, which saw and heard the witnesses (see, People v. Gaimari, 176 N.Y. 84, 94, 68 N.E. 112). "Since this case was tried before a court without a jury, the greatest respect must be accorded the determination of the hearing court in assessing the credibility of [the witnesses] and resolving disputed questions of fact (see, Matter of Jamal V., 159 A.D.2d 507 ; Matter of Angel R., 134 A.D.2d 265, 266 . The decision of the Family Court is accorded the same weight as that given to a jury verdict (see, People v. Carter, 63 N.Y.2d 530 [483 N.Y.S.2d 654, 473 N.E.2d 6]; Matter of Michael D., 109 A.D.2d 633 , affd 66 N.Y.2d 843 [498 N.Y.S.2d 365, 489 N.E.2d 252]" (Matter of Bernard J., 171 A.D.2d 794, 567 N.Y.S.2d 608).

We discern no basis in the record to disturb the Family Court's determination that the complainant's testimony was credible. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the finding of guilt was not against the weight of the credible evidence (see, CPL 470.15[5].

With respect to the appellant's contention that the trial court erred in permitting the use of leading and suggestive questions during the...