William Taylor v. United States No 238 United States v. Neil Macdonald No 404

• Decision Date: 18 November 1907
• Docket Number: 404,Nos. 238,s. 238
• Citation: 28 S.Ct. 53,52 L.Ed. 130,207 U.S. 120
• Parties: WILLIAM F. D. TAYLOR, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES. NO 238. UNITED STATES, Plff. in Err., v. NEIL MACDONALD. NO 404
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

207 U.S. 120

28 S.Ct. 53

52 L.Ed. 130

WILLIAM F. D. TAYLOR, Petitioner,

v UNITED STATES.

NO 238.

UNITED STATES, Plff. in Err.,

v. NEIL MACDONALD.

NO 404.

Nos. 238, 404.

Argued October 24, 25, 1907.

Decided November 18, 1907.

Messrs. Lucius H. Beers and William G. Choate for petitioner in No. 238.

Assistant Attorney General Cooley for the United States.

Assistant Attorney General Cooley and Attorney General Bonaparte for plaintiff in error in No. 404.

[Argument of Counsel from page 121 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Harrington Putnam and Rouse, Grant, & Grant for defendant in error.

[Argument of Counsel from page 122 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:

The first of these cases comes up on certiorari to review a judgment of the circuit court of appeals for the second circuit, affirming a conviction of the petitioner under the immigration act of March 3, 1903, chap. 1012, § 18, 32 Stat. at L. 1213, 1217. That section makes it the duty of any officer in charge of any

Sec. 18. That it shall be the duty of the owners, officers, and agents of any vessel bringing an alien to the United States to adopt due precautions to prevent the landing of any such alien from such vessel at any time or place other than that designated by the immigration officers, and any such owner, officer, agent, or person in charge of such vessel, who shall land or permit to land, any alien at any time or place other than that designated by the immigration officers, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, on conviction, be punished by a fine for each alien so permitted to land of not less than one hundred nor more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment, and every such alien so landed shall be deemed to be unlawfully in the United States and shall be deported, as provided by law vessel bringing an alien to the United States to adopt due precautions to prevent the landing of such alien at any time or place other than that designated by the immigration officers, and punishes him if he lands or permits to land any alien at any other time or place. The indictment was for wilfully permitting an alien to land at another place. The evidence was that the defendant was master of the Cunard Steamship Slavonia, that the alien was an Austrian sailor who shipped as a cook at Fiume, Hungary, for the round trip, not to be paid off until he returned, and that on the evening of the day of arrival at New York, after he had reported his work finished, he went ashore intending to come back, but changed his mind. He did not formally ask leave to go, but leave habitually was given and no additional precautions were taken when leave was asked. The judge was requested to direct a verdict for the defendant and to instruct the jury that, if the sailor intended to return when he left the ship, they must acquit, etc.; but he left it to the jury to say whether the defendant had used reasonable precautions, adverting to the fact that there were other desertions, and emphasizing the failure to enforce a rule requiring the men to ask leave to go ashore. Exceptions were taken, but the circuit court of appeals sustained the judgment, as we have said. 152 Fed. 1.

We assume for purposes of decision that one who makes it possible for an alien to land, by omitting due precautions to prevent it, permits him to land within the meaning of the penal clause in § 18. But we are of opinion that the section does not apply to the ordinary case of a sailor deserting while on shore leave, and that therefore the judgment must be reversed. We are led to this opinion by what seems to us the literal meaning of the section and also by the construction that would be almost necessary if the literal meaning seemed to us less plain.

The reasoning is not long. The phrase which qualifies the whole section is, 'bringing an alien to the United States.' It is only 'such' officers of 'such' vessels that are punished. 'Bringing to the United States,' taken leterally and nicely means, as a similar pharase in § 8 plainly means, transporting with intent to leave in the United States and for the sake of transport,—not transporting with intent to carry back, and merely as incident to employment on the instrument of transport. So again, leterally, the later words 'to land' mean to go ashore. To avoid certain inconveniences the goverment and the courts below say that sailors do not land unless they permanently leave the ship. But the single word is used for all cases and must mean the same thing for all, for sailors and other aliens. It hardly can be supposed that a master would be held justified under this section for allowing a leper to wander through the streets of New York on the ground that, as he expected the passenger to return and his expectations had been fulfilled, he could not...