Williams-Garrett v. Murphy

• Decision Date: 19 July 2000
• Docket Number: No. 4:99-1010-23.,4:99-1010-23.
• Citation: 106 F.Supp.2d 834
• Parties: Lorraine WILLIAMS-GARRETT, Plaintiff, v. Lynn MURPHY, individually and d/b/a Centurion Financial Services, Ltd., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

106 F.Supp.2d 834

Lorraine WILLIAMS-GARRETT, Plaintiff, v. Lynn MURPHY, individually and d/b/a Centurion Financial Services, Ltd., Defendant.

No. 4:99-1010-23.

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Florence Division.

July 19, 2000.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Robert T. King, Wilcox, Buyck & Williams, Florence, SC, for plaintiff.

Jefferson Boone Aiken, III, Florence, SC, for defendant.

ORDER

DUFFY, District Judge.

Plaintiff, a ninety-year-old woman, brings claims against defendant, a coin dealer, relating to defendant's possession of plaintiff's 914 $20 St. Gaudens gold coins. Both parties have moved for summary judgment. The defendant's motion is granted in part, and denied in part. Plaintiff's motion is denied. All claims, with the exception of the claim for breach of fiduciary duty, remain for resolution at trial.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Lorraine Williams-Garrett, was born on September 11, 1909. Several years ago, Ms. Williams-Garrett began collecting coins as a hobby and for investment purposes. She considered herself an amateur collector, and by no means compared her knowledge of the coins and precious metals market to that of a professional. She placed all of the coins she purchased in safe-deposit boxes at local banks. She had never sold or traded any of her coins, save her first purchase of gold coins which was made shortly after it became legal to buy gold coins. Her only coin dealings up until the fall of 1998 had been purchases.

Defendant, Lynn Murphy, is a coin dealer now located in North Carolina. Beginning sometime in 1995, Mr. Murphy began contacting Ms. Williams-Garrett regarding the purchase of coins. Mr. Murphy obtained her name from a customer list which he had purchased from other dealers, and first visited her in 1996 in Mullins, South Carolina. Ms. Williams-Garrett took Mr. Murphy and his girlfriend, who had accompanied him on his trip with the ultimate destination of Charleston, to church for a chicken-bog lunch. After lunch, Ms. Williams-Garrett purchased some coins from Mr. Murphy. She did, at least on one occasion, seek Mr. Murphy's advice regarding a purchase that she had made, and Mr. Murphy, at least on one occasion, invited Ms. Williams-Garrett to consult with him before making any further purchases.

Some time prior to June of 1998, Ms. Williams-Garrett sold a significant amount of stock in a local corporation, and purchased 914 $20 St. Gaudens gold coins from International Rarities Group for $732,000.00. As was her custom, she placed those coins in her safe-deposit boxes. She viewed the transaction as one which would provide her future security; moreover, she had heard much ado about the impending Y2K crisis, and heeded, reasonably or unreasonably, those warnings.

Mr. Murphy, by this time, had given his customer list to two individuals in California, Bradford Kaye and Rahmaan Robertson (aka Eric Fontaine).¹ Kaye and Robertson were to contact Mr. Murphy's clients to inquire about possible sales, and then conduct any such sales through Mr. Murphy. The three agreed to evenly split any commission.

According to Mr. Murphy, Kaye or Robertson contacted Ms. Williams-Garrett and learned that she had recently purchased a number of $20 St. Gaudens coins. They allegedly discussed with her the possibility of trading the coins she had recently purchased for other more valuable coins. On November 19, 1998, Mr. Murphy drove to Mullins, South Carolina to meet with Ms. Williams-Garrett. Mr. Murphy drove Ms. Williams-Garrett to the bank, and they removed the 914 $20 St. Gaudens coins from her safe-deposit box. They then drove back to Ms. Williams-Garrett's home.

At this point, Mr. Murphy and Ms. Williams-Garrett's accounts of what transpired diverge. Ms. Williams-Garrett claims that she only allowed Mr. Murphy to bring the coins back to her house so that he could examine them more closely. She denies ever having discussed him taking or trading the coins. However, according to Ms. Williams-Garrett, Mr. Murphy never brought the coins inside her home to do that examination. Instead, she claims that once they pulled into her driveway, she got out of the car and began walking to her door. Then, Mr. Murphy drove away with the coins still in the backseat.

Mr. Murphy tells a different story. He asserts that both he and Ms. Williams-Garrett discussed his trading the coins, which was the reason they went to the bank to retrieve them. After having lunch together, they drove to the bank and removed the coins from the safe-deposit box. Mr. Murphy claims that he promised to come back in a few days with some coins in trade and that Ms. Williams-Garrett agreed to the transaction because that was what she wanted to do.

It is undisputed that Ms. Williams-Garrett did not notify anyone that Mr. Murphy had absconded with her coins. In deposition, she explained that she did not notify anyone because she thought Mr. Murphy would be contacting her soon.

In the days after obtaining the coins, Mr. Murphy contacted U.S. Coins in Houston, Texas for the purpose of trading the coins for other allegedly more valuable coins. It appears that Mr. Murphy traded approximately 555 of the coins. Additionally, Mr. Murphy obtained some Russian Roubles from National Gold Exchange, allegedly, to complete the deal. In total, it appears that Mr. Murphy valued Ms. Williams-Garrett' 914 $20 St. Gaudens gold coins at approximately $537,000, and went out and purchased/traded rarer coins totaling that value. However, Ms. Williams-Garrett maintains that Mr. Murphy overstated the value of the coins which he brought her in return.

On two visits to Mullins, South Carolina, November 30, 1998 and December 21, 1998, Mr. Murphy delivered the coins he obtained from U.S. Coins and National Gold Exchange to Ms. Williams-Garrett. Ms. Williams-Garrett had no recollection of meeting with Mr. Murphy on either of these dates at the time of her deposition. However, according to the bank records and Mr. Murphy, it appears that on the November 30, 1998 visit, Mr. Murphy, Ms. Williams-Garrett and her nephew and lawyer, Reynolds Williams, went to lunch and then the three of them traveled to the bank to place the coins Mr. Murphy had brought with him in the safe-deposit box. Additionally, Ms. Williams-Garrett closed two of her safe-deposit boxes at that time.

On December 22, 1998, Mr. Murphy returned to Ms. Williams-Garrett's home. Both went again to the bank where Ms. Williams-Garrett opened her safe-deposit box and deposited the coins brought to her that day by Mr. Murphy.

Despite the lack of Ms. Williams-Garrett's recollection, it appears that in January of 1999, Ms. Williams-Garrett was contacted by Kaye or Robertson regarding another proposed sale. Ms. William-Garrett agreed to purchase coins from Mr. Murphy at a price of $69,500. Mr. Murphy paid only $48,500 for those coins. On January 4, 1999, Ms. Williams-Garrett wrote a check for $72,500, which was canceled for insufficient funds. She, thereafter, forwarded $69,500 in the form of a cashier's check.

It is undisputed that it was not until January 15, 1999 that Ms. Williams-Garrett received anything in writing pertaining to the coins. After receiving the January 15, 1999 letter and invoices, Ms. Williams-Garrett asked Mr. Williams to assist her because she was unsure of what had transpired and felt unable to handle the matter. After examining the coins in Ms. Williams-Garrett's safe-deposit box on January 22, 1999, Mr. Williams wrote to Mr. Murphy and informed him that Ms. Williams-Garrett had not agreed to the trade, that Ms. Williams-Garrett was rejecting any proposed trade, and that Ms. Williams-Garrett wished to have her coins returned. Mr. Williams informed Mr. Murphy that Ms. Williams-Garrett was safely storing the coins in her safe-deposit box, and was ready, willing and able to return them to him. Mr. Murphy maintained that the trade was a completed transaction, and that he was not willing to return the 914 $20 St. Gaudens-coins.

Furthermore, the parties dispute the state of Ms. Williams-Garrett physical and mental health at the time all of these "transactions" took place.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

To grant a motion for summary judgment, this court must find that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The judge is not to weigh the evidence, but rather to determine if there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If no material factual disputes remain, then summary judgment should be granted against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which the party bears the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). All evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir.1990). "[W]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, disposition by summary judgment is appropriate." Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 v. Centra, Inc., 947 F.2d 115, 119 (4th Cir.1991). "[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The "obligation of the non-moving party is `particularly strong when the non-moving party bears the burden of proof.'" Hughes v. Bedsole, 48 F.3d 1376, 1381 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 870, 116 S.Ct. 190, 133 L.Ed.2d 126 (1995) (quoting Pachaly v. City of Lynchburg, 897 F.2d 723, 725 (4th Cir.1990)). Summary judgment is not "a disfavored...