Williams v. Arkansas County Courthouse Improvement District

• Decision Date: 08 May 1922
• Docket Number: 351
• Citation: 240 S.W. 725,153 Ark. 469
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. ARKANSAS COUNTY COURTHOUSE IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

240 S.W. 725

153 Ark. 469

WILLIAMS v. ARKANSAS COUNTY COURTHOUSE IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT

No. 351

Supreme Court of Arkansas

May 8, 1922

Appeal from Arkansas Chancery Court, Northern District; John M Elliott, Chancellor; reversed.

Decree reversed and cause remanded.

J E. Ray, for appellants.

Act 442 is unconstitutional in that it gives immunity from taxation to the people of the Southern District by creating no lien on their property, for an undertaking which is strictly a county purpose. Art. 2, sec. 18, Const. The act also is in violation of art. 1, sec. 10, because it impairs the obligation of contracts, in that it provides for a first lien on the property of the Northern District, whereas such a lien was created by Acts 1919, vol. 1, p. 1071, creating a road district. See also 102 U.S. 203. The act is also in violation of art. 26, sec. 6, Constitution, in that there is no uniformity of taxation in the two districts. 57 Ark. 555; 48 Ark. 370. It violates art. 7, sec. 30, because it usurps the jurisdiction of the county court; and art. 12, sec. 5 because it makes the county loan its credit to an improvement district; and further it invades the jurisdiction of the county court. 92 Ark. 53.

John L. Ingram, Frauenthal & Johnson, for appellees.

The lands of the district are especially benefited and enhanced in value and are the subject of an improvement district for the purpose mentioned. The creation of the district by the Legislature was within its province. 71 Ark. 478; 80 Ark 333; 141 Ark. 612; 81 Ark. 562; 103 Ark. 127; 107 Ark. 285; 146 Ark. 288; 147 Ark. 112.

The act does not invade the jurisdiction of the county court. 104 Ark. 425; 145 Ark. 279; 138 Ark. 549; 139 Ark. 153; Id. 595; 142 Ark. 73; Id. 439; 143 Ark. 228; 144 Ark. 632.

The legislative determination of an improvement as a local one is conclusive, unless arbitrary and unfounded in reason, and is not subject to judicial interference if there is only a difference of opinion as to the wisdom or expediency of making the improvement. 130 Ark. 507; 131 Ark. 59. See also 23 A. S. R. 742; 50 Mich. 7; 147 Ind. 476 and cases cited; 153 Ind. 204; 19 Pa. 258.

HART J. MCCULLOCH, C. J., dissenting.

OPINION

HART, J.

B. L. Williams and other owners of real property in the Northern District of Arkansas County, Ark., filed their complaint against the board of commissioners of Arkansas County Courthouse Improvement District to restrain the issue of bonds and other action providing for the erection of a courthouse at Stuggart, in said district and county, and the payment thereof by local assessments on the real property in said district.

The complainants urge that the district is illegal on several grounds, but the main reliance is that the erection of a county courthouse cannot be made the subject of a local improvement.

The chancery court sustained a demurrer to the bill. The plaintiffs declining to plead further, their bill was dismissed for want of equity, and they have appealed to this court.

Arkansas County was divided into two judicial districts known as the Northern and Southern Districts of Arkansas County. DeWitt was the county seat of the county and was named as the seat of justice for the Southern District. Stuttgart was named as the seat of justice for the Northern District. Acts of 1913, p. 192.

Act 442 of the Legislature of 1921 creates the Arkansas County Courthouse Improvement District. Special Acts of Arkansas, 1921, p. 914.

Sec. 3 provides that the district is formed for the purpose of purchasing a building site and constructing and equipping a building in the city of Stuttgart to be occupied by the officials of Arkansas County as a county courthouse.

Sec. 12 provides that the commissioners shall make an assessment of benefits of all the lands within the Northern District of Arkansas County for the purpose of making said improvement.

Sec. 14 provides that said assessment shall be a charge against the real property of said district for such an amount as may be necessary to complete the improvement and pay all the expenses of the district. Sec. 21 provides that in order to hasten the work the commissioners may borrow money, issue bonds, and pledge the assessment of benefits for the payment of the principal and interest.

Sec. 29 authorizes the commissioners and the county judge to enter into an agreement for the use and occupancy of the building by county officials. It provides that such rental shall not exceed two mills per annum of the assessed value of all the real and personal property in the county. The section further provides for setting aside two mills out of the county general tax for the payment of said rent, and that such tax shall be payable only in lawful money of the United States.

Under the act, the question arises whether the Northern District of Arkansas County can be organized into an improvement district for the purpose of erecting a courthouse for the use of said district.

Counsel for the commissioners of the district rely upon our cases holding that local improvement districts may be organized for the purpose of improving roads and building bridges and wharfs. Sallee v. Dalton, 138 Ark. 549, 213 S.W. 762, and cases cited; Shibley v. Ft. Smith & Van Buren District, 96 Ark. 410, 132 S.W. 444; Com'rs. of Broadway- Main Street Bridge Dist. v. Quapaw Club, 145 Ark. 279, 224 S.W. 622, and Solomon v. Wharf Imp. Dist. No. 1, 145 Ark. 126, 223 S.W. 385.

We do not think these cases are any authority for the organization of such a local improvement district as the one in question. The question of what shall be considered a local improvement is determined by the nature and character of the improvement itself. Of course every local improvement must be for a public and not for a mere private purpose. Moreover, local assessments are a species of taxation, and there must be some special or peculiar benefit to the property upon which the assessment of benefits is made. We have held that roads, bridges and wharfs may be the subjects of local improvements because the adjoining property will be especially and peculiarly benefited and that the benefit to the public is merely incidental. That the improvement will benefit adjoining property more than that at a distance is not conclusive as to the nature of the improvement. The primary purpose and effect of a local improvement must be to benefit the adjoining property, although it may incidentally benefit the public.

The definition in Crane v. Siloam Springs, 67 Ark. 30, 55 S.W. 955, is, "if we look for the technical or legal meaning of the phrase 'local improvement,' we find it to be a public improvement, which, although it may incidentally benefit the public at large, is made primarily for the accommodation and convenience of the inhabitants of a particular locality, and which is of such a nature as to confer a special benefit upon the real property adjoining or near the locality of the improvement."

The nature and character of the improvement in question shows that it is not a local improvement within the definition above given. This court has held that a county may be divided into judicial districts, but that the expense of maintaining two judicial districts in a county is necessarily a county expense, and that the revenue to pay it can be raised only by a county tax. The court further said that such a tax to be valid must be levied at a uniform rate upon all the taxable property of the county. Hutchinson v. Ozark Land Co., 57 Ark. 554, 22 S.W. 173.

Again, the court said that all the affairs of the two districts are concerns of the county, and that the expenses incurred in both, whether in the holding of courts or otherwise, constitute demands against the county. So it was held that the expense of maintaining two judicial districts in a county is a county expense.

Carrying out this idea in the case of Law v. Falls, 109 Ark. 395, 159 S.W. 1130, the court held that, a seat of justice having been established at Dardanelle and the courthouse having been destroyed by fire, the county court had the authority to direct the erection of a new building for the use of the courts of the district.

The Legislature of 1913 made the city of Stuttgart the seat of justice for the Northern District of Arkansas County. If the expense of holding the courts and otherwise maintaining two judicial districts in a county is a county expense, it would seem that it necessarily follows that the erection of a courthouse for the use of such district would also be a county expense. Of course the establishment of a seat of justice in a certain town adds to the material prosperity of the town and the surrounding country. This fact arises, however, because the seat of justice is established there and the kind and character of building to be used as a courthouse only incidentally adds to the value of the real property in the surrounding country. The establishment of a seat of justice is a governmental purpose, and the erection of a courthouse within which to carry it on also partakes of the same character.

In the case of building roads, bridges and wharfs, the primary object to be accomplished is the benefit of the adjoining property, and the benefit to the public is merely incidental. The establishment of a seat of justice and the erection of a courthouse within which to carry on governmental functions is essentially different. The primary object to be accomplished is to carry on the county government for the protection of the life, liberty, and property of the inhabitants, and the benefit to the property owners is merely incidental. Therefore the expense must be borne by the whole public and cannot be charged against the real property of a portion thereof.

In discussing what may be a local...