Williams v. Bank of Am.
| Decision Date | 06 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:12-cv-2513 JAM AC PS,2:12-cv-2513 JAM AC PS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | SANDRA E. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. BANK OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants. |
On May 1, 2013, the court held a hearing on defendants' January 2, 2013 motion to dismiss. Sandra E. Williams appeared in pro per. There were no appearances for defendants.1 On review of the motion and the documents filed in support and opposition, after hearing the arguments of plaintiff, and good cause appearing therefor, THE COURT FINDS AS FOLLOWS:
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is proceeding in this action on the original complaint filed October 9, 2012. The pleading is 118 pages long (with over 400 paragraphs) and has attached to it 1,239pages of exhibits. Plaintiff names as defendants "Bank of America Corporation, Bank of America, National Association, f/k/a; BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, f/k/a; Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP f/k/a/; Countrywide Home Loans Inc. f/k/a; Countrywide Financial Corporation f/k/a; Countrywide Mortgage Ventures LLC, f/k/a/; Countrywide Bank, FSB, f/k/a/; Treasury Bank National Association; SOL Homes, LLC; and any successors in interest; Does 1-1000." Compl. at 1.
While it is difficult to separate plaintiff's factual allegations from, inter alia, case citations, quotes, and discussion of the history of lending practices in the United States, it appears plaintiff's claims are directed to the origination and servicing of a $260,000 mortgage loan entered into on January 6, 2005 and secured by real property located at 1215 Pheasant Drive, Suisun City, CA 94585. See Defs.' Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN"), Ex. 1. Plaintiff's claims are also directed to the non-judicial foreclosure of the Subject Property, which occurred following the March 12, 2009 recording of a Notice of Default in the Solano County Recorder's Office. RJN, Ex. 4.
The Subject Property was sold at a Trustee's Sale on July 7, 2009. RJN, Ex. 7. On an unspecified date, defendants filed an unlawful detainer action in Solano County. Also on an unspecified date, plaintiff filed a bankruptcy petition.
Plaintiff premises jurisdiction in this court on the basis of her federal claims, which are brought pursuant to (1) the False Claims Act ("FCA"), 31 U.S.C. § 3729, (2) the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"), 12 U.S.C. § 1833a, (3) the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act ("SCRA"), 50 U.S.C. § 501 et seq., (4) the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause, (5) the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, (6) the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 -1692p, (7) the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a), and (8) the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1691, and (9) 42 U.S.C. § 1986.
On January 2, 2013, defendants Bank of America and Bank of America Corporation filed a motion to dismiss, to which defendant SOL Homes LLC filed a joinder. ECF Nos. 13, 21. Plaintiff opposes the motion.
The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. N. Star Int'l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). "Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff is required to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, a defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the court's ability to grant any relief on the plaintiff's claims, even if the plaintiff's allegations are true.
In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989).
Defendants ask the court to take judicial notice of documents accompanying the motion to dismiss. See RJN (ECF No. 14). The court may take notice of facts that are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1993). Facts subject to judicial notice may be considered by a court on a motion to dismiss. In re Russell, 76 F.3d 242, 244 (9th Cir. 1996). In actions arising from mortgage disputes, courts may take judicial notice of the deed of trust and other documents pertaining to the loan. Kelley v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1052-53 (N.D. Cal.2009). A court may also take "judicial notice of matters of public record outside the pleadings." Indemnity Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986). The court has examined each of the exhibits for which judicial notice is requested and finds that each of the exhibits is suitable for judicial notice as matters of public record outside of the pleadings. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).
Because the court's jurisdiction over this case hinges on the presence of an actionable federal claim, the court turns first to plaintiff's federal claims, which are reproduced here: (1) the False Claims Act ("FCA"), 31 U.S.C. § 3729, (2) the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"), 12 U.S.C. § 1833a, (3) the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act ("SCRA"), 50 U.S.C. § 501 et seq., (4) the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause, (5) the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, (6) the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 -1692p, (7) the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a), (8) the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1691, and (9) 42 U.S.C. § 1986.
The False Claims Act ("FCA") prohibits individuals from engaging in specified fraudulent activity, and makes persons who engage in such conduct liable to the United States government. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). Civil actions under the FCA may be brought either by the United States or as a qui tam action by a private individual, wherein the private individual sues on behalf of the government as well as the individual. See id. at § 3720(b)(1). Plaintiff's allegations, however, appear to be asserted in plaintiff's private capacity, against a private entity based on nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. Thus, plaintiff's claim does not fall within the scope of the FCA. This claim should be dismissed without leave to amend.
Congress enacted FIRREA following the saving and loan crisis of the 1980s togive the FDIC power to take all actions necessary to resolve problems posed by financial institutions in default. Benson v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir. 2012). FIRREA gives the FDIC authority to act as receiver of a failed institution to protect depositors and creditors. Id. The statute provides detailed procedures for the FDIC's consideration claims of claims against the receivership estate. Id. ()
FIRREA requires a plaintiff to exhaust its administrative remedies with the FDIC before the plaintiff can file certain claims in court. Benson, 673 F.3d at 1211. The statute reads, in pertinent part:
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D).
In Benson, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that FIRREA's jurisdictional bar apples to claims against institutions that purchased assets of failed institutions from the FDIC when the claims are based on the conduct of the failed institution. "FIRREA's jurisdictional bar applies to claims asserted against a purchasing bank when the claim is based on the conduct of the failed institution." 673 F.3d at 1214. The Benson court further explained that if a plaintiff's claims rely on the alleged wrongdoing of a failed institution, those claims "plainly relate 'to any act or omission' of 'a depository institution for which the FDIC has been appointed receiver,' " and therefore must be exhausted in administrative proceedings. Id. at 1215 (quoting 12 U.S.C.§ 1821(d)(13)(D)).
Initially, it is unclear whether there exists a private cause of action under FIRREA. See Hess v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2013 WL 791494, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 2013); U.S. v. Meisinger, 2011 WL 4526082, at *7 (C.D. Cal. 2011). In any event, it is evident that plaintiff's FIRREA claim fails for her failure to allege that she exhausted FIRREA's exhaustion requirements, that any of the defendants were ever in receipt of receivership, or that any of the defendants purchased a bank that was in receivership. At the hearing on defendants' motion, plaintiff was asked whether she exhausted FIRREA's exhaustion requirements by filing a claim with the FDIC. Plaintiff admits she did not. Accordingly, this claim must be dismissed with prejudice.
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