Williams v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga.

• Decision Date: 29 September 2022
• Docket Number: CV 120-100
• Parties: DR. LESLEY WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF GEORGIA d/b/a AUGUSTA UNIVERSITY, et. al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

DR. LESLEY WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF GEORGIA d/b/a AUGUSTA UNIVERSITY, et. al., Defendants.

No. CV 120-100

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Augusta Division

September 29, 2022

ORDER

J RANDAL HALL CHIEF JUDGE

Before the Court are three motions for summary judgment: one by Defendant Phillip Coule, M.D. ("Dr. Coule") (Doc 79); one by Augusta University Medical.Center ("AUMC")^[1] (Doc. 72); and one by Defendants Board of Regents of the University of Georgia ("BOR"), Dr Brooks Keel, Dr. Steffen Meiler, and Dr. Mary Arthur (collectively, the "State Defendants") (Doc. 104). For the reasons explained below, Defendants' motions are GRANTED, f

I. BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are outlined in the Court's July 7, 2021 Order granting several Defendants' motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. (Doc. 60.) All Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims remaining against them. (Docs. 72, 79, 104.) These include, for Dr. Coule:

• Count Four: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 equal protection claims;

• Count Seven: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due process claims;

• Count Eight: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fourth amendment claims;

• Count Five: libel; and

• Count Six: slander.

(Doc. 23; Doc. 113, at 4-5.) Plaintiff agrees. (Doc. 113, at 45.) For AUMC:

• Count One: Title IX Sex Discrimination;

• Count Two: Title IX Retaliation;

• Count Three: Violation of the Georgia Whistleblower Act, O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4;

• Count Five: libel;

• Count Six: slander;

• Count Nine: Disability Discrimination pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), Title II;

• Count Ten: ADA Title II Retaliation; • Count Eleven: ADA Title III Disability Discrimination;

• Count Twelve: Disability Discrimination pursuant to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act;

• Count Thirteen: Rehabilitation Act Retaliation;

• Count Fourteen: Breach of Contract.

(Doc. 73, at 4-5.) Plaintiff agrees. (Doc. Ill. at 1-3.) For the State Defendants,

• Count One: Title IX Sex Discrimination;

• Count Two: Title IX Retaliation;

• Count Three: Violation of the Georgia Whistleblower Act, O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4;

• Count Seven: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due process claims

• Count Nine: ADA Title II Discrimination;

• Count Ten: ADA Title II Retaliation;

• Count Twelve: Disability Discrimination pursuant to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act;

• Count Thirteen: Rehabilitation Act Retaliation;

• Count Fourteen: Breach of Contract.

(Doc. 105, at 31.) Plaintiff agrees. (Doc. 132, at 1-2.) The Court addresses the Parties' arguments below.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate only if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Facts are "material" if they could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), and must draw "all justifiable inferences in [its] favor." United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court should not weigh the evidence or determine credibility. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

The moving party has the initial burden of showing the Court, by reference to materials on file, the basis for the motion. Celotex Corp, v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). How to carry this burden depends on who bears the burden of proof at trial. Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). When the non-movant has the burden of proof at trial, the movant may carry the initial burden in one of two ways - by negating an essential element of the non-movant's case, or by showing that there is no evidence to prove a fact necessary to the non-movant's case. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 606-08 (11th Cir. 1991) (explaining Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) and Celotex, 477 U.S. 317). Before the Court can evaluate the non-movant's response in opposition, it must first consider whether the movant has met its initial burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jones v. City of Columbus, 120 F.3d 248, 254 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). A mere conclusory statement that the non-movant cannot meet the burden at trial is insufficient. Clark, 929 F.2d at 608.

If - and only if - the movant carries its initial burden, the non-movant may avoid summary judgment only by "demonstrat[ing] that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment." Id. When the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the non-movant must tailor its response to the method by which the movant carried its initial burden. Id. If the movant presents evidence affirmatively negating a material fact, the non-movant "must respond with evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial on the material fact sought to be negated." Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1116. If the movant shows an absence of evidence on a material fact, the non-movant must either show that the record contains evidence that was "overlooked or ignored" by the movant or "come forward with additional evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency." Id. at 1116-17 (citation omitted). The non-movant cannot carry its burden by relying on the pleadings gr by repeating conclusory allegations contained in the complaint. See Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (11th Cir. 1981). Rather, the non-movant must respond with affidavits or as otherwise provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

The Local Rules require the movant to include a statement of undisputed material facts with its motion. See L.R. 56.1, SDGa. "Parties may not, by the simple expedient of dumping a mass of evidentiary material into the record, shift to the Court the burden of identifying evidence supporting their respective positions." Preis V. Lexington Ins. Co., 508 F.Supp.2d 1061, 1068 (S.D. Ala. 2007) . Essentially, the Court has no duty "to distill every potential argument that could be made based upon the materials before it on summary judgment." Id. (citing Resol. Trust Corp, v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995)). Accordingly, the Court will only review the materials the Parties have specifically cited and legal arguments they have expressly advanced. See id.

In this action, the Clerk of Court provided all parties notice of the motions for summary judgment, the right to file affidavits or other materials in opposition, and the consequences of default. (Docs. 77, 85, 108.) For that reason, the notice requirements of Griffith v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir. 1985), have been satisfied. The time for filing materials in opposition has expired, the issues have been thoroughly briefed, and the motions are now ripe for consideration.

III. DR. COULE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Dr. Coule and Plaintiff agree that Plaintiff asserts five claims against him: three 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for sex discrimination, unlawful search, and violations of due process as well as Georgia law claims of slander and libel.^[2] (Doc. 113, at 4-5; Doc. 137, at 2.) The Court addresses those claims below.

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Actions (Counts Four, Seven, and Eight)

First Dr. Coule asserts he cannot be held liable in this § 1983 action because AUMC is a private, non-governmental entity and he act.s as an agent for this private entity. (Doc. 80, at 56.) In the alternative, Dr. Coule argues he is entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. at 10-13.) Plaintiff counters that AUMC is not a private entity and engaged in state action for a number of reasons. (Doc. 113, at 14-28.) First, she argues AUMC and its agents have a history of asserting that they are governmental entities to avoid liability and are inextricably entangled with the Board of Regents. (Id. at 24-28.) Second, she argues Dr. Coule engaged in state action because he acted on behalf of and in concert with the Board of Regents. (Id. at 14-15.) Third, she argues Dr. Coule engaged in state action because his actions were compelled by the State. (Id. at 16-21.)

1. AUMC is a Private Entity that Engaged in State Action

The Court recently addressed Dr. Coule's argument that AUMC is a private, non-governmental entity and he acts as its agent in a separate case, Street v. Augusta Univ. Health Sys., Inc., No. 1:2C-cv-084, (S.D. Ga. Mar. 22, 2021). There, the Court found that AU Health System, Inc., formerly known as MCG Health System, Inc., was "a private, non-profit corporation."^[3] See Gordon v. MCG Health, Inc., 301 F.Supp.2d 1331, 1335 (S.D. Ga. 2003). The Court took judicial notice^[4] of the Office of the Georgia Secretary of State's website listing AU Heath System, Inc. as a "domestic nonprofit corporation."^[5] Since AU Health System, Inc. and AUMC are both privately owned and operated nonprofit corporations, their employees, such as Dr. Coule, are private parties. (See Doc. 23, at 5.) As such, they cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless their actions amount to state action.

"Only in rare circumstances can a private party be viewed as a 'state actor' for section 1983 purposes." Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992). Private parties will be found to be state actors if one of the following three conditions is met:

(1) the State has coerced or at least significantly encouraged the action alleged to violate the Constitution ("State compulsion test"); (2) the private parties performed a public function that was traditionally the

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