Williams v. Blakley

• Decision Date: 15 June 1987
• Docket Number: No. 16551,16551
• Citation: 114 Idaho 323,757 P.2d 186
• Parties: Forrest J. WILLIAMS and Kay Williams, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Ronald M. BLAKLEY; Blakley Engineers, Inc., and N.D. (Del) Geddes and Donald N. Pearson, dba GP Engineering, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 186

757 P.2d 186

114 Idaho 323

Forrest J. WILLIAMS and Kay Williams, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Ronald M. BLAKLEY; Blakley Engineers, Inc., and N.D. (Del) Geddes and Donald N. Pearson, dba GP Engineering, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 16551.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

June 15, 1987.

On Rehearing June 23, 1988.

Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & Gillespie, Chartered, Boise, for appellants. Richard K. Lierz argued.

William J. Brauner, Caldwell, for respondent Blakley.

Anderson, Kaufman, Ringert & Clark, Boise, for respondents Geddes and Pearson. James G. Reid argued.

SHEPARD, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from summary judgment in favor of respondent-defendants in an action essentially asserting professional malpractice in the performance of engineering functions. Respondents asserted, and the trial court agreed, that the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations. I.C. § 5-219(4). We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

In May 1978 the then owner of certain property (Campbell), employed Geddes and Pearson dba GP Engineering, to perform a boundary survey to be used in connection with the sale of the property to plaintiffs-appellants Williams. That survey was completed and recorded in June 1978, and the Williams purchased the property in August, which they intended to subdivide into smaller lots to be known as Granite View Subdivision. In the course of that 1978 survey, GP Engineering located and Following the Williamses' purchase of the property, they employed GP Engineering for additional surveys to facilitate the subdivision of the property. GP Engineers utilized their earlier survey, completed the additional services, and filed a certificate of survey in the plat of Granite View Subdivision with the Adams County Recorder. The Williamses were notified that the survey performed by GP Engineering did not comply with the applicable requirements, and thus development of the subdivision was precluded. In August 1980, GP Engineering ceased to exist as a separate entity and was sold to Blakley Engineers. Thereafter, in 1980 and 1981, Blakley Engineers performed additional engineering pertaining to sewage disposal in the subdivision.

[114 Idaho 324] marked on the ground what they asserted to be a section corner.

In the fall of 1981 the Williamses hired a new engineer, Richard Johnson, to complete a preliminary plat for, and do the staking and relocation of the subdivision road system. During the Johnson survey it was discovered that the section corner allegedly located by GP Engineering in 1978 was erroneous, and differed from the location of the same section corner marked by the Idaho Department of Transportation in 1981. The differing location of the section corner was evidently significant to the extent of 20-30 feet. In an attempt to resolve the discrepancy, Blakley Engineers filed a complaint with the Idaho Association of Land Surveyors, and maintained that the section corner located and marked during the survey by GP Engineering in 1978, was the correct section corner. However, in August 1982, the complaint was resolved against Blakley Engineers, and it was held that the correct section corner was that located by the Department of Transportation.

In May 1984, the instant complaint was filed against GP Engineering, Blakley Engineers, Inc., and Blakley, Geddes and Pearson as individuals. Among other allegations it was asserted that the defendants were guilty of professional malpractice. In response to the complaint, defendants asserted that the action was barred by the statute of limitations, I.C. § 5-219(4), and moved for summary judgment. The court held that since the Williamses were informed of the discrepancy between the asserted section corners no later than December 31, 1981, that the cause of action accrued by that date, the statute of limitations began to run and had expired, and hence summary judgment was granted.

The Williamses here, and in the court below, maintain that the doctrine of equitable estoppel prevents defendants-respondents from pleading and utilizing the statute of limitations, although the time limits thereof may have expired. The Williamses assert that they did not know, and could not discover, the alleged discrepancies in the asserted section corners until following a new survey in the fall of 1981, three years after the initial GP Engineering survey. The Williamses further assert that thereafter the defendants-respondents continued to maintain that the section corner location of June 1978 was correct, that the section corner located by the Department of Transportation was erroneous, and that such statements and assertions of defendants-respondents continued until August 10, 1982, when the correct location of the section corner was determined. The Williamses assert that they had, and have, no surveying or engineering expertise, cannot be held to be required to have discovered which of the corners was correct and which erroneous, that the defendants-respondents were licensed professionals, that the defendants-respondents' statements and representations were intended to be relied upon, and that the Williamses did in fact rely upon those representations and thus delayed in initiating the action. The Williamses argue that the statements, representations, and the reliance placed thereon gives rise to inferences which demonstrate equitable estoppel, and although the inferences may be conflicting at the summary judgment stage, the party against whom summary judgment issought is entitled to the benefit of conflicting inferences.

It is axiomatic that at the point of summary judgment the facts, the record, and all legitimate inferences arising therefrom are to be construed most favorably toward This Court, and other jurisdictions, have held that a party can be estopped from pleading a statute of limitations. See Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital Building Corp. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19, 644 P.2d 341 (1982); Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 79 S.Ct. 760, 3 L.Ed.2d 770 (1959); Groseth v. Ness, 421 P.2d 624 (Alaska 1966); Klamm Shell v. Berg, 165 Colo. 540, 441 P.2d 10 (1968); Lyden v. Goldberg, 260 Or. 301, 490 P.2d 181 (1971); Gould v. Bird & Sons, Inc., 5 Wash.App. 59, 485 P.2d 458 (1971).

[114 Idaho 325] the party against whom summary judgment is sought. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238 (1986); Boise Car & Truck Rental Co. v. WACO, Inc., 108 Idaho 780, 702 P.2d 818 (1985). Here, as above noted, it is asserted that legitimate inferences arise from the facts which demonstrate the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel which operates as a bar to defendants-respondents' defense of the statute of limitations.

This Court has held, Tommerup v. Albertson's, Inc., 101 Idaho 1, 607 P.2d 1055 (1980); Idaho Title Co. v. American States Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 465, 531 P.2d 227 (1975); Bjornstad v. Perry, 92 Idaho 402, 443 P.2d 999 (1968), that the elements of equitable estoppel are a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or constructive knowledge of the truth; the party asserting estoppel did not know or could not discover the truth; the false representation or concealment was made with the intent that it be relied upon; and the person to whom the representation was made, or from whom the facts were concealed, relied and acted upon the representation or concealment to his prejudice. In the case at bar, we hold that there are questions of material fact and questions of legitimate inferences to be drawn therefrom which remain for resolution by a fact finder. Hence, the granting of summary judgment in favor of defendants-respondents was improper.

It is argued, nevertheless, that I.C. § 5-219 continues to be controlling notwithstanding the common law doctrine of estoppel. I.C. § 5-219 provides in pertinent part:

Within two years ... (4) an action to recover damages for professional malpractice ... provided, however, when the action is for damages arising out of the placement and inadvertent, accidental or unintentional leaving of any foreign object in the body of a person by reason of the professional malpractice of any hospital,...