Williams v. Byron
Decision Date | 23 May 1974 |
Citation | 359 N.Y.S.2d 140,78 Misc.2d 873 |
Parties | Jocelynn WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. George A. BYRON, Chairman of Stress Comprehensive Housing Service, et al., Defendants. |
Court | New York Supreme Court |
Ralph A. Accoo, New York City, for plaintiff.
Paterson, Michael, Dinkins & Jones, New York City (Paul E. Moore, of counsel), for defendants Byron, Coleman, Dennis, Stewart, Atkinson, Miller, Roberts, Reese, Jack and Moody.
Adrian P. Burke, Corp. Counsel, New York City (Allen F. London, New York City, of counsel), for defendants Greenidge, McRae, Gentle, Abdulkarim, Murray, Dougall, Dumpson and Reid.
This purports to be an action for declaratory judgment in which ancillary preliminary and permanent injunctive relief is sought. At issue, however, is the propriety of (1) certain actions taken by the board of directors of Stress Comprehensive Housing Services (Stress), a not-for-profit corporation engaged in assisting low income persons with housing problems, and (2) the administrative review thereof. Neither the constitutionality nor the applicability of the regulations pursuant to which the specified actions were taken and the administrative review conducted are attacked. What is actually sought, aside from the specified injunctive relief, is certiorari, and, to a limited extent, mandamus (CPLR Article 78), and not declaratory judgment. Accordingly, the court shall deem the instant application as a special proceeding under CPLR Article 78 and the complaint shall be deemed to be a petition (24 Carmody-Wait 2d section 147:8; Board of Education v. Allen, 25 A.D.2d 659, 268 N.Y.S.2d 182; Industrial Group Service, Inc. v. Cantor, 24 A.D.2d 1032, 264 N.Y.S.2d 880). The caption is amended to reflect the status of the parties as petitioner and respondents, respectively.
Petitioner is a former director (chief executive officer) of Stress. Stress operates as a community action program funded by the Federal Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). In this regard the OEO allocates funds to the New York City Human Resources Administration for distribution to various Community Action Corporations (also known as delegate agencies) such as Stress. The City Community Development Agency (CDA) is responsible for assuring that the various community action programs are operable, and the City Council Against Poverty (CAP) has the decision making responsibility for the OEO funds and determining overall program plans.
The petitioner claims that on April 16, 1973 she was improperly terminated, purportedly for cause, as the director of Stress, and she now moves for a mandatory preliminary injunction directing, inter alia, that she be restored to that position. The respondents consist of the Chairman of the Board of Stress, various other members of its board of directors, the Chairman of CAP, the members of the Due Process Panel of CAP, the Acting Commissioner of CDA and the Commissioner of the Human Resources Administration.
Although a not-for-profit corporation, like any other corporation, may normally discharge an executive officer or employee, who is not under contract for a fixed term, at any time and without cause, Stress as a 'delegate agency' is subject to Office of Economic Opportunity Memorandum No. 23--A (CAP Memo No. 23--A), dated August 26, 1966, which provides:
Pursuant to CAP Memo No. 23--A, CDA and CAP have promulgated various regulations, which require that certain 'due process...
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Williams v. Action for Better Community, Inc.
...for justifiable cause (see Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 159, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577, 578, 156 N.E.2d 297, 298; Williams v. Byron, 78 Misc.2d 873, 874, 359 N.Y.S.2d 140, 141). The issues before the jury were (1) whether plaintiff violated defendant agency's procedures, justifying his discharge ......