Williams v. Campbell

Decision Date28 May 1973
Docket NumberNo. 73--10,73--10
PartiesTom WILLIAMS et al., Trustees of Mt. Moriah Baptist Church and Burying Ground, Appellants, v. Arthur CAMPBELL, Appellee.
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

James L. Sloan, Little Rock, for appellants.

Charles A. Walls, Jr., Lonoke, for appellee.

HOLT, Justice.

Appellants, Trustees of Mt. Moriah Baptist Church and Burying Ground, initiated this action in 1959 by a complaint to quiet title and to enjoin appellee from using any portion of a 20 acre tract of land which the appellants claim their predecessors acquired by deed from the state land commissioner in 1950. The appellee answered and denied the validity of appellants' title and affirmatively asserted fraud by the appellants' predecessors in procuring the deed. Specifically, the appellee alleged that 'said land was not set aside as a church or burying ground but was used by the school district for school purposes and all affidavits filed with the Land Commissioner are false.' A few months later the Pulaski County Special School District filed an intervention alleging ownership of the 20 acres; that it had always been used for school purposes and exempt from taxation; that it had conveyed the land by quitclaim deed to appellee in 1957, reserving the right to use the land for school purposes and that the intervenor now has need of the lands for school purposes. The school district asked that title be quieted in it. A copy of the quitclaim deed to appellee was made an exhibit to the intervention. The Trustees responded and in substance denied the allegations. The case was dormant until 1971 when appellee secured a temporary order restraining appellants from using certain portions of the improved land for burial purposes. Thereafter, the appellants secured an injunction against appellee. Shortly before the trial, the school district, the intervenor, asked that it be dismissed as a party to the suit stating that it had only used a small portion of the land; that the balance was used by the church and cemetery and it had no further interest in the property.

A decree was rendered by the chancellor invalidating appellants' 1950 land commissioner's deed and awarding divided possession of the 20 acres to both the appellants and the appellee. For reversal the appellants first contend that the chancellor misapplied the controlling law. We cannot agree.

As appellants assert they acquired their 1950 deed pursuant to the provisions of Ark.Stat.Ann. § 10--208 (1956 Repl.), which was then in effect with respect to this type of a conveyance. It is appellants' interpretation that the act requires only (1) a claim based upon a regular unbroken chain of title to 1889, (2) no adverse claim for 20 years subsequent to 1889, and (3) actual possession at the end of the 20 year period which is, at the most, the end of the year 1909. It is appellants' position that they met these requirements and the 1950 land commissioner's deed vested title in the appellants as of 1909 or at the end of the 20 year period following 1889.

In their 1950 petition to the land commissioner for a deed, appellants' predecessors asserted that '(W)e, the undersigned, state that we are the owners and in possession of (the 20-acre tract). Claim to title is based on 'continuous ownership since prior to 1891 and used as a church and burying ground continuously since that date to the present time. " Affidavits supported the petition's assertion of ownership, claim of continuous possession and use of the land, for the required period, for a church and burying ground and the absence of any adverse claimants. Accompanying the petition and affidavits was a certificate from the county clerk that the 20 acres was not assessed between 1889 and 1948 because it was noted on the tax books as church and cemetery property. The deed, duly issued by the commissioner to the appellants, acknowledges 'proof of its actual possession, together with its abstract and muniments of title, showing further that there are no adverse claimants.'

The chancellor, as indicated, invalidated the deed finding that the preponderance of the evidence did not indicate that the requirements of § 10--208 were met by appellants. Quoting the chancellor, '(I)t appears from the evidence that the affidavits upon which the deed was obtained were obviously in error as there were adverse claimants and that the applicants (appellants) were not in actual possession of the twenty acres.' The chancellor's finding was properly based upon a factual issue. It is, of course, well settled that this court will reverse a chancellor's finding of fact only when the finding is against the preponderance of the evidence. Marine Mart v. Pearce, 252 Ark. 601, 480 S.W.2d 133 (1972), Home Insurance Co. v. Moyer, 252 Ark. 51, 477 S.W.2d 193 (1972).

The appellants, of course, had the burden of proof in their quiet title action to establish their allegations as to ownership and the right to an injunction against the appellee. Appellants introduced into evidence their 1950 land commissioner's deed together with the supporting affidavits and the county clerk's certificate reciting that the property had not been assessed or taxes collected on it since 1889 or succeeding years inasmuch as it was not assessed because it was 'church and cemetery property.'

It appears that the affiants who secured the 1950 deed are deceased. However, the appellants adduced evidence from some of the present Trustees and other witnesses that they were long time members of the church; that school was held in the church building until about 1919 when a small one room school building was placed on the land and operated as a public school. One of these witnesses stated he assisted in securing the state deed. According to appellants' witnesses there was a church cornerstone indicating that the church existed in 1891 and inscriptions on tombstones reflect that there were burials as early as 1895. The cemetery was not used exclusively for the church membership and was available for public use. The burial area, approximately three acres and rather recently fenced, is located on the southeast corner of the 20 acre tract. This tract is bisected by a bayou. Appellee has about 100 to 150 acres of pastureland adjoining the area south of the bayou. Appellants' witnesses acknowledged that appellee had pastured his cattle for many years in the area outside the cemetery. In fact one stated that this had occurred as long as he could remember. It appears that none of the witnesses testified to their personal knowledge there was no adverse use of the 20 acre tract preceding 1909, which appellants say is the critical year.

The appellee, who is 89 years of age, testified that he had lived in the vicinity and was acquainted with the area since 1910. He, also, stated that when he first became acquainted with the property there was an old school house on it which was later removed in the 1950's. It was his understanding that the 20 acre tract was 'a sixteenth section land' or school land and he had used part of it as pastureland by permission of the local school director. Another witness corroborated appellee's testimony as to the existence of a school house on the tract. The appellee, also, adduced as an exhibit to his testimony his 1957 quitclaim deed from the Pulaski County Special School District. Also, a 1953 certificate of the county clerk was introduced as evidence, reciting there had been no tax assessments against the 20 acre tract since it had always been carried on the tax books as school lands. Of course, this conflicted with the clerk's 1950 certificate. Appellee produced another certificate of the county clerk dated in 1971 again certifying there had been no tax assessment on the 20 acre tract through 1889--1957 because it was on the county records as school lands. Since 1958 the tract has been carried on the books in appellee's name and taxes paid by him.

We cannot say the chancellor's findings that appellants' affidavits were obviously in error, there were adverse claimants, and appellants were not in actual possession of the 20 acre tract are against the preponderance of the evidence. In doing so we disregard the quitclaim deed, which appellants say is a nullity, of the school district to the appellee and any acts of adverse possession by appellee. Let it be remembered that the burden of proof was upon the appellants in their quiet title action to establish their ownership of the entire 20 acres and their right to an injunction. Appellants' deed, presumptively valid, is only evidence of title.

This tract was 'school land,' as appellants acknowledge, because it was and is a sixteenth section. There was evidence that a school building was on this tract of land before 1909, which appellants say is the critical year, and the tract was used thereafter for school purposes until after 1950. This is the date of appellants' deed based upon their petition which stated continuous ownership and possession from before 1891 to 1950. The area is unfenced and largely unimproved land. The topography is such that it is bisected by a bayou and the burial area, which occupies only approximately three acres, is on the south side where the ground is higher.

Although in 1950 the county official certified the lands were tax exempt since 1889 because they were carried on the books as church and cemetery property, a 1953 and 1971 certificate by this official corrects this certification to the effect that the lands were school lands which is understandable since it is a sixteenth section. Even if the 1950 certificate was not an essential part in securing the 1950 state deed, we think the chancellor properly gave the contradictory certificates some significance as to whether there was any adverse use of the 20 acre tract between the years 1889 and 1909 which appellants assert are the critical years.

We have considered and find...

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5 cases
  • Weber v. Weber
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • 13 d1 Maio d1 1974
    ...against the preponderance of the evidence. Hampton v. Hampton, 245 Ark. 579, 433 S.W.2d 149; Hendrix v. Hendrix, supra; Williams v. Campbell, 254 Ark. 592, 495 S.W.2d 512; Marine Mart v. Pearce, 252 Ark. 601, 480 S.W.2d 133. Where, as here, there are sharp conflicts in the testimony which m......
  • Bobo v. Jones
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    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • 12 d4 Janeiro d4 2006
    ...By seeking to have title quieted, Jones bore the burden of proof to establish ownership of the disputed land. Williams v. Campbell, 254 Ark. 592, 495 S.W.2d 512 (1973). Under Ark.Code Ann. § 18-60-506 (Repl. 2003), a prima facie title is shown by proof of color of title and payment of taxes......
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    • Arkansas Court of Appeals
    • 30 d3 Junho d3 2004
    ...burden of proof in his quiet title action to establish his allegations as to ownership of the land in question. Williams v. Campbell, 254 Ark. 592, 495 S.W.2d 512 (1973). He did not meet this burden. The only evidence as to the location of the "true" boundary consisted of the testimony of P......
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    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • 6 d1 Maio d1 1974
    ...if they are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Hendrix v. Hendrix (1974), 256 Ark. ---, 506 S.W.2d 848; Williams v. Campbell, 254 Ark. 592, 495 S.W.2d 512. Having reviewed all the evidence, we find that the chancellor's ruling granting reformation and quieting title in appel......
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