Williams v. Capital Life & Health Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 24 January 1947
• Docket Number: 15908.
• Citation: 41 S.E.2d 208,209 S.C. 512
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. CAPITAL LIFE & HEALTH INS. CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

41 S.E.2d 208

209 S.C. 512

WILLIAMS v. CAPITAL LIFE & HEALTH INS. CO.

No. 15908.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

January 24, 1947

A. W. Holman and D. McK. Winter, both of Columbia for appellant.

Frank M. Turner, of Columbia, for respondent.

BAKER Chief Justice.

In January, 1938, the appellant (defendant below) issued a sick benefit policy to the respondent providing for the payment to the respondent of the sum of $3 per week in the event of sickness, upon conditions stated in the policy. There are five of such conditions, all expressed in a clause of the policy reading as follows (the numbers are interpolated): 'Clause 6. Weekly benefits for sickness will be paid (1) for each period of seven consecutive days (2) while the Insured is totally disabled by sickness from performing or giving any attention whatever to his or her usual or other occupation; and (3) necessarily confined to bed and (4) there visited professionally by a duly licensed and practicing physician. (5) A certificate must be furnished by the Insured signed by the physician at the beginning of each week of such disability, setting forth the nature of illness and probable duration.'

In July, 1945, the respondent became ill. She presented to the appellant a claim for sick benefits in the amount of $3 covering a week of her illness. The appellant refused to pay the claim, following which the present action was brought to recover $500 actual and punitive damages.

The facts being undisputed, the trial Judge directed a verdict in favor of the appellant with respect to punitive damages, and a verdict in favor of the respondent for $3 as actual damages.

The matter comes before this Court upon exceptions which raise the single question whether the respondent complied with that provision of the policy (quoted above) which requires attendance upon the insured 'by a duly licensed and practicing physician,' and the issuance of a certificate by such physician at the beginning of each week of the alleged disability. The respondent here was attended by a practitioner of that school of medicine which is known as naturopathy, and the required physician's certificate upon which the respondent's claim is based was signed by such practitioner. It is the position of the appellant that such a practitioner is not a 'duly licensed and practicing physician' within the meaning or contemplation of the controlling policy provision above quoted.

Section 5162 of the Code provides that persons qualified in the various healing or medical arts therein described, including naturopathy, may practice their professions upon obtaining a license in the manner therein provided for. The very general provisions of this section of the Code are supplemented by Section 5231-19 et seq. of the Code. In these sections provision is made for the creation of a board of naturopathic examiners, and the practice of naturopathy is defined. It is stated to embrace 'the use and practice of psychological, mechanical and material health sciences to aid in purifying, cleaning and normalizing human tissues for preservation or restoration of health according to the fundamental principles of anatomy, physiology and applied psychology, as may be required. Naturopathic practice employs among other agencies, heat, light, water, electricity, psychology, diet, massage and other manipulative methods. These agencies are known as psychotherapy, suggesto-therapy, hydro-therapy, electro-therapy, mechano-therapy, biochemistry, external appliances, mechanical and electrical appliances, hygiene, first aid, sanitation, heliotherapy and dietetics. Provided, however, that nothing in §§ 5231-19 through 5231-22 shall be held or construed to authorize any naturopathic physician licensed hereunder to practice materia medica or surgery, or shall the provisions of §§ 5231-19 through 5231-22 in any manner apply to or affect the practices of osteopathy, chiropractic, christian science or any other treatment authorized or provided for by law for the cure and prevention of diseases and ailments.' These provisions of the Code were enacted in 1937, Act 1937, p. 441. Section 5231-20.

In 1941 the regulations relating to the practice of naturopathy were further enlarged by provisions dealing with general educational qualifications and with professional training. In addition to a pre-medical course, the statute requires a four year course of professional training in a college or university of naturopathy conferring a degree of Doctor of Naturopathy, and approved by the State Board of Naturopathic Examiners, as well as the holding of examinations for the issuance of licenses to practice naturopathy, Code, Sec. 5231-23 et seq.

Section 5231-25 of the Code provides as follows: 'Practice of naturopathy defined.--The use and practice of phytotherapy, minor surgery, obstetrics and gynecology, autotherapy and biologicals shall be made a part of and be included in the practice of naturopathy.'

In Section 5231-27 it is provided that 'all naturopathic physicians who are in active practice,' etc., are authorized to sign birth, death and health certificates and they are accorded the use of the State biological and chemical laboratories.

The undisputed testimony discloses that the respondent was having trouble with her tonsils. She testified that she had been sick for a couple of weeks, and that when the naturopath in question came to see her he told her that her tonsils would have to be taken out and that she should come to his office. She further testified that she 'went to his hospital in West Columbia on the highway. There was a sign outside' with 'Dr.' preceding the name. He took out the respondent's tonsils and apparently the respondent then went home and was confined to her bed and unable to do anything for two weeks after that.

It would appear from the testimony of the respondent that for each of the two weeks prior to the tonsillectomy and for each of the two weeks succeeding the operation there was a claim under the policy. The record does not disclose which of these four weeks is covered by the claim for one week involved in the present action, though it is inferable, and appellant's counsel so states in his brief that the claim relates ...