Williams v. Chase Manhattan Bank, NA
| Decision Date | 16 January 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 87 Civ. 4784 (RWS).,87 Civ. 4784 (RWS). |
| Citation | 728 F. Supp. 1004 |
| Parties | Mildred W. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, N.A., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
John Ware Upton, New York City, for plaintiff.
Kent T. Stauffer, The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., Litigation Div. (Laura Effel, Jeanne C. Miller, of counsel) New York City, for defendant.
Plaintiff Mildred W. Williams ("Williams") moves to file a second amended complaint ("Second Amended Complaint") pursuant to Rule 15(a), Fed.R. Civ.P. Defendant Chase Manhattan Bank ("Chase") moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P. For the reasons set forth below, Williams' motion to amend her complaint for a second time is granted, and defendant's motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
Williams is a black female who began employment with Chase, in January, 1969 as a teller. In 1979 Williams was promoted to the position of assistant manager ("Assistant Manager"). Williams left Chase on February 4, 1987.
Chase is a New York corporation with its principal offices at One Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York, New York, and is engaged through many branch offices in the general field of banking.
Williams filed this federal court action pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("1981") and the New York State Human Rights Law, Executive Law § 296 et seq. on July 7, 1987. Williams bases these claims on the same set of facts and events. On January 23, 1989 Williams filed an Amended Complaint with Chase's consent. On June 22, 1989, Chase filed this motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), on June 22, 1989 and on August 17, 1989 Williams filed a Second Amended Complaint. Oral arguments were heard on these motions on October 20, 1989 and considered fully submitted as of that date.
This lawsuit concerns a series of events alleged to have taken place over a three-year period beginning 1983 and ending on February 4, 1987 when Williams left Chase. Williams contends that while employed in various positions with Chase, because of her race, she was subjected to discriminatory treatment. This discrimination included denial of promotions and harassment in her employment conditions.
Williams became an Assistant Manager in February, 1978; she managed Branch # 238 as an assistant during 1982 and 1983 for about fifteen months. Williams alleges that, contrary to Chase's policy and practice, she was not promoted to the position of branch manager ("Branch Manager") and that she was not compensated appropriately for her managerial duties.
In 1983, Williams was interviewed by George Witt for the position of Second-in-Charge of Branch # 230. Witt allegedly promised Williams that she would be promoted to assistant treasurer ("Assistant Treasurer"), a position which would have made her an officer of the bank at that particular branch. Following this interview, Williams' supervisors, Agatha Kimmel, Branch Manager, and Richard Eiter, Zone Manager, harassed, criticized and ultimately prevented Williams' promised promotion. Kimmel and Eiter transferred Williams to Branch # 013 in February of 1984.
Thereafter, Williams' new supervisors, Anita D'Angelo and Frank Mangini allegedly favored white employees over Williams for promotions. Williams requested a promotion to Assistant Treasurer at Branch # 013, but she was passed over for three white males who were allegedly less qualified than Williams. Williams was also denied a promotion to Assistant Treasurer at other branch offices to which she applied.
In October, 1986, Williams was disciplined when Branch # 013 lost funds due to a series of forgeries. D'Angelo and another of Williams' supervisors, William Bergen, informed Williams that her salary and bonuses would be frozen for over three years. Williams alleges that this disciplinary action was baseless and discriminatorily issued. Williams left Chase on February 4, 1987.
Williams alleges that she has been subjected to discriminatory treatment in violation of § 1981. To support these allegations and to provide a cognizable claim, Williams moves to amend her complaint for a second time to include the following specific allegations:
Chase maintains that Williams' complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted under § 1981 as interpreted by the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989). Additionally, Chase argues that since Patterson bars Williams' § 1981 claim, this court has no jurisdiction over Williams' pendent state claims. Finally, Chase raises the statute of limitations as a bar to this action.
Pursuant to Rule 15(a), Fed.R.Civ.P., leave to amend a complaint "shall be freely given when justice so requires." If the plaintiff has at least colorable grounds for relief under the amendment, the amendment should be permitted unless the plaintiff has acted in bad faith, is guilty of undue delay, or if permission to amend would unduly prejudice the defendant. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 179, 83 S.Ct. 227, 228, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962); Ryder Energy Distrib. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir. 1984).
In the present case Chase does not contend that it would be unduly prejudiced or that Williams seeks to amend in bad faith to cause undue delay. Moreover, the discussion below indicates that Williams' Second Amended Complaint provides a colorable claim under § 1981, and therefore Williams' motion to file a Second Amended Complaint meets the Rule 15(a) requirements.
According to Chase, Williams' Second Amended Complaint is futile in that it contains allegations that are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Chase failed to raise this defense in its Answer and may thus have waived its opportunity to raise the defense. See Wade v. Orange County Sheriff's Office, 844 F.2d 951, 955 (2d Cir.1988); Strauss v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 404 F.2d 1152, 1155 (2d Cir.1968). Nonetheless, it would be futile to consider this defense waived when Chase would be permitted to amend its answer to include the defense pursuant to the Rule 15 liberal policy favoring a "decision on the merits, rather than on pleadings or technicalities," Ragin v. Macklowe, 126 F.R.D. 475, 476 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (quoting CBS, Inc. v. Ahern, 108 F.R.D. 14, 18 n. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)). The statute of limitations defense is considered raised, even though it is not pleaded, on this motion for dismissal. See Ippolito-Lutz, Inc. v. Harris, 473 F.Supp. 255, 260 (S.D.N.Y.1979), citing Quigley v. Hawthorne Lumber Co., 264 F.Supp. 214, 220 (S.D.N.Y.1967).
Generally, claims arising under § 1981 are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Tuckett v. Police Dept. of New York, 708 F.Supp. 77, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Grub v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 699 F.Supp. 382, 384 (E.D.N.Y.1987). Where discriminatory activities are allegedly continuous in nature, courts may assert jurisdiction over allegations that occurred before the statute of limitations period as long as some action occurred during the applicable period. See Cook v. Pan American World Airlines, Inc., 771 F.2d 635, 646 (2d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1109, 106 S.Ct. 895, 88 L.Ed.2d 929 citing Acha v. Beame, 570 F.2d 57, 65 (2d Cir.1978), aff'd, 817 F.2d 1030 (2nd Cir.1987); Guardians Ass'n of the New York City Police Dept., Inc., 466 F.Supp. 1273, 1280 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, rev'd on other grounds, 633 F.2d 232 (2nd Cir.1980).
According to Williams, the continuing violations doctrine applies and that her complaint is therefore not barred by the statute of limitations. Williams alleges that her denial of a promotion to Assistant Treasurer occurred after July 7, 1984. Since Williams filed this action on July 8, 1987 and since she alleges a series of related discriminatory events including several denials of the same promotion, her complaint is deemed one of continuing violations for purposes of statute of limitations. As such, Williams may reach back before July, 1984 to allegations that may be cognizable under § 1981 as examined below.
In deciding the merits of a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., all material allegations composing the factual predicate of the action are taken as true, for the court's task is to "assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof." Ryder Energy Distrib., 748 F.2d at 779. Thus, "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of her claim which would entitle her to relief," a motion for dismissal must be denied. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).
The Supreme Court recently limited § 1981 employment discrimination claims in the Patterso...
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