Williams v. Chrans

• Decision Date: 13 March 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-1290,91-1290
• Citation: 957 F.2d 487
• Parties: Xavier WILLIAMS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. James R. CHRANS, et al., Respondents-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 487

957 F.2d 487

Xavier WILLIAMS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. James R. CHRANS, et al., Respondents-Appellees.

No. 91-1290.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued Nov. 6, 1991.

Decided March 13, 1992.

Robert Agostinelli (argued), Office of the State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, Ill., for petitioner-appellant.

Bradley P. Halloran (argued), Office of the Atty. Gen., Chicago, Ill., for respondents-appellees.

Before CUMMINGS and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges, and WILL, Senior District Judge. ^*

WILL, Senior District Judge.

Xavier Williams was convicted of felony murder in the Circuit Court of Will County, Illinois. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. People v. Williams, 136 Ill.App.3d 126, 91 Ill.Dec. 24, 483 N.E.2d 306, appeal denied, 111 Ill.2d 564, 92 Ill.Dec. 849, 485 N.E.2d 1092 (1985). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, 479 U.S. 1075, 107 S.Ct. 1268, 94 L.Ed.2d 129 (1987), and remanded to the state courts for further consideration of Williams' claim that the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges to strike black prospective jurors violated his federal constitutional rights. ¹ The state courts let the conviction stand. 177 Ill.App.3d 787, 127 Ill.Dec. 215, 532 N.E.2d 1044 (1988), appeal denied, 125 Ill.2d 573, 130 Ill.Dec. 488, 537 N.E.2d 817 (1989). Williams then petitioned for habeas relief in district court. The district court denied the petition. We affirm.

I.

Xavier Williams, along with a co-defendant, was convicted of the felony murder of a white taxicab driver. The evidence at trial showed that the defendants, who were both black, had called the victim's cab company because it was known to have white drivers. The driver was robbed and then shot by Williams' co-defendant. Williams was sentenced to thirty-five years in prison.

In support of his habeas petition, Williams contends that the prosecution used peremptory challenges to strike two black venirepersons because of their race, leaving him to be tried by an all-white jury. A defendant establishes a prima facie case of discrimination based on the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges "by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1721, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Once a defendant has made out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the prosecution to offer a race-neutral explanation for the exclusion. Id. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724. As a final step, the trial court determines whether the defendant has established that there was purposeful discrimination. See Hernandez v. New York, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991).

Following a remand from the state appellate court, 156 Ill.App.3d 560, 109 Ill.Dec. 121, 509 N.E.2d 782 (1987), the trial court held a hearing to determine whether prospective jurors were excluded because of their race. The court found that Williams had established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination based on the prosecutor's peremptory strikes of two black venirepersons, Irma Berry and James Churchill. Williams raises no claim against the prosecution's strike of a third black venireperson, Roy Britton. All three jurors were part of a single panel of four struck by the state.

The prosecution was then required to explain its strikes of Berry and Churchill. The prosecutor gave three reasons for striking Berry. First, he had a feeling that she did not want to serve as a juror because she stated on her juror questionnaire that she might have problems serving because of her employment. There was also an inconsistency in a questionnaire answer and her response during voir dire regarding prior jury service. On the questionnaire Berry stated that she had served on a jury previously, but during voir dire said that she had never served.

A final reason offered for excluding Berry was the location and nature of her employment. Berry worked in job placement for the Private Industry Council. Williams was a member of a gang which operated in the same area as the Council. The prosecutor stated that he was concerned that gang members might seek employment through the Private Industry Council.

The prosecution also offered this gang area justification for excluding Mr. Churchill. Churchill lived in the vicinity of the gang's activities. A second ground for striking Churchill was that the location of his residence was also two blocks from the crime scene. During voir dire, however, Churchill indicated that he had no knowledge of the murder, and police had never questioned him about the case.

Williams argues that the prosecution's articulated reasons for striking Berry and Churchill were mere pretexts to exclude them because of their race. The most problematic explanations were that Churchill lived, and Berry worked near the base of operations of Williams' gang. The prosecution offered these reasons even though it did not contend that Williams' offense was gang related, nor did it intend to introduce evidence of Williams' gang involvement. Therefore the jury was never going to be informed about Williams' gang membership.

The basic problem with the prosecution's gang area explanation, even if it had been relevant to the evidence at trial, is obvious. Gangs with black members will frequently operate in areas populated primarily by residents who are also black. Allowing the exclusion of black venirepersons simply because their home or place of work is in a gang area has an enormous potential to disproportionately exclude black jurors in most cases involving black gang members. Moreover, this rationale, if unscrutinized, is easily subject to abuse. In fact, Williams offered affidavits to the trial court suggesting that the same prosecutors here have articulated a gang area justification to exclude black jurors in other cases involving black defendants.

The disproportionate impact of a prosecutor's criteria for excluding black prospective jurors, however, does not compel a finding that the state's motives were discriminatory. Hernandez, 111 S.Ct. at 1867. The effect of the state's proffered reasons for using peremptory strikes is only part of the equation a court may use to assess the credibility of the prosecutor's explanation. Id. at 1868. Ultimately, a violation of the equal protection clause is made out by evidence of discriminatory intent. Id. at 1866. Nonetheless, courts should be very wary of allowing gang membership to be an acceptable ground for striking jurors, particularly absent any gang involvement in the offense. This reasoning is particularly suspect when black defendants are being tried for an offense against a white victim.

Batson requires that the prosecution's reasons be "a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried." 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724. The justification for exercising a peremptory challenge, however, does not need to be sufficient to justify a challenge for cause in order to be race-neutral. Id. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. Adequate explanations for exercising a peremptory strike may include a prosecutor's "intuitive assumptions that are not fairly quantifiable." United States v. Williams, 934 F.2d 847, 850 (7th Cir.1991).

The trial court concluded that the prosecution had provided legitimate, race-neutral, reasons for excluding Mrs. Berry and Mr. Churchill. We cannot reverse this finding unless the court's determination was clearly erroneous--even if we find it dubious. Hernandez, 111 S.Ct. at 1870.

The state's reasons were thin, but it was not clear error for the trial court to find that the explanations were based on considerations other than Berry's and Churchill's race. Even absent the gang activity justification, the trial court could reasonably have concluded that a prospective juror's inconsistent answers, hesitancy about jury service or residence near the scene of the crime were specific neutral grounds for using a peremptory strike. Moreover, the state's gang proximity justification, though highly suspect, did not require the trial court to find that the prosecution had intentionally excluded venirepersons because of their race. Cf. United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1488-89 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 173, 112 L.Ed.2d 137 (1990) (peremptory strike of black venireperson who lived near two witnesses was legitimate). Given these considerations, and the deference owed to the trial court, we cannot say on this record that it was clear error to find that the...