Williams v. Circuit Court of St. Louis Cnty.

• Decision Date: 30 June 1838
• Citation: 5 Mo. 248
• Parties: HARVEY WILLIAMS v. CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

5 Mo. 248

HARVEY WILLIAMS

v.CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

June Term, 1838.

H. R. GAMBLE, for Plaintiff in Error. 1. It is utterly denied that, in this country, a court has any power to set aside a verdict of a jury when no person complains of it, particularly in a civil cause. 2. The law referred to has no application to the present case. 3. The statute referred to gives authority to the court to amend what the preceding section, which is substantially a statute of jeofails, would cure, and does not apply to this case. 4. The judge in this reason begs the question. It cannot on this record be seen what effect the discretion exercised by the judge against the requisition of the law had upon the right and justice of the case. 5. The fact that a person who is counsel in fifty causes in court, is in the court-house when an illegal act is done by the court against one of his clients, does not surely cut off all right of that client. 6. We know of no provision of law which makes the court counsel for the parties, or authorizes a court to direct the action of attorneys, or dispense with action which the law requires. 7. That the statute is just as imperative that a motion for a new trial shall be accompanied by reasons, as that a declaration shall be filed before a writ issues; and the court is to decide upon the reasons filed, and not on other reasons. 1 Mo. R. 718. 8. When the constitutional triers of the issues of fact find a verdict for a party, the judge has no authority to dispense with what the law requires as a preliminary step to his having any right to disturb the verdict. Tidd's Practice, 820; 5 T. R. 436; 3 Chitty's Practice, 50, 51.

H. S. GEYER, for Defendants in Error. The Circuit Court has a jurisdiction and power, on the subject of new trials, as extensive as that of the King's Bench; and it is an incontestable rule of law, that the Circuit Court has a power to grant a new trial in any case not prohibited by express law.” In England, the time of making an application for a new trial is limited by a rule of court; in this country, by statute. If the courts have power to make such rules, they have, until altered or repealed, all the binding force of a statute. King v. Holt, 5 T. R. 436. In this case, the record shows that the motion was made within the four days after the trial; the time of filing the specifications was prolonged by the court; the reasons were filed according to the leave given, and when the motion was considered by the court, it was accompanied with the reasons. Doug. R. 1, 2; 1 Johns. Cases; 15 T. R. 1, and 3 Mo. R.; 6 Bac.; 1 East.

EDWARDS, J.

One Gabriel H. Barbour commenced an action in the St. Louis Circuit Court, against Harvey Williams, by petition in debt on a promissory note. Williams pleaded that the note was obtained by fraud: and on this plea Barbour joined issue, and the jury found a verdict for Williams. The day after the verdict was rendered by the jury, Barbour, by his counsel, moved the court to set aside the verdict, and to grant a new trial; at the same time stating to the court that he would file his reasons for the new trial at some other time. The court then gave leave to the counsel to file his reasons for the new trial at a future day. On the tenth day after the verdict was rendered, Barbour filed his reasons for setting aside the verdict and the court sustained the motion and granted a new trial. At the last term of this court, Williams, by his attorney, moved the court to award a writ of mandamus to the Circuit Court of St. Louis county, commanding that court to enter judgment in his favor on the verdict of the jury found in the action of Gabriel H. Barbour against the said Williams, and filed a transcript of the record in saId cause. On this a mandamus was awarded, commanding the Circuit Court to enter a final judgment upon the verdict of the jury in said cause, or to show cause to the contrary at the next term of this court. The Circuit Court refused to enter up judgment as commanded, and returned the reasons for this refusal.

The first matter that will be considered upon this statement of the case, is the origin of the power of our Circuit Courts to grant new trials under any circumstances. In England, the courts exercise it as a common law power, and according to their sound discretion; and in every description of case, civil and criminal, when substantial justice has not been done, unless they are prohibited from exercising it by law, or prevented by an unreasonable lapse of time. But although the courts are to some extent unrestricted in their power to grant new trials, yet the rule of court there requires “that all objections to the verdict, intended to be made by the party interested, must regularly be made within the first four days of the term.” Rex v. Holt, 5 T. R. 438; and every motion for a new trial must be made within four days, exclusive, after the entry of a rule for judgment. 2 Tidd's Prac. 820; Douglas, 171, 797; and the same rule applies both to civil and criminal cases. In construing this rule, a distinction seems to be drawn between the rights of a party to move for a new trial, and the power of the court to grant a new trial. The rule limits the right of the party to move for a new trial to four days, but leaves the power of the court to grant a new trial as it existed before the adoption of the rule.

As regards the power of granting new trials in criminal cases, after the four days have expired, in the case of King v. Holt, Lord Kenyon says: “I will remember the case of the King v. Gough, where the objection to the verdict was taken by the court themselves, who thought that substantial justice had not been done. And there are not wanting other instances of the same kind, where the court in criminal cases have shown themselves anxious to be satisfied whether or not the defendant had been properly convicted, without any motion of the party for that purpose. This was done by Lord Mansfield, in the King v. Morris, and the same has often occurred in other cases.” “If the counsel have anything to offer, in order to show that justice has not been administered to the defendant in this instance, the court will readily hear it.” Ashhurst, J., in the same case, says that “the rule with regard to the time of moving for new trials, seems now to be the same in criminal as in civil cases. But though that be the general rule, when the court see reason to suspect that justice has not been done to any particular defendant, they will, in their discretion, direct a further inquiry into the merits of the cause.” Grose, J., in the same cause, says that “though the rule be settled that, after the first four days, the defendant cannot move for a new trial, whenever the court have seen of themselves, or on the suggestion of counsel, that the defendant has been improperly convicted, they always have interposed to prevent judgment from being passed on an innocent man.” 5 T. R. 438. In Tidd's Practice, it is said, “where the court have seen of themselves, or it has appeared to them on the suggestion of counsel, that substantial justice has not been done, they have sometimes interposed after the regular time, and granted a new trial.” 2 Tidd's Prac. 820; Doug. 171, 797. In the case of Rex v. Atkinson, where the four days had expired, Lord Mansfield said that “no motion could be made for a new trial, but if it came out incidentally from the report that it was proper, the court might grant one.” And in the same case, he said further, that “if the court conceive a doubt that justice is not done, it is never too late to grant a new trial, but not on the application of the party.” 5 T. R. 437, n. a. By these authorities, then, it seems that in England, under the rule of court, the party has no right to move for a new trial, in criminal cases, after four days have expired; but it seems, also, that the court has the power to grant new trials when the four days have gone by; and that, in cases where substantial justice has not been done, they will exercise that power, but, in doing so, they will not entertain a motion for a new trial, yet they will hear suggestions from the party.

In civil cases, in regard to the right of the party to move for a new trial, as before observed, the rule is the same as in criminal cases. Being the same in each description of cases, there is no good reason why it should...