Williams v. City of Mount Vernon

• Decision Date: 14 April 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05 Civ. 8052(WCC).,05 Civ. 8052(WCC).
• Parties: Andrew WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF MOUNT VERNON, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

428 F.Supp.2d 146

Andrew WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF MOUNT VERNON, et al., Defendants.

No. 05 Civ. 8052(WCC).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

April 14, 2006.

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Ebanks & Sattler, LLP, New York, New York, (Adam B. Sattler, of counsel), for Plaintiff.

Helen M. Blackwood, Corporation Counsel, City Hall, Mount Vernon, New York (Hina Sherwani, of counsel), for Defendants The City of Mount Vernon, The Mount Vernon Police Department and Mount Vernon P.O. Conley in his Individual and Official Capacities.

AMENDED OPINION AND ORDER

WILLIAM C. CONNER, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiff Andrew Williams brings the instant action against defendants: (1) the City of Mount Vernon (the "City"); (2) the Mount Vernon Police Department (the "Department"); (3) former Mount Vernon Police Commissioner Bernice Kennedy; (4) Mount Vernon Police Officer Conley; (5) former Mount Vernon Police Officer DellaDonna; (6) Mount Vernon Police Officers John Doe 1-5, unknown police officers employed by the Department; (7) Westchester County District Attorney Jeanine Pirro; (8) Assistant Westchester County District Attorney Mark Garreto; and (9) Assistant Westchester County District Attorney Robert F. Docherty, Jr. Plaintiff's inartful Verified Complaint ("Complaint") appears to assert claims for: (1) false arrest; (2) false imprisonment; (3) use of excessive force; and (4) malicious prosecution in violation of his Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 1985(3). In addition, plaintiff asserts parallel claims under Article I, sections 1, 5, 6, 11 and 12 of the New York State Constitution as well as a New York State law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

As an initial matter, this Court notes that defendants Kennedy and DellaDonna have not been served by plaintiff in accordance with the time limits provided by FED. R. Civ. P. 4. Consequently, the claims against defendants Kennedy and Della-Donna are dismissed without prejudice. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c), (m). Also, the claims against defendants Pirro, Garreto and Docherty were dismissed with prejudice by stipulation dated November 22, 2005.

Defendants the City, the Department and Conley (collectively, the "defendants") now move to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the following reasons, defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part. In addition, this Court dismisses without prejudice the claims against defendants Police Officers John Doe 1-5, as the Complaint fails to allege any facts indicating that any police officers other than Conley and DellaDonna were involved in the incidents alleged therein.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the Complaint, unless otherwise noted. On September 16, 2004, plaintiff Williams was working at the Mount Vernon Western Beef grocery store stocking shelves when he was approached by two men later identified as Police Officers Conley and Della-Donna. (Complt. ¶17.) These two officers were in plain clothes rather than in police uniforms and bore no visible police insignia.¹ (Id.) As the pair neared plaintiff, the Complaint alleges one of the officers said "Tim," and Williams responded "What?". (Complt. ¶ 18.) According to the police report, however, the officers observed Williams, saw him as fitting the description of Fields that they had received, approached him and said, "Hey Tim," whereupon Williams reportedly "acknowledged" their identification by responding "What." (Sherwani Decl., Ex. C at 1.) The parties dispute the inflection attributed to plaintiff's "What," response, i.e., whether it connoted puzzlement (plaintiff's version) or affirmation of identity (defendants', version).

Intonation aside, Williams alleges that immediately following this response, the officers, without having identified themselves as such, told Williams to put his hands behind his back. (Complt. ¶ 18.) Despite Williams's subsequent statement that his name was not Tim, Conley allegedly punched Williams in the face, sparking a struggle resulting in the two officers and plaintiff falling to the ground. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 19.) The struggle left Williams pinned down, subject to repeated punching by both officers, before being handcuffed. (Id.) Plaintiff was placed under arrest and transported to the City's police station for processing, at which time Conley and DellaDonna determined that Williams was in fact not the Timothy Fields whom they were seeking. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 20.) Nevertheless, Conley, DellaDonna, and other unknown officers strip searched Williams, held him overnight, and denied him the opportunity to contact his family. (Id. ¶ 20.)

The next morning, Williams was arraigned on charges of obstructing governmental administration, pursuant to N.Y. PENAL LAW § 195.05, and resisting arrest, pursuant to N.Y. PENAL LAW § 205.30. (Id.) Ultimately, Mount Vernon City Judge William Edwards dismissed both charges, finding that the misdemeanor information was facially insufficient given that none of the essential elements of obstructing governmental administration were met and that Conley and DellaDonna lacked reasonable suspicion to arrest Williams. (Id. ¶ 25; Sattler Decl., Ex. A.)

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), the issue is "whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984). A court's task in determining the sufficiency of a complaint is "necessarily a limited one." Id. A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23, 26 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10, 101 S.Ct. 173, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980)). Generally, "conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss." 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 12.34[1][b] (3d ed.1997); see also Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 72 F.3d 1085, 1088 (2d Cir.1995).

"In assessing the legal sufficiency of a claim, the Court may consider those facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached as an exhibit thereto or incorporated by reference . . . and documents that are `integral' to plaintiffs claims, even if not explicitly incorporated by reference." John v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Corrs., 183 F.Supp.2d 619, 627 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (Conner, J.) (internal citations omitted). On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept as true all of the well-pleaded facts and consider those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Hertz Corp. v. City of New York, 1 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir.1993); In re AES Corp. Sec. Litig., 825 F.Supp. 578, 583 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (Conner, J.).

II. Qualified Immunity²

"The doctrine of qualified immunity shields police officers acting in their official capacity from suits for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless their actions violate clearly-established rights of which an objectively reasonable official would have known." Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir.1999); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Qualified immunity is not merely a defense; it is also "an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) ("The entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." (emphasis in original)). Accordingly, "the availability of qualified immunity ought to be decided by a court at the earliest possible opportunity—preferably at the outset of the case, at which point plaintiffs well pleaded allegations are assumed to be true, and defendant's version of the facts is immaterial." Torres v. Vill. of Sleepy Hollow, 379 F.Supp.2d 478, 483 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200, 121 S.Ct. 2151).

Qualified immunity can be established in three ways: (1) if defendant's acts did not violate a clearly established constitutional right; (2) if it remains unclear as to whether an exception permitted such acts; and (3) if, even though the law was clearly established, "`it was objectively reasonable for [the defendant] to believe that his acts did not violate those rights.'" Sorensen v. City of New York, 42 Fed. Appx. 507, 509-10 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 920-21 (2d Cir.1987)).

A. Probable Cause and Qualified Immunity

It is well established that an arrest without probable cause is a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. Lillis v. Golino, 505 U.S. 1221, 112 S.Ct. 3032, 120 L.Ed.2d 902 (1992); Cook v. Sheldon, 41 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir.1994) ("It is now far too late in our constitutional history to deny that a person has a clearly established right not to be arrested without probable cause."). Probable cause to arrest exists when the authorities have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 n. 9, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); see also Posr v. Court Officer Shield No. 207, 180 F.3d 409, 414 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir.1996)). The existence of probable cause is objective—the officer's subjective...