Williams v. City of Bowling Green
| Decision Date | 24 April 1934 |
| Citation | 254 Ky. 11 |
| Parties | Williams v. City of Bowling Green et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
2. Constitutional Law; Licenses. — General Assembly and municipalities may classify occupations for taxation purposes and subdivide classes into particular classes according to natural and well-recognized lines of distinction (Constitution U.S. Amend. 14; Constitution Ky. secs. 181, 181a).
3. Constitutional Law. — Equal protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment does not compel adoption of iron rule of equal taxation, nor prevent variety or differences in taxation, or discretion in selection of subjects or classification for taxation (Constitution U.S. Amend. 14).
4. Constitutional Law; Taxation. — Discrimination in taxing statute in favor of certain classes is not arbitrary, where founded on reasonable distinction, or where any state of facts reasonably can be conceived to support it (Constitution U.S. Amend. 14; Constitution Ky. secs. 181, 181a).
5. Constitutional Law; Licenses. — Classification of occupations for taxation purposes is constitutional where substantial differences exist between occupations separately classified (Constitution U. S. Amend. 14; Constitution Ky. secs. 181, 181a).
6. Constitutional Law; Licenses. — Differences in organization, management, and type of business transacted may justify classification for taxing purposes (Constitution U.S. Amend. 14; Constitution Ky. secs. 181, 181a).
7. Constitutional Law; Licenses. — Ordinance imposing license fee of $200 for engaging in or soliciting business of cleaning or dyeing clothes without operation of plant in city held not arbitrarily discriminatory because it imposed fee of only $25 on business of operating cleaning and dyeing plant in city, since businesses were essentially different (Constitution U.S. Amend. 14; Constitution Ky. secs. 181, 181a).
8. Licenses. — Where general license ordinance specified purpose for which tax was levied in accordance with constitutional and statutory requirements, amendment to ordinance held not invalid because of failure to state such purpose, since amendment became part of general ordinance (Constitution Ky., sec. 180; Ky. Stats., sec. 3290-12).
Appeal from Warren Circuit Court.
RODES K. MYERS, for appellant.
GEORGE W. MEUTH and LAURENCE B. FINN, for appellees.
Affirming.
By an ordinance approved February 18, 1931, the common council of the city of Bowling Green amended section 213, subsection 53, of the 1929 Bowling Green City Code, so as to read as follows:
W.M. Williams brought this suit to enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance on the ground that it is discriminatory, and does not specify the purpose for which the tax is levied. The stipulated facts are: There are persons operating cleaning and dyeing plants in Bowling Green who pay a license tax of $25. Williams does not operate a plant in the city, but has contracted with a dry cleaning establishment located outside the city to do the work for him. He solicits and obtains business from citizens and residents of the city, assembles the clothes and other materials at a store which he has rented for the purpose, transports them in his own vehicle to a plant at Nashville, Tenn., where the dry cleaning work is done, and then delivers them to his customers. For engaging in this business he is required to pay a license tax of $200. From a judgment upholding the validity of the tax, and dismissing the petition, Williams appeals.
There is no provision of our Constitution that fixes a different standard from that prescribed by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Under sections 181 and 181a of the Constitution the General Assembly may by general laws only provide for the payment of license fees on franchises, trades, occupations, and professions for state purposes, and may also by general laws delegate the power to municipal corporations to impose and collect the same kind of taxes for municipal purposes, and the power thus delegated is as broad and far-reaching as when exercised by general laws for state purposes. From the very beginning we have upheld the power of the General Assembly and all municipalities, not only to classify different trades and occupations for taxation purposes, but to subdivide the classes into particular classes, if made according to natural and well-recognized lines of distinction. Hager v. Walker, 128 Ky. 1, 107 S.W. 254, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 748, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 195, 129 Am. St. Rep. 238; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. City of Paris, 138 Ky. 801, 129 S.W. 112. Whether a particular classification offends or does not offend the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been the subject of numerous decisions by the United States Supreme Court. The principles established by those decisions are in brief as follows: The restriction imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment does not compel the adoption of an iron rule of equal taxation, nor prevent a variety or differences in taxation, or discretion in the selection of subjects or the classification for taxation for properties, businesses, callings, or occupations. The fact that a statute discriminates in favor of certain classes does not make it arbitrary, if the discrimination is founded upon a reasonable distinction, or if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived to sustain it. A classification adopted by a Legislature in imposing occupation taxes will be held constitutional if there are substantial differences between the occupations separately classified, and such differences need not be great. Differences in organization, management, and type of business transacted are sometimes sufficient to justify the classification. State Board of Tax Commissioners of Indiana v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 51 S....
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