Williams v. City of Montgomery
| Decision Date | 21 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-14925,19-14925 |
| Parties | BRANDON LEE WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF MONTGOMERY, DAVID E. SHIRAH, in his individual capacity as police officer employed with The City of Montgomery & its police department, MATTHEW D. GEIER, in his individual capacity as police officer employed with The City of Montgomery & its police department, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
Non-Argument Calendar
D.C. Docket No. 2:17-cv-00805-ALB-SMD
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, JORDAN and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
Brandon Williams appeals the summary judgment in favor of Officer David Shirah and Sergeant Matthew Geier of the Montgomery Police Department. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Shirah and Geier arrested Williams after mistaking him for his younger brother who had five outstanding warrants for his arrest. Shirah charged Williams with harassment, but the City of Montgomery later dismissed the charge. Williams complained of a false arrest and the use of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. IV, and of false imprisonment, assault and battery, and malicious prosecution under Alabama law. The district court dismissed Williams's claims under federal law based on qualified immunity and his claims under state law based on discretionary-function immunity. Williams also alleged municipal liability but has abandoned any challenge to the summary judgment in favor of the City. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004). We affirm the summary judgment against Williams's claims under federal law and his claims of false imprisonment and of assault and battery under state law. But we vacate the summary judgment against Williams's claim of malicious prosecution under state law because material disputes of fact exist about whether the officers lacked probable cause and acted in bad faith when they charged Williams with harassment, and we remand for further proceedings.
On review of a summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir. 2009), "to the extent supportable by the record," Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n.8 (2007). The record includes a three-minute video of Williams's arrest recorded by Shirah's body camera. We must view "the facts in the light depicted by the" recording and may not adopt a version of the facts that is "utterly discredited" by the recording. Id. at 380-81. "But where the recording does not clearly depict an event or action, and there is evidence going both ways on it," we credit Williams's account of the incident. Shaw v. City of Selma, 884 F.3d 1093, 1097 n.1 (11th Cir. 2018).
At the request of the Montgomery School Enforcement Bureau, Officer Shirah, Sergeant Geier, and Officer Blake Hicks drove to 6812 Briar Gate Court to arrest a student, Braxton Williams, on five felony warrants outstanding in another jurisdiction. Hicks and Geier walked to the house and spoke to a woman who identified herself as Braxton's cousin. Shirah activated his body camera and stood at the front corner of the house where he could see the side yard and his fellow officers standing in front of a glass storm door with iron bars that was ajar.
A young man came to the door to talk to Hicks and Geier. The man resembled Braxton Williams, whose photograph the officers had viewed earlier. The officers asked Williams to identify himself, and he responded that his name was Brandon. While talking to Williams, one of the officers further opened the door.
When Williams told the officers a second time that his name was Brandon, they grabbed his arm, which was visible through the storm door, and pulled him outside the house. Shirah observed the officers' movement and ran to assist them. A 30-second struggle ensued during which the officers pushed Williams against the outside of the house and then to the ground. Williams yelled "help" and "no" while being instructed to "put your hands behind your back" and to "give [us] your hands." Williams insisted that he was innocent, as he was Brandon Williams, Braxton's brother, and was 18 years old. When Williams returned to his feet, a small amount of blood was visible on his left eyebrow. Williams yelled "help" as the officers escorted him to a patrol car, and an officer warned him that, if he fought them, they would "chain his ass to that g*d*mn pole right there."
Williams offered both his own affidavit and that of his cousin, Kimberly Williams, who first answered the door and witnessed the events. Kimberly stated in her affidavit that In his affidavit, Williams stated,
The officers transported Williams to the police station. Within a few hours of Williams's arrival, officers in the Criminal Investigation Division identified him as Braxton's brother. In his affidavit, Mr. Williams stated that he overheard the officers state that they "had made a mistake and now they had to find something to charge [Brandon] with." Shirah filed a complaint against Williams for harassment, and Williams was released on bond. Later, the City nol prossed the complaint.
We review a summary judgment de novo. Eslinger, 555 F.3d at 1324-25. Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine dispute exists as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). For a material dispute of fact to exist, there must be "sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor." Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995).
Williams challenges the summary judgment against his claims against the officers. Williams argues that officers Geier and Shirah are not entitled to qualified immunity from his federal claims because they "conducted no investigation to ensure they were arresting the correct person" and because their use of force was excessive. Williams also argues that the officers are not immune from liability against his claims of false arrest, assault and battery, and malicious prosecution under state law.
Claims of False Imprisonment and Excessive Force.
Officers enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages for their discretionary acts so long as their "conduct violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1345 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). To receive qualified immunity, officers must "prove that [they were] acting within the scope of [their] discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred." Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1487 (11th Cir. 1991)). Because Williams does not dispute that Geier and Shirah were acting within their discretionary authority when executing valid arrest warrants, he must "show that qualified immunity is not appropriate." Id.
"Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments, and protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). So if officers make a "reasonable mistake in the legitimate performance of [their] duties [they] ought to be protected by qualified immunity." Washington v. Rivera, 939 F.3d 1239, 1249 (11th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). They enjoy immunity from suit whether the "error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We judge the reasonableness of officers' actions objectively. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). We assess Geier and Shirah's actions from the perspective of how a reasonable officer on the scene would conduct himself in the same circumstance. Id.; Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. We cannot "second-guess" the officers' actions using the benefit of "20/20 hindsight vision." Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 854 (11th Cir. 2010).
False Arrest.
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. "[A]n officer ordinarily does not violate the Fourth Amendment when he executes a facially valid arrest warrant . . . ." Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147, 1162 (11th Cir. 2020). So "when the police have probable cause to arrest one party [based on a valid warrant], and when they reasonably mistake a second party for the first party, then the arrest of the second party is a valid arrest." Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802 (1971). An arrest based on a reasonable mistake in identity does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Rodriguez, 280 F.3d at 1346-48.
The "reasonable mistake" standard originated in Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971), where the Supreme Court concluded that arresting a man named Miller in the mistaken belief that he was Hill—who the police had probable cause to arrest—did not violate the Constitution. Id. at 802-05. The Supreme Court stated that the "mistake was understandable and the arrest...
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