Williams v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE POLICE, COA03-1450.

• Decision Date: 03 August 2004
• Docket Number: No. COA03-1450.,COA03-1450.
• Citation: 599 S.E.2d 422,165 NC App. 587
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: Todd WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT, Billy J. Houston and Earl K. Burkhart, Individually and in their official capacity, Defendants.

599 S.E.2d 422

165 NC App. 587

Todd WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT, Billy J. Houston and Earl K. Burkhart, Individually and in their official capacity, Defendants.

No. COA03-1450.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

August 3, 2004.

Ernest J. Wright, Jacksonville, for plaintiff-appellee.

Crossley, McIntosh, Prior & Collier, by Brian E. Edes and Clay A. Collier, Wilmington, for defendants-appellants.

TYSON, Judge.

The City of Jacksonville Police Department ("Jacksonville Police Department"), Officer Billy J. Houston ("Officer Houston"), and Officer Earl K. Burkhart ("Officer Burkhart") (collectively, "defendants") appeal from an order denying their Motion for Summary Judgment. We reverse.

I. Background

Plaintiff originally filed this action on 2 March 2000 in Onslow County Superior Court from incidents that arose during a traffic stop of plaintiff by defendants. Plaintiff asserted claims for: (1) "personal injuries, pain and suffering, humiliation, loss of liberty and emotional distress" that he suffered as a result of defendants'"negligence, malicious and wanton conduct;" (2) "the action of Defendants violated the 4th and/or the 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, protecting against unlawful seizures;" (3) "the acts and conduct of the Defendants... constitutes [sic] false arrest and negligence under the laws of the State of North Carolina;" and (4) "The City of Jacksonville intentionally or negligently failed to properly train its officers...."

Defendants removed the action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina ("the U.S. District Court") pursuant to plaintiff's assertion of a violation of the Civil Rights Act, Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and moved for summary judgment. By Order entered 29 May 2001, the Honorable James C. Fox, Senior U.S. District Court Judge, granted defendants' motion. Judge Fox found, as a matter of law: (1) defendants had probable cause to stop and detain plaintiff; (2) defendants acted reasonably in conducting a pat-down search and in using "threat of force;" and (3) defendants did not use excessive force. Judge Fox also concluded, "Because the officers [Houston and Burkhart] did not commit any constitutional violation, summary judgment is also appropriate as to the plaintiff's claims against the City of Jacksonville." Judge Fox's Order stated, "To the extent that the plaintiff's complaint alleges state law causes of action, the court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such pendent claims, and ORDERS these claims DISMISSED without prejudice."

Plaintiff timely filed a new complaint on 16 November 2001 asserting the causes of action stated in his earlier complaint, except for deleting his claim for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Defendants filed an answer and asserted thirty defenses, including governmental immunity, public duty doctrine, and res judicata /collateral estoppel. Defendants moved for summary judgment and asserted, "Plaintiff's pendant state tort claims are premised on either the lack of probable cause or the unreasonableness of Defendants' conduct ... [and] are barred under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel in that the necessary elements of Plaintiff's claims have been previously adjudicated in favor of Defendants." The trial court denied defendants' motion. Defendants appeal.

II. Issues

The issues presented are whether: (1) this appeal is interlocutory; and (2) the trial court erred in denying defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment because the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar plaintiff's claims.

III. Interlocutory Appeal

"The denial of summary judgment is not a final judgment, but rather is interlocutory in nature. We do not review interlocutory orders as a matter of course." McCallum v. N.C. Coop. Extension Serv., 142 N.C.App. 48, 50, 542 S.E.2d 227, 230, appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 353 N.C. 452, 548 S.E.2d 527 (2001) (citing Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 361-62, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381, reh'g denied, 232 N.C. 744, 59 S.E.2d 429 (1950)). "If, however, `the trial court's decision deprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be lost absent immediate review,' we may review the appeal under N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 1-277(a) and 7A-27(d)(1)." McCallum, 142 N.C.App. at 50, 542 S.E.2d at 230-31 (quoting N.C. Dept. of Transportation v. Page, 119 N.C.App. 730, 734, 460 S.E.2d 332, 334 (1995)).

Although interlocutory, "the denial of a motion for summary judgment based on the defense of res judicata may affect a substantial right, making the order immediately appealable." Bockweg v. Anderson, 333 N.C. 486, 491, 428 S.E.2d 157, 161 (1993) (citations omitted). "Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits in a prior action in a court of competent jurisdiction precludes a second suit involving the same claim between the same parties or those in privity with them." Id. (citing Thomas M. McInnis & Assoc., Inc. v. Hall, 318 N.C. 421, 428, 349 S.E.2d 552, 556 (1986)).

Denial of a summary judgment motion based on res judicata raises the possibility that a successful defendant will twice have to defend against the same claim by the same plaintiff, in frustration of the underlying principles of claim preclusion. Thus, the denial of summary judgment based on the defense of res judicata can affect a substantial right and may be immediately appealed.

McCallum, 142 N.C.App. at 51, 542 S.E.2d at 231 (citing Bockweg, 333 N.C. at 491, 428 S.E.2d at 161). "The denial of summary judgment based on collateral estoppel, like res judicata, may expose a successful defendant to repetitious and unnecessary lawsuits. Accordingly, ... the denial of a motion for summary judgment based on the defense of collateral estoppel may affect a substantial right .... [such that the appeal] is properly before us." McCallum, 142 N.C.App. at 51, 542 S.E.2d at 231. Defendants' appeal is properly before this Court.

IV. Summary Judgment

Defendants argue the trial court erred in denying their motion for summary judgment based on res judicata and collateral estoppel.

Rule 56(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment will be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c)(2003).

An issue is "genuine" if it can be proven by substantial evidence and a fact is "material" if it would constitute or irrevocably establish any material element of a claim or a defense. A party moving for summary judgment may prevail if it meets the burden (1) of proving an essential element of the opposing party's claim is nonexistent, or (2) of showing through discovery that the opposing party cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his or her claim. Generally this means that on "undisputed aspects of the opposing evidential forecast," where there is no genuine issue of fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If the moving party meets this burden, the non-moving party must in turn either show that a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial or must provide an excuse for not doing so.

Lowe v. Bradford, 305 N.C. 366, 369, 289 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1982) (internal citations omitted).

Here, defendants moved for summary judgment and asserted plaintiff's claims were barred under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The parties did not brief, move for, or present further arguments or other grounds to the trial court to support or contest the Motion for Summary Judgment. Our review is limited to whether defendants were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law based on res judicata and collateral estoppel. See McDonald v. Skeen, 152 N.C.App. 228, 567 S.E.2d 209,

disc. rev. denied, 356 N.C. 437, 571 S.E.2d 221 (2002) (addressing only the issue of collateral estoppel and declining to consider arguments that were not presented in motion or argued at the hearing); see also N.C.R.App. P. 10(b)(1).

V. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel

The trial court concluded neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel precluded plaintiff's claims and denied defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

"The companion doctrines of res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) have been developed by the courts for the dual purposes of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating previously decided matters and promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation." Bockweg, 333 N.C. at 491, 428 S.E.2d at 161.

Where the second action between two parties is upon the same claim, the prior judgment serves as a bar to the relitigation of all matters that were or should have been adjudicated in the prior action. Where the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim, the prior judgment serves as a bar only as to issues actually litigated and determined in the original action.

Id. at 492, 428 S.E.2d at 161 (citations omitted). Our Supreme Court has distinguished between these two doctrines:

Under the doctrine of res judicata or "claim preclusion," a final judgment on the merits in one action precludes a second suit based on the same cause of action between the same parties or their privies. The doctrine prevents the relitigation of all matters ... that were or should have been adjudicated in the prior action. Under the companion doctrine of collateral estoppel, also known as "estoppel by judgment" or "issue preclusion," the determination of an issue in a prior judicial or administrative proceeding precludes the relitigation of that issue in a later action, provided the party against whom the estoppel is

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