Williams v. City of Minneola
| Citation | 16 Fla. L. Weekly 335,575 So.2d 683 |
| Decision Date | 31 January 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-1819,89-1819 |
| Parties | 16 Fla. L. Weekly 335 Linda WILLIAMS, et al., Appellants, v. CITY OF MINNEOLA, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Jack R. Elliott, Arfken & Elliott, Melbourne, for appellants.
Robert D. Vanhorne and Daniel J. Gerber, Rumberger, Kirk, Caldwell, Cabaniss, Burke & Wechsler, P.A., Orlando, for appellee Dwayne Lovell.
F. Scott Pendley, Dean, Ringers, Morgan & Lawton, Orlando, for appellee Joseph Brennan.
Jennings L. Hurt, III, and Vance R. Dawson, Rissman, Weisberg, Barrett & Hurt, P.A., Orlando, for appellees City of Minneola and Minneola Police Dept.
This is an appeal from final orders granting summary judgment in favor of the appellees, defendants below, on all the tort theories alleged by the appellants. Because we determine that it would be possible for a jury to find that a tort was committed, we reverse and remand.
Fourteen year old Glenn Williams, the son of one of the appellants and the brother of the other, died of an apparent drug overdose. Officers of the Minneola Police Department considered it possible that the death resulted from suicide or foul play.
Officers Cason, Lameida, and Lovell participated in an investigation.
On November 29, 1986, the day after Glenn died, an associate of the Medical Examiner performed an autopsy which Officers Cason, Lameida, and Lovell attended at the direction of Minneola Police Chief Joseph Brennan. Officer Cason, on orders from Chief Brennan, took 35mm still photographs of the autopsy to preserve and document any physical evidence which might assist in the investigation of the death. Officer Lovell, using a borrowed video camera, made an approximately hour long videotape of the autopsy.
The officers took the videotape to Chief Brennan's home, where the men watched about five minutes of it. 1 Officer Lovell then took the tape home with him. Chief Brennan stated that he was shocked when he learned about the videotaping, and that he had told Lovell to put the tape in the evidence locker. Lovell testified that he had the chief's consent to take the tape home.
The next evening, at Lovell's home, the tape was viewed by Lovell, Officer Poole of the Mascotte Police Department (from which the video camera had been borrowed), Officer Davis of the Minneola Police Department (who stayed for only about ten minutes), and a man named John Warrington who had been invited to Lovell's house for dinner that evening and wanted to see the videotape. Lovell testified that he knew that Warrington had been a police officer and believed that he would soon be employed by the Minneola Police Department. Warrington was never professionally involved with the Minneola Police Department and had not worked as a police officer for six years.
On February 21, 1987, The Orlando Sentinel published an article describing the viewing at Lovell's home as having taken place in a party atmosphere where the audience joked and laughed. Earlier in February Chief Brennan had told the appellants about the videotaping and the viewing at Lovell's home. In deposition, Warrington denied making or signing a statement (not in evidence) allegedly made to the Minneola Police Department on February 25, 1987 which supported the newspaper's version of events. The four men who had been at Lovell's home that evening testified that the atmosphere had been professional, with no unseemly laughter or joking.
In a separate incident, Chief Brennan showed the still photographs of the autopsy to a man named Art Brewer, who was cleaning the chief's office. The pictures were on Chief Brennan's desk; he passed them to Brewer, asking, "Do you want something to eat?"
Glenn Williams' mother and sister (the appellants) sued the appellees on various theories, including intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and tortious interference with a dead body.
The appellees' responses have centered on two points: (1) That the videotape and photographs were public records, making it impossible for anyone to commit an actionable tort by showing them to other people. (2) That in any event the facts do not constitute any tort recognized at law.
The videotape and photographs are public records pursuant to Florida's Public Records Act, Chapter 119, Florida Statutes (1987), because they were made in connection with the official business of a police department. See Mahone v. State, 222 So.2d 769 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1969); § 119.011(1), Florida Statutes (1987).
The appellees' contend that under no circumstances can anyone ever be liable in tort for display of a public record. That argument is based partly on the provision of section 119.07(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), that "Every person who has custody of a public record shall permit the record to be inspected and examined by any person desiring to do so ...", and partly on the last sentence of Article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution
Right of privacy.--Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free Subsection 119.07(3), Florida Statutes (1987), provides exemptions to the requirement that public records be made available for public inspection. One exemption is for certain "active criminal investigative information," 2 but, contrary to the appellants' argument, the exemption does not prohibit the showing of such information. There are many situations in which investigators have reasons for displaying information which they have the option not to display.
from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law.
By similar reasoning, we cannot agree with the appellants that a custodian violates the Public Records Act simply by displaying public records without having been requested to do so by a member of the public. The entire thrust of the Act is to permit access to public records upon request, but it does not impose a secrecy requirement which bars a custodian from displaying a public record entirely of his own volition.
We concur with the opinions which have held that neither a custodian of records nor a person who is the subject of a record can claim a constitutional right of privacy as a bar to requested inspection of a public record which is in the hands of a government agency. See, e.g., Michel v. Douglas, 464 So.2d 545 (Fla.1985) (); Forsberg v. Housing Authority of Miami Beach, 455 So.2d 373 (Fla.1984); Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid and Associates, Inc., 379 So.2d 633 (Fla.1980) (); Mills v. Doyle, 407 So.2d 348 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
Those cases deal with the public's right of access to examine public records in the custody of government personnel, and the principle that there is no constitutional right of privacy which prevents access upon request. We find, however, that neither the Public Records Act nor the Florida Constitution grants a custodian protection against tort liability resulting from that person's intentionally communicating public records or their contents to someone outside the agency which is responsible for the records unless (1) the person inspecting the records has made a bona fide request to inspect them, in accordance with the Public Records Act, or (2) it is necessary to the agency's transaction of its official business to reveal the records to a person who has not requested to see them.
There is no law against gratuitously releasing public records, but neither will the law protect from civil liability custodians of public records who unnecessarily and perhaps abusively or maliciously reveal such records to persons outside the agency which controls the records. "Custodians" refers to all agency personnel who have it within their power to release or communicate public records. 3
The reference to public records in Article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution appears to guarantee the absolute right to inspection and examination of public records which are not subject to some statutory exception, but there is no indication that the section was intended to give license to individuals, be they agency personnel or members of the public who inspect public records, to do whatever they please with public records with immunity from all the safeguards for individual rights which the common law has painstakingly developed over the centuries. It would serve no useful social purpose, would contradict the constitutional intent to protect citizens Florida's policy underlying the Public Records Act is to hold governmental agencies, their officials, and their employees publicly accountable for their own actions. "The purpose of the Public Records Act is to promote public awareness and knowledge of governmental actions in order to ensure that governmental officials and agencies remain accountable to the people." Forsberg, 455 So.2d at 378 (Fla.1984), Justice Overton, specially concurring in result. Justice Overton emphasized that it remained an open question whether misuse of public records could result in civil liability:
from government intrusions into privacy, and would be contrary to logic and to the moral precepts which underlie our legal system, if an individual could lose his protection against such torts as invasion of privacy and infliction of emotional distress merely because certain information happened to get into the hands of a government agency.
Because the proper parties and facts are not before this Court, I would not address the issue of whether a civil action for invasion of privacy could...
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