Williams v. City of Spokane
| Decision Date | 03 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 99071-9 |
| Citation | 199 Wash.2d 236,505 P.3d 91 |
| Parties | Chris WILLIAMS, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated, Petitioner, v. CITY OF SPOKANE; and American Traffic Solutions, Inc, a foreign corporation, Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Sarah Nicole Harmon, Powell, Kuznetz & Parker, 1106 N. Washington St. Ste. A, Spokane, WA, 99201-2205, for Petitioner.
Vanessa Soriano Power, Stoel Rives LLP, 600 University St. Ste. 3600, Seattle, WA, 98101-3197, Rachel Hoffman Cox, Attorney at Law, 600 University St. Ste. 3600, Seattle, WA, 98101-4109, Salvatore J. Faggiano, Office of City Attorney, 808 W. Spokane Falls Blvd., Spokane, WA, 99201-3333, Respondents.
¶1 This case involves procedural questions that may arise when a person seeks relief from a municipal court judgment imposing a traffic infraction fine. Chris Williams was fined in Spokane Municipal Court for speeding in a school zone, an infraction captured by a traffic safety camera. Williams did not contest the infraction when it was issued, but he now claims that the camera was improperly positioned to photograph vehicles outside of the school zone. As a result, Williams contends that his infraction and the resulting municipal court judgment are invalid.
¶2 Instead of moving to vacate the judgment in municipal court, Williams filed a putative class action complaint in superior court against the City of Spokane (City) and American Traffic Solutions Inc. (ATS), seeking a refund of his fine and declaratory and injunctive relief. The trial court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Williams's complaint must be dismissed. We affirm the Court of Appeals.
¶3 In accordance with court rules, statutes, and case law, Williams must seek a refund of his infraction fine from the municipal court that issued the judgment. Until he does so, Williams does not have standing to seek declaratory or injunctive relief. Therefore, all of his claims are precluded. We remand to the superior court for dismissal of Williams's complaint.
¶4 On March 1, 2016, an ATS traffic safety camera near an elementary school captured Williams's car traveling at 28 miles per hour. Spokane Municipal Court issued him a notice of infraction (NOI) for speeding in a school zone. Williams initially requested a hearing to contest the NOI, but after the court scheduled a hearing date, Williams elected to pay the $234 fine without contest in July 2016.
¶5 On April 25, 2018, Williams filed a putative class action complaint against the City and ATS in Spokane County Superior Court. His complaint alleges that the traffic safety camera was incorrectly positioned and therefore that "[t]he tickets were improper as plaintiff and the class of similarly situated individuals were ticketed for allegedly speeding when they were not actually in a designated school zone." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 3. In addition to a refund of his fine based on theories of due process and unjust enrichment, Williams seeks an injunction and a judicial declaration "that defendants are unlawfully issuing speeding tickets for exceeding 20 miles per hour using speed enforcement equipment to measure vehicle speed outside of the statutorily designated school zone." Id. at 9.
¶6 The City and ATS moved for summary judgment, contending that all of Williams's claims are barred by res judicata and applicable court rules, that his unjust enrichment claim is barred by his voluntary payment of the fine, that the superior court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and that Williams's claims fail on the merits. The superior court denied summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals granted the City and ATS's motion for discretionary review.
¶7 On appeal, the City and ATS raised the same arguments as in their motion for summary judgment, and they contended for the first time that Williams lacks standing to seek equitable relief and that he fails to state a claim against ATS. Following oral argument, the Court of Appeals requested supplemental briefing on four questions related to standing:
Letter Requesting Suppl. Briefing, Williams v. City of Spokane , No. 36508-5-III, at 1 . After the parties filed their supplemental briefs, the Court of Appeals issued an unpublished opinion reversing the superior court.
¶8 The Court of Appeals held that the superior court has subject matter jurisdiction because "it holds authority to adjudicate the type of controversy involved in the action." Williams v. City of Spokane , No. 36508-5-III, slip op. at 10, 2020 WL 3284171 (Wash. Ct. App. June 18, 2020) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/365085_unp.pdf. However, the court held that Williams's monetary claims are precluded by statutes and court rules requiring those claims to be brought in the first instance in the municipal court. The Court of Appeals also chose to reach the issue of standing and held that Williams lacks standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief because he "does not allege that he ever drives through the ... school speed zone anymore."
Id. at 26. The court did not reach the other arguments raised by the City and ATS.
¶9 We granted Williams's petition for review and now affirm.
¶10 A. Did the Court of Appeals err by holding that Williams's monetary claims must be dismissed because he has not sought relief in municipal court?
¶11 B. Did the Court of Appeals err by reaching the issue of standing when it was raised for the first time on appeal?
¶12 C. Does Williams have standing to seek equitable relief?
¶13 Williams's complaint raises two claims for monetary damages based on theories of due process and unjust enrichment. Both monetary claims seek a refund of Williams's infraction fine and the fines paid by other members of the class, should a class ultimately be certified in this case.1 The superior court is not the proper forum to seek refunds of infraction fines that were adjudicated in municipal court. Therefore, Williams's monetary claims must be dismissed.
¶14 "Infractions are noncriminal violations of law defined by statute." IRLJ 1.1(a). Speeding in a school zone is one such infraction, defined by RCW 46.61.440(1). Therefore, like "all cases involving infractions," the disposition of Williams's infraction is governed by the "uniform and expeditious system" established in chapter 46.63 RCW and the Infraction Rules for Courts of Limited Jurisdiction (IRLJs). State v. Keltner , 102 Wash. App. 396, 399, 9 P.3d 838 (2000) ; RCW 46.63.010, .080(1).
¶15 Traffic infraction cases are initiated by a "notice of traffic infraction" or "[n]otice of infraction." RCW 46.63.060(1) ; IRLJ 1.2(b), 2.2(a). "If a notice of infraction is filed in a court which is not the proper venue, the notice shall be dismissed without prejudice on motion of either party." IRLJ 2.3. In this case, Williams's NOI was filed in Spokane Municipal Court, which the parties do not dispute was the proper venue.
¶16 A person must respond to an NOI within 15 days. RCW 46.63.070(1) ; IRLJ 2.4(a). If they do not want to contest the infraction, the person must respond by paying the fine "to the court specified on the notice," in which case "an appropriate order shall be entered in the court's records." RCW 46.63.070(2) ; see also IRLJ 2.4(b)(1). If they want to contest the infraction or "explain mitigating circumstances," the person must request a hearing. RCW 46.63.070(3), (4) ; see also IRLJ 2.4(b)(2), (3). An NOI "represents a determination that an infraction has been committed" and is "final unless contested as provided in" chapter 46.63 RCW. RCW 46.63.060(1) ; see also IRLJ 2.5.
¶17 In this case, Williams initially requested and received a hearing date but ultimately chose to pay the fine without contesting it or attempting to explain mitigating circumstances. As a result, Williams's NOI was not "contested" and is therefore "final." RCW 46.63.060(1). He is not entitled to (and did not attempt to) appeal the resulting municipal court judgment. IRLJ 5.1. The only avenue for Williams to obtain relief from the judgment "is governed by CRLJ 60(b)." IRLJ 6.7(a). CRLJ 60(b), in turn, provides that "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or [their] legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding." It does not refer to "a" court or "any" court; it refers to "the" court, that is, the court that issued the underlying judgment. Cf. Guardado v. Guardado , 200 Wash. App. 237, 243-44, 402 P.3d 357 (2017) (published in part) ( CR 60(e)(1) ).
¶18 Thus, in accordance with the plain language of IRLJ 6.7(a) and CRLJ 60(b), to obtain a refund of his uncontested fine, Williams must file a motion to vacate the judgment in Spokane Municipal Court. He did not do so, choosing instead to file a complaint for a refund of his fine in superior court. This was not the proper forum to seek such relief, so his monetary claims must be dismissed.
¶19 In all relevant aspects, this case is indistinguishable from Boone v. City of Seattle , a persuasive, unpublished Court of Appeals decision.2 No....
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