Williams v. Cnty. of San Bernardino

• Decision Date: 22 October 2014
• Docket Number: E057017
• Parties: KARL JOHN WILLIAMS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO et al., Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

KARL JOHN WILLIAMS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO et al., Defendants and Respondents.

E057017

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO

October 22, 2014

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Super.Ct.No. CIVRS1101825)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Barry L. Plotkin, Judge. (Retired judge of the San Bernardino Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.

David H. Ricks & Associations and David H. Ricks for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Jean-Rene Basle, County Counsel, and James H. Thebeau, Deputy County Counsel, for Defendants and Respondents.

A sheriff's deputy responded to Karl Williams's (plaintiff) residence in response to a 911 call about men fighting. Plaintiff became belligerent, refusing to comply with repeated directions and attempting to go inside the residence, so the deputy used a Taseron plaintiff more than once, before taking him into custody for interfering with an officer. (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1).) Plaintiff eventually pled guilty to an infraction (Pen. Code, § 415),¹ filed a claim against the County of San Bernardino (the County), and then brought this action for violation of his civil rights pursuant to title 42 of the United States Code, section 1983, assault and battery, false arrest or imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation of Civil Code sections 51.7 and 52.1, and negligence. The County and the deputy (collectively, defendants) first filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which resulted in dismissal of several of the causes of action without leave to amend, followed by a successful motion for summary judgment, disposing of the remainder of the complaint. Plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, plaintiff argues, among other things, that his civil rights claims were not barred by his conviction on the infraction, that his government claim adequately presented all theories of liability, and that the deputy was not covered by qualified immunity. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Because a motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, attacking defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters subject to judicial notice, we accept as true the complaint's factual allegations and give them a liberal construction. (Burnett v. Chimney Sweep (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1057,1064-1065.) We also rely upon facts as adduced from the record before the superior court in reviewing the defendants' summary judgment motion.

On the evening of April 27, 2010, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Sheriff's Deputy J. Tebbetts pulled his cruiser into the driveway of plaintiff's residence, exited the vehicle, and approached the garage. Tebbetts was responding to an emergency 911 call reporting a fight between two males. Plaintiff was sitting in the garage with his friend, Dan Cliff, watching television. The garage door was partially open, so Tebbetts bent down and informed plaintiff he had been dispatched to the location in reference to a fight. Plaintiff informed Tebbetts that he and Cliff had been drinking.

Tebbetts asked the two men to exit the garage. Cliff complied, but plaintiff was uncooperative. Plaintiff was in an agitated state and refused to comply with Tibbetts's commands to step out of the garage and away from areas that posed a danger to Tebbetts's safety.² Plaintiff refused to produce identification despite being repeatedly asked. Plaintiff demanded that Tibbetts leave the property, and announced, in defiance of the deputy's commands, that he was going inside and that Tebbetts had no reason or right to be there. As plaintiff moved back, his body was in a "bladed position." Given plaintiff's conduct and potential access to weapons inside the residence, Tebbetts believed that plaintiff posed a threat to his safety.

As plaintiff re-entered the garage, Tebbetts unholstered his Taser, ordered plaintiff to step outside, and warned him that he would be tased if he did not comply. Plaintiff moved back inside the garage and in the direction of the door to the interior of the house. Tebbetts deployed the Taser, which was ineffective, and plaintiff continued to step backward away from the deputy. Plaintiff directed expletives at Tebbetts, and swiped his arm over his chest area, preventing the Taser from making proper contact. Tebbetts then deployed the Taser a second time, striking plaintiff in his chest and abdomen. Plaintiff fell in front of the door leading into the house and removed the Taser probes from his chest, rendering the cycle ineffective.

Tebbetts approached plaintiff and instructed him to roll over and place his hands behind his back multiple times. Plaintiff refused to put his hands behind his back. Plaintiff continued to resist, so Tebbetts threatened to pepper spray him. Plaintiff finally rolled over onto his stomach, placing his hands behind his back. Tebbetts placed plaintiff under arrest for violation of Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a)(1), resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer in the performance of his duty.

On August 11, 2010, plaintiff filed a claim against the County of San Bernardino seeking damages based on the following circumstances: "Claimant Williams was inside his garage when he was approached by San Bernardino County Sheriff Deputy J. Tebbetts. Without provocation and warning, Deputy J. Tebbetts discharges [sic] his Taser weapon at Mr. Williams, not once, but twice, resulting in significant physical injuries to Mr. Williams." On September 7, 2010, the County rejected plaintiff's claim.

On February 17, 2011, plaintiff filed a civil complaint against Deputy Tebbetts and his employer, the County, alleging seven causes of action: (1) Violation of civil rights (42 U.S.C § 1983); (2) assault; (3) battery; (4) false arrest and imprisonment; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (6) violation of Civil Code sections 51.7, 52, and 52.1; and (7) negligence.³

On June 9, 2011, plaintiff pled guilty to an infraction violation of Penal Code section 415, disturbing the peace, pursuant to a plea agreement.

On July 6, 2011, defendants answered the complaint, raising several affirmative defenses. On December 21, 2011, the County and Tebbetts made a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the first, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh causes of action. The grounds for the motion included the fact that (a) the causes of action were barred by plaintiff's subsequent conviction arising from the subject arrest, (b) the County cannot be held vicariously liable for a civil rights violation, (c) he failed to present all claims in his government tort claim, and (d) he failed to allege outrageous conduct for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In support of the motion, the County requested that the court take judicial notice of plaintiff's plea of guilty to the infraction violation of Penal Code section 415, his government tort claim, and the notice of rejection of that claim by the County.

On February 28, 2012, the trial court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings as follows: as to the County, the motion was granted without leave to amendas to the first, fourth, sixth and seventh causes of action; as to Tebbetts, the motion was granted as to the fourth, sixth, and seventh causes of action, without leave to amend. As to Tebbetts, the motion was denied as to the first and fifth causes of action.⁴

On March 16, 2012, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment as to the first (as to Tebbetts), second, and third causes of action (as to all defendants). In support of the motion, the County submitted a transcript of the belt recording made contemporaneously with the incident, along with declarations of Tebbetts and Dan Cliff (plaintiff's companion in the garage) and extracts from their deposition transcripts. On June 5, 2012, the court granted the motion for summary judgment as to the balance of the complaint. The trial court awarded costs to the defendants. On August 24, 2012, plaintiff appealed from the judgment.

DISCUSSION

1. The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Counts 4 through 7.

Plaintiff challenges the order granting judgment on the pleadings, which resulted in dismissal without leave to amend counts 1 (civil rights violation as to the County only), 4 (false arrest/imprisonment), 5 (intentional infliction of emotional distress), 6 (state civil rights violations, Civ. Code, §§ 51.7, 52, 52.1), and 7 (negligence).

a. Standard of Review—Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

Motions for judgment on the pleadings may be made on grounds that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action, or the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B); Protect Agricultural Land v. Stanislaus County Local Agency Formation Com. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 550, 556.) Such a motion performs the same function as a general demurrer, attacking only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. (Burnett v. Chimney Sweep (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1064.)

The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a demurrer. (Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399, 416.) We accept as true the complaint's factual allegations and give them a liberal construction. (Burnett v. Chimney Sweep, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 1065.) We also consider evidence outside the pleadings which the trial court considered without objection. (Ibid., citing Pomona College v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1716, 1721; see also,...