Williams v. Colvin
| Decision Date | 06 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 12–cv–6179–YGR |
| Citation | 24 F.Supp.3d 901 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
| Parties | Craig Dewey Williams, Plaintiff, v. Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant. |
Benjamin Patrick Smith, Herman Joseph Hoying, Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff.
Daniel Paul Talbert, Patrick William Snyder, Social Security Administration, Office of the General Counsel, Alex Gene Tse, U.S. Attorney's Office, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant.
Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Defendant's Cross–Motion for Summary Judgment
On May 13, 2013, Plaintiff Craig Dewey Williams filed this action seeking judicial review of Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Benjamin F. Parks' decision that he is not disabled under sections 216(i), 223(d), or 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. Pending before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. (Dkt. Nos. 18, 22, 23.) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed four errors: (i) the ALJ failed to consider Plaintiff's panic disorder in his Step Two evaluation and instead found that Plaintiff had a severe impairment Plaintiff did not claim as a basis of disability; (ii) the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's impairments did not meet any listed impairments without specifically identifying the factors for certain listed impairments and analyzing whether Plaintiff demonstrated those factors; (iii) the ALJ's determination of Plaintiff's Residual Functional Capacity was not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ did not properly consider medical opinion evidence and improperly discredited Plaintiff's allegations of disabling symptoms; and (iv) the ALJ's Step Five determination that Plaintiff can perform specific work was not supported by substantial evidence and was based on legal error. In opposition, Defendant Commissioner Carolyn W. Colvin contends that the ALJ made no reversible errors of law and that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's decision.
Having carefully considered the papers submitted and the pleadings in this action, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby Grants Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Denies Defendant's Cross–Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income on July 31, 2009, alleging that he had been disabled since January 15, 2008. (Record at 14.) These claims were first denied on December 10, 2009 and upon reconsideration on June 28, 2010. (Id. ) On July 9, 2010, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ. (Id. ) On January 11, 2011, Administrative Law Judge Benjamin F. Parks held a hearing at which Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified. (Id. ) Robert A. Raschke, an impartial vocational expert, also testified.1 (Id. ) On May 24, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision in which he determined that Plaintiff was non-disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and denied Plaintiff's application for disability benefits and supplemental security income. (Id. ) On October 2, 2012, the Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's decision, rendering the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Id. at 1–4.) Plaintiff now appeals from that decision. (Dkt. No. 1.)
This Court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g). The Court may reverse the ALJ's decision only if it “contains legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir.2007) (internal citations omitted). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir.2005). It is “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n. 1 (9th Cir.2005). Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational conclusion, the Court must uphold the ALJ. Burch, 400 F.3d at 679.
The SSA uses a five-step sequential framework to determine whether a claimant is disabled. At Step One, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). A person is involved in substantial work activity if he engages in work that involves significant physical or mental activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572(a), 416.972(a). Gainful work activity is defined as “work usually done for pay or profit,” regardless of whether the claimant receives a profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572(b), 416.972(a). If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, he is not disabled. If the claimant does not engage in substantial gainful activity, the ALJ proceeds to Step Two of the evaluation.
At Step Two, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has an impairment or combination of impairments that is severe. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). A “severe” impairment is defined in the regulations as one that significantly limits an individual's ability to perform basic work activities. If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, he is not disabled. If the claimant does have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the ALJ proceeds to Step Three.
At Step Three of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ must determine whether a claimant's impairment or combination of impairments “meets or equals” the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1., 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925, 416.926. If the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments meets the criteria of a listing and the duration requirement, the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 416.909. If the impairment or combination of impairments does not meet the criteria of a listing or does not meet the duration requirement, the ALJ proceeds to the next step.
Before reaching Step Four in the sequential evaluation, the ALJ must determine the claimant's residual functional capacity (“RF Capacity”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). A claimant's RF Capacity consists of his ability to engage in physical and mental work activity on an ongoing basis, in spite of any limitations from impairments. The ALJ considers both severe and non-severe impairments in determining the claimant's RF Capacity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545, 416.920(e), 416.945.
At Step Four, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has the RF Capacity to perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If the claimant has such capacity, he is not disabled. If the claimant is unable to do past relevant work or has no past relevant work, the ALJ proceeds to the final step in the sequential evaluation.
At Step Five, the ALJ considers the claimant's RF Capacity, age, education, and work experience in determining whether the claimant can perform any other work besides past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If the claimant can perform other work, he is not disabled. If the claimant cannot perform other work and fulfills the durational requirement, he is disabled.
The ALJ applied the five-step sequential analysis to determine whether Plaintiff was disabled and eligible for disability insurance benefits. (Record at 14–24.)
At Step One, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 15, 2008, the alleged disability onset date. (Record at 16.) Specifically, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “worked after the alleged disability onset date but this work activity did not rise to the level of substantial gainful activity.” (Id. )
At Step Two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “has the following severe impairments: HIV, Depression, and Drug and Alcohol Abuse in Early Remission.” (Record at 16.) The ALJ thus proceeded to Step Three.
At Step Three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have “an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments” under the regulations. (Record at 16.) Specifically, the ALJ “considered all of the claimant's impairments individually and in combination but can find no evidence that the combined clinical findings from such impairments reach the level of severity contemplated by the Listings.” (Id. ) Accordingly, the ALJ stated that disability could not be established on the medical facts alone. (Id. at 16–17.) The ALJ also considered Plaintiff's mental impairments both singly and in combination, and determined that again, Plaintiff's impairments did not rise to the level of a listed impairment for two listed impairments: 12.04 (Affective Disorders) and 12.09 (Substance Addiction Disorders). The ALJ concluded that medical evidence and the Plaintiff's testimony established only “mild restrictions in the activities of daily living, moderate difficulties in maintaining social functioning, and mild difficulties maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace.” (Id. at 17.)
As a result, before proceeding to Step Four, the ALJ made a determination regarding Plaintiff's RF Capacity, considering “all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence” as required by 20 C.F.R. sections 404.1529 and 416.929, and SSRs 96–4p and 96–7p. (Record at 18.) The ALJ noted that when considering Plaintiff's symptoms, he “must follow a two-step process.” (Id. ) First, the ALJ must determine “whether there is an underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment... that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant's pain or other symptoms.” (Id. ) “Second, once an underlying physical ... impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant's pain...
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