Williams v. Commonwealth, 2013-CA-001592-DG
| Decision Date | 27 February 2015 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2013-CA-001592-DG,2013-CA-001592-DG |
| Parties | JAMES ANTHONY WILLIAMS APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
TO BE PUBLISHED
ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
This case arose as a result of a single vehicle rollover crash on I-65 in Jefferson County, approximately a half-mile before the junction with I-265. Policeobserved Williams at the scene with slurred speech and eyes that were bloodshot and glassy. Upon inquiry from a police officer, Williams responded to the officer that he had drunk "too much to be driving."
Williams was transported by EMS to University Hospital and refused to consent to having blood drawn for the police officer's "blood kit." The uniform citation recited that Williams had informed the police officer he had been drinking alcohol at a party on campus at the University of Louisville. Further, the citation stated that Williams reported he had not known exactly how much he had had to drink but had "several cups from a bottle of liquor."
However, upon his arrival at University Hospital's Emergency Department, Williams was placed under a "warrantless arrest" per the hospital's protocol with patients who are homicidal, suicidal, or otherwise demonstrating impaired decision-making ability. During this process, a blood sample was taken to determine whether, because of the serious nature of the rollover accident, Williams had any alcohol in his system that would affect his treatment.
Prior to trial, Williams made a motion to suppress the blood alcohol evidence obtained by the hospital, as well as any statements made by him to law enforcement officers. Thereafter, hearings were conducted on two separate dates in district court concerning Williams' suppression motions.
Officer Lawrence Farmer of the Louisville Metro Police Department stated he was working the midnight to 10:00 a.m. shift on October 2, 2010. He further explained that he was dispatched to the scene of a one-vehicle crash at 4:17that morning. He related that he and another officer were the first responders on the scene, and that upon arriving, he observed Williams outside of his vehicle. Officer Farmer went over to Williams to assess if he had sustained any injuries in the crash and otherwise to see how he was doing.
Officer Farmer could smell alcohol on Williams, and he observed him with bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. When the officer asked how much he had had to drink, Williams responded that it was too much to be driving. After EMS arrived at the scene, the officer followed the EMS vehicle to University Hospital in downtown Louisville. The police officer explained that Williams was being treated at the hospital for injuries sustained in the rollover crash. Officer Farmer asked Williams if he would submit to the taking of blood for purposes of his investigation as he suspected Williams may have been driving under the influence of alcohol. In response, Williams refused to submit to Officer Farmer's request for blood to be drawn.
Officer Farmer explained that he did not ask the hospital to place Williams in any sort of restraint or confinement that morning. He also explained that he prepared the citation charging Williams with driving under the influence without knowing about the hospital's testing of Williams that morning.
Angela McKnight, a registered nurse at University Hospital's Emergency Department, also testified during the course of the district court proceedings. She explained that the medical records the Commonwealth sought to introduce at trial were generated during the hospital's treatment of Williams onOctober 2, 2010. She further explained that the medical records reflected, among other things, that testing had been done on Williams and that said tests revealed the presence of alcohol in his system. Per the hospital's protocol, Williams was considered in a "warrantless arrest" situation. She explained that the status was not a criminal matter, but is a status dealing with patients who are homicidal, suicidal, or are otherwise demonstrating impaired decision-making ability. She explained that the hospital conducts an evaluation of such patients and removes personal items so that the patients cannot harm themselves or others in any way.
At the hearings before the district court, Williams argued that the information gathered by University Hospital constituted state action and should be suppressed. The Commonwealth argued that the complained about information was not state action, as it was not the result of a police investigation, but was instead gathered by a private party at the hospital for use in treating Williams as a patient. Regarding Williams' inculpatory statement that he had been drinking too much to drive, the district court did not specifically rule on that issue, and defense counsel stated that "we can just review that before trial." The district court ruled that the alcohol test results gathered by University Hospital would be suppressed. At this point, the Commonwealth stated that it would not be able to proceed to trial without evidence of the blood alcohol tests. The trial court agreed, and on November 2, 2012, on its own motion, dismissed the driving under the influence case against Williams.
The Commonwealth then appealed as a matter of right to the Jefferson Circuit Court. There, Williams moved to dismiss the Commonwealth's appeal, citing Harrel v. Yonts, 113 S.W.2d 426 (1938), for the rule that an appeal cannot be maintained "in cases where the appealing party agrees to termination of the action." Williams also cited Stoecklin v. River Metal Recycling, LLC, 370 S.W.3d 527, 529 (Ky. App. 2012), for the proposition that appeals
The Commonwealth contended that it was properly before the Jefferson Circuit Court to review the final action of the district court, which dismissed its criminal prosecution. Relying upon Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 23A.080(1), the Commonwealth noted that it was properly before the circuit court as the appeal taken by it was from a "final action" of the district court. Further, the Commonwealth also noted that pursuant to Section 115 of the Kentucky Constitution, it was entitled to one appeal as a matter of right. Id.
The Commonwealth also argued that there was nothing voluntary about the dismissal of its criminal prosecution of Williams. The Commonwealth pointed out that throughout the proceedings in the district court, it vigorously opposed the complained about suppression motion, which was ultimately granted by the district court, and throughout the proceedings in the trial court maintained that it was entitled to proceed to a trial on the merits. Further, the Commonwealthnoted that Judge Armstrong stated on the record that based upon his earlier rulings the Commonwealth was unable to go forward and that the case would therefore be dismissed upon the court's own motion. In its response, the Commonwealth noted that Williams acknowledged in his motion to dismiss the appeal that Judge Armstrong stated on the record that "I have pretty much taken away anything you could put on at a trial" and that Judge Armstrong specifically stated on the record that the dismissal from which the Commonwealth took its appeal was "on motion of the court."
The circuit court denied Williams' motion to dismiss in an opinion rendered on June 3, 2013. The court noted that the Commonwealth expressed frustration that it no longer had admissible evidence to submit to a jury, but felt as though it was not in a position to dismiss the case or amend the charges. The circuit court noted that there was never a motion by the Commonwealth to have the case dismissed and that "the record does reflect an objection by the Commonwealth to the dismissal." The circuit court noted that the district court dismissed the criminal prosecution "sua sponte" and that
Thereafter, the circuit court entered its opinion reversing and remanding on August 13, 2013. This Court granted discretionary review on January 24, 2014, and this appeal now follows.
On appeal, Williams argues that the Commonwealth waived its right to appeal from an order of dismissal and that the district court properly excluded evidence arising from a blood sample. The Commonwealth counters that the circuit court correctly concluded that it had properly invoked the appellate jurisdiction of the circuit court.
A review of the record indicates that the Commonwealth opposed the motion to suppress and consistently asserted that it was entitled to proceed to a trial on the merits with the evidence the district court suppressed. The district court observed that in view of its prior rulings the Commonwealth could not "go forward." The district court specifically noted that the dismissal of the criminal prosecution was on the trial court's own motion at least two times during the proceedings. The record indicates that the Commonwealth vigorously opposed the suppression efforts, and the circuit court below rightly rejected the notion that somehow the Commonwealth had...
To continue reading
Request your trial