Williams v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 17 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2015-CA-001579-MR,2015-CA-001579-MR |
| Parties | HOWARD WILLIAMS APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
In 2014, the Covington Police Department structured several sting operations involving the controlled purchase of narcotics. Dawnita Neaves initially agreed to work for the Department as a confidential informant in exchange for the dismissal of several pending drug charges. She fulfilled the terms of the initial agreement and her charges were dismissed. However, Neaves continued to work for the Department as a paid confidential informant.
Neaves met Williams at a bus stop in November 2014. She observed Williams walking across the street repeatedly saying "boy, boy, boy." "Boy" is a slang term for heroin. She asked Williams for a "tester" (sample) of his product, which he did not have, but she did obtain his telephone number. Neaves then reported the incident to her handler at the Department. Neaves did not know Williams' name so she nicknamed him "Rude Ass" because she thought he was rude in their initial encounter. Williams was thus dubbed "Rude Ass" in Neaves' cellphone, and this was reflected in texts from that cellphone that would later be presented as evidence to the jury.
Covington police followed up on Neaves' information and used Neaves to implement two controlled drug transactions, first on November 6, 2014, and later on December 9, 2014. The police obtained the aforementioned text messages, as well as audio recordings of Neaves' telephone conversations with Williams and video recordings of the two controlled drug transactions. In each instance, Neaves paid Williams forty dollars for a substance she believed washeroin, and then turned the substance over to her handler. The police initially thought both transactions resulted in the purchase of heroin, but laboratory testing revealed the material procured on November 6, 2014, did not contain a controlled substance. The purchase from December 9, 2014, however, was found to contain heroin.
On April 16, 2015, the grand jury indicted Williams for first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance1 (less than two grams of heroin)2 and for trafficking in a simulated controlled substance.3 In a pretrial conference held eight days before trial, Williams' trial counsel orally informed the circuit court that Williams wished to represent himself. All parties agreed that this would necessitate a Faretta4 hearing before trial. The Commonwealth asked the court for time to prepare for the hearing, and informed the court that he would be unavailable for a hearing on the matter that week, and suggested postponing the trial. Defense counsel stated that she was not certain how Williams would feel about continuing the trial date. The circuit court then spoke to Williams directly, telling him the next available date for the Faretta hearing would be on August 25, 2015, the date scheduled for trial. The court offered Williams time to confer with his attorneys and offered to schedule the Faretta hearing. Williams was averse todelaying the trial, since it had been six months since his arrest, and stated that if the matter were to take more time, then he would rather just proceed to trial. The court confirmed that Williams wished to withdraw his motion for a Faretta hearing, and Williams ultimately elected to go to trial with his current counsel.
The case proceeded to a two-day jury trial ending on August 26, 2015. Williams testified in his own defense, stating he had never sold heroin to Neaves and the items he sold her were energy pills. The jury found Williams guilty on both counts and recommended a sentence of eight and one-half years for trafficking in a controlled substance and eight months for trafficking in a simulated controlled substance, to be served concurrently. On October 9, 2015, the circuit court entered its written Final Judgment and Sentence of Imprisonment in accordance with the jury's recommendation. This appeal follows.
Williams brings four issues on appeal. He first asserts the circuit court erred when it forced him to choose between two Sixth Amendment5 rights:his right to represent himself at trial and his right to a speedy trial. Second, Williams states that the circuit court erred in permitting the Commonwealth to refer to him by the nickname "Rude Ass" during trial, in violation of KRE6 404(b) and (c). Third, Williams contends that the circuit court erred by allowing the Commonwealth to submit character evidence without providing notice under KRE 404(c). Finally, Williams argues that the circuit court erred by improperly redacting information related to the charges facing Neaves when she decided to become a confidential informant. We will address the KRE 404 arguments together, and the remaining two arguments separately.
Williams first argues that the circuit court erred by forcing him to abandon his right to self-representation to gain his right to a speedy trial. He claims the rights were not incongruous; that is, the circuit court had ample time to hold a Faretta hearing without continuing Williams' trial, but it chose not to, thereby resulting in reversible error. We disagree.
"The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section Eleven of the Kentucky Constitution guarantee criminal defendants the right to counsel as well as the converse right to self-representation." King v. Commonwealth, 374 S.W.3d 281, 290 (Ky. 2012). When a defendant makes an unequivocal request to waive counsel and proceed pro se, a hearing - known in legal parlance as a Faretta hearing - is not simply advised, but is required "toensure that the defendant's waiver of the right to counsel is both knowing and voluntary." Winstead v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 678, 683 (Ky. 2009); St. Clair v. Commonwealth, 319 S.W.3d 300, 311 (Ky. 2010). "[Appellant] should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open." Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Sixth Amendment also guarantees criminal defendants the right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI.; Ky. Const. § 11; Goncalves v. Commonwealth, 404 S.W.3d 180, 198 (Ky. 2013). What constitutes a "speedy trial" is often fact specific and is not subject to a clearly designated time frame. Four factors must be weighed to determine if a speedy-trial violation has occurred,7 the first of which is the length of delay. Goncalves, 404 S.W.3d at 198. Smith v. Commonwealth, 361 S.W.3d 908, 914 (Ky. 2012) (citation omitted); Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n. 1 (1992) ().
Despite Williams' assertions that he was faced with a choice that could violate his right to a speedy trial, it is clear that this right was never actually in jeopardy. Williams clearly preferred an expeditious resolution. But a mere sixth month delay between arrest and trial is not constitutionally intolerable. See, e.g., Gerlaugh v. Commonwealth, 156 S.W.3d 747, 750 (Ky. 2005) (); Brown v. Commonwealth, 934 S.W.2d 242, 248-49 (Ky. 1996) (); Barnett v. Commonwealth, 2014-SC-000226-MR, 2015 WL 9243368, at *3 (Ky. Dec. 17, 2015)8 (). At no point was Williams required to surrender one constitutional right in favor of another.
In our view, Williams created the predicament of which he now complains. Despite his admitted familiarity with the judicial process,9 Williams waited until the week before trial - six months after indictment - to move for self-representation, knowing such a motion would necessitate a Faretta hearing. This motion could have been made weeks prior to trial, thereby allowing the circuit court ample time to conduct a hearing and to rule on the motion without disturbing the scheduled trial date. Stacy v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.3d 787, 797 (Ky. 2013).
Had the circuit court declined to hold a Faretta hearing in favor of Williams' right to a speedy trial, Williams would be before this Court complaining the court violated his Sixth Amendment right in that regard. Because the circuit court took ample steps to protect Williams' right to self-representation and there was no imminent threat to Williams' right to a speedy trial, we find no error.
Williams next argues that the circuit court erred in permitting the Commonwealth to refer to...
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