Williams v. Corpus Christi Independent School District, No. 13-04-00455-CV (Tex. App. 7/20/2006)
| Decision Date | 20 July 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 13-04-00455-CV.,13-04-00455-CV. |
| Parties | ELIZABETH J. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. CORPUS CHRISTI INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Texas |
On Appeal from the 94th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.
Before Justices HINOJOSA, YAÑEZ, and GARZA.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment rendered in favor of appellee, Corpus Christi Independent School District, in a worker's compensation retaliation suit brought by appellant, Elizabeth J. Williams. In five issues, appellant contends the trial court erred in (1) denying the discovery of certain documents, (2) overruling objections to the District's summary judgment evidence, (3) granting summary judgment on the workers' compensation retaliation claim, (4) granting summary judgment on the age and gender discrimination claims, and (5) impliedly finding that the District's policies are not contrary to public policy. We affirm.
Appellant was hired by the District in July 1996, and employed as a bus driver until she sustained an on-the-job injury on October 4, 2001. After appellant was injured, Samuel Cardona, an employee with the District's benefits office, prepared an "Employer's First Report of Injury or Illness." The report was mailed on October 11, 2001, and a workers' compensation benefits claim was initiated for appellant.1
Following its written policy, the District presented appellant with the payment options offered by the District for injured employees. Appellant could receive (1) seventy to seventy-five percent of her weekly wage from workers' compensation, (2) one hundred percent of her wage, by supplementing her workers' compensation benefits with accrued sick leave benefits, or (3) full wages if she used only her accrued sick leave benefits. Appellant chose to receive workers' compensation benefits only. Appellant claims that the District pressured her to use some or all of her accrued sick leave. The District contends it was only trying to help appellant by letting her know that she could supplement her workers' compensation benefits with accrued sick leave benefits.
Dr. Bernard Segar began treating appellant for her injuries on October 16, 2001. Appellant was notified by letter, dated October 18, 2001, that the first "Temporary Income Benefit" payment had been mailed.
The District has a written policy that applies to all employees not able to work for extended periods of time. The maximum leave time allowed for any temporary disability is 180 calendar days. Upon returning from disability leave, the employee is placed on a priority list and is returned to duty, contingent upon there being a vacancy in a job for which the person is qualified. When such a vacancy occurs, the employee is notified by mail. If the employee fails to respond to the notice within ten days, a final attempt to contact the employee is made by telephone. An employee's failure to respond or communicate is deemed an election to not report, and the employee's employment is then terminated.
On March 4, 2002, the District sent appellant a letter advising her (1) of the District's 180 day policy, (2) that she had already used more than 150 days, (3) that she had "thirty (30) calendar days . . . to submit to the Office of Employee Benefits the attached physical requirement form that needed to be completed by [her] examining physician," and (4) if she failed "to submit the attached form by April 3, 2002, [she would] be placed on indefinite medical leave" (emphasis in original). The letter also described the District's procedure for her to return to duty.
Dr. Segar gave appellant a limited medical release, effective March 25, 2002, which allowed appellant to return to work, but specified that she was to perform "sedentary [duties] only with a brace." On March 25, 2002, appellant took the medical release to Cardona. Cardona informed appellant that the District did not currently have any "light duty" positions suitable for her limited ability to work.
On March 27, 2002, the District mailed appellant a letter. The letter stated that (1) appellant had been notified she was approaching the 180 day limit on employee leave of absence for temporary disability, (2) appellant would be placed on indefinite medical leave effective March 27, 2002, and (3) appellant would "then be placed on a priority list and be restored to duty contingent upon there being a vacancy for which the [appellant] is qualified."
On May 20, 2002, 228 days after the October 4, 2001 injury, Dr. Segar released appellant to return to work, without restrictions, effective May 22, 2002. An "Approval to Return to Work" stamp was placed on the document and signed by the District's Office of Employee Benefits, completing the first step in allowing appellant to return to work. However, appellant did not file the required application form to be placed on the priority list.
On July 10, 2002, appellant filed a "Claim of Discrimination" with the Texas Commission on Human Rights, alleging that discrimination had occurred between March 25, 2002 and May 20, 2002. Appellant filed suit against the District on November 8, 2002, alleging that the District had (1) violated labor code sections 451.001 et seq., 21.051 et seq., 21.101 et seq., and 21.055, (2) retaliated against her for filing and pursuing her workers' compensation benefits, and (3) acted with malice and reckless indifference which entitled her to exemplary damages.
The District denied appellant's allegations and filed both traditional and no-evidence motions for summary judgment asserting (1) there was no evidence showing that the District had placed appellant on indefinite medical leave because she had filed a worker's compensation claim, and (2) there was no evidence showing that appellant had been discriminated against because of her race, age, or gender and that others similarly situated were treated differently. In support of its motion for summary judgment, the District relied upon the following: (1) affidavits from (a) Helen Gurley, (b) Engledina Garcia, the District's custodian of records for Records Pertaining to Driver Assignments, (c) Stephan Horner, and (d) the District's custodian of records for Printouts of Bus Driver Populations; (2) the deposition of appellant; and (3) appellant's personnel records.
In response to the District's motions for summary judgment, appellant (1) asserted that the motion was premature because more time was needed for discovery, (2) objected to certain affidavits attached to the District's motion, and (3) argued that she had presented more than a scintilla of evidence of a disputed material fact. In support of her response, appellant relied upon thirty-six exhibits previously submitted to the trial court.
On July 9, 2004, the trial court granted a partial summary judgment in favor of the District on appellant's claims for discrimination under section 21.051 of the Texas Labor Code. The trial court later granted summary judgment in favor of the District on appellant's remaining claims for retaliatory discharge under section 451.001 of the labor code and signed a final judgment on July 30, 2004, that appellant take nothing by her suit. This appeal ensued.
In her first issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying her request for the production of certain items during discovery.
The trial court is imbued with discretion to rule on matters related to discovery. Lopez v. Martin, 10 S.W.3d 790, 795 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. denied); Gen. Tire, Inc. v. Kepple, 970 S.W.2d 520, 526 (Tex. 1998); Jampole v. Touchy, 673 S.W.2d 569, 574-75 (Tex. 1984). We will not reverse the decision of the trial court unless there is some indication that the court acted without reference to guiding rules and principles or acted arbitrarily and unreasonably. Lopez, 10 S.W.3d at 795; Koslow's v. Mackie, 796 S.W.2d 700, 704 (Tex. 1990). We presume the record to be a complete record for the purposes of reviewing the stated issues. TEX. R. APP. P. 34.6(c)(4). To determine whether error has "probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment," the content of documents denied during discovery must be available to the appellate court. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.1(a)(1).
In her first motion to compel, appellant sought the production of documents requested in five of her interrogatories. The trial court agreed with appellant that the District should produce certain documents, agreed to review, in camera, two files to determine if they should be produced, and reserved its ruling on all other matters for thirty days. Appellant subsequently filed a second motion to compel requesting several more documents. The trial court denied appellant's request for production of the documents inspected in camera and denied all of the requests for production contained in her second motion to compel.
The District objected to appellant's request for production of documents. The District argued the items sought "either do not relate to the grounds of relief [appellant] has sought or seek information or documents that are unduly burdensome."
Appellant failed to bring forward, under seal, the documents reviewed by the trial court in camera. Appellant also failed to bring forward all documents requested, but denied by the trial court. Without these documents, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying production of the requested documents, or that any error committed by the trial court has probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.1(a)(1). Appellant's first issue is overruled.
In her second issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in overruling her objections to several affidavits filed by the District as summary judgment evidence.
We apply an abuse of discretion standard to...
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