Williams v. County of Los Angeles
Decision Date | 30 November 1978 |
Citation | 150 Cal.Rptr. 475,22 Cal.3d 731,586 P.2d 956 |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Parties | , 586 P.2d 956 Bennie C. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Respondents. L.A. 30938. |
Bennett B. Cohon and Steven H. Gardner, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and appellant.
John H. Larson, County Counsel, and Halvor S. Melom, Deputy County Counsel, for defendants and respondents.
Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 124 Cal.Rptr. 14, 539 P.2d 774 held that a permanent civil service employee may not be dismissed unless, "(a)s a minimum . . . preremoval safeguards . . . include notice of the proposed action the reasons therefor, a copy of the charges and materials upon which the action is based, and the right to respond, either orally or in writing, to the authority initially imposing discipline." (Id., p. 215, 124 Cal.Rptr. p. 28, 539 P.2d p. 788.)
In this case we hold that the Skelly rules apply to the dismissal of certain seasonal civil service employees. The initial question is whether plaintiff here has a right to his job that is protected by article I, section 7 of the California Constitution. A second question concerns the procedures that appear to have preceded plaintiff's dismissal.
Plaintiff was a civil service employee of Los Angeles County and, because of his ratings, had justifiable expectations as to re-employment. During the Spring of 1975 he accepted the county's offer that, beginning on June 16, he manage a swimming pool. Relying on that contract he rejected alternate employment opportunities for the 1975 summer season.
Problems arose as to the date of the pool's opening, and county counsel has advised us regarding succeeding events as follows:
Plaintiff's contract assured his employment until the close of the summer 1975 work period. Under the county's Civil Service Commission rules he was classified as a recurrent employee, and rule 15.04 provides for release at the close of the seasonal work period as follows: "When recurrent employees are to be released the release shall be made in accordance with the needs of the service, in the order determined by the appointing power." 2 Related rules read:
Because neither "his performance evaluation report" (rule 15.05) nor the "evidence of changed work habits or performance" (rule 21.02) appears in the record here, we cannot fully assess the "unsatisfactory" rating. For reasons we will explain, though, due process requires that an employee such as plaintiff, when faced with discharge for alleged unsatisfactory service, be accorded more than a mere opportunity to "review his rating at any time with any of the persons who have signed the report or who have assisted in making the rating" (rule 21.07). In this case, county counsel tells us, that review consisted of "numerous discussions and counseling with his supervisors." Those meetings could not have begun until June 28, and apparently they were concluded in three days or less.
Because he was fired plaintiff lost not only his job but also his right, accorded by the pertinent rules, to a place on the county's "recurrent re-employment list." Those rules read as follows:
'Outstanding';
Second, all employees having ratings of
'Competent';
Third, all employees having ratings of
'Improvement Needed.'
Employees having ratings of 'Unsatisfactory' shall be omitted from the list.
Under those rules plaintiff had a right not only to his Summer 1975 job but also, because of his ratings, to certain Summer 1976 job prospects. The July 1, 1975, discharge cancelled both.
This case does not involve "employment . . . at the pleasure of the appointing authority." (Bogacki v. Board of Supervisors (1971) 5 Cal.3d 771, 782-783, 97 Cal.Rptr. 657, 489 P.2d 537; cf. Barthuli v. Board of Trustees (1977) 19 Cal.3d 717, 721-722, 139 Cal.Rptr. 627, 566 P.2d 261 ( ).) Plaintiff's discharge here required a showing of unsatisfactory service. (Rule 15.05.) "It is, of course, widely recognized that if the employee is subject to discharge only for cause, he has a property interest which is entitled to constitutional protection."
We noted in our first paragraph above that the Skelly case requires (1) notice of the proposed action, (2) the reasons therefor, (3) a copy of the charges and materials on which the action is based, and (4) the right to respond, either orally or in writing, to the authority initially imposing the discipline. Plaintiff here, if he is allowed to try his case, may be able to demonstrate noncompliance with those four requirements. Further, the skimpy review that rule 21.07 provides is by no means "the right to respond" before a reasonably impartial, noninvolved reviewer that is implied in the fourth requirement.
The demurrer should not have been sustained as to the first and second causes of action, which allege discharge without just cause and a hearing. 3 The dismissal order as to those causes of action is reversed. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
After stating the "initial question is whether plaintiff here has a right to his job that is protected by article I, section 7 of the California Constitution," the majority fail to further address that issue. Finding an undefined property interest in employment at issue, they conclude plaintiff is entitled to procedural rights afforded by Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 124 Cal.Rptr. 14, 539 P.2d 774. Mr. Williams' discharge without according him those rights is deemed by the majority to be actionable.
The unresolved issue is whether plaintiff, as a recurrent employee, was vested with a property right subject to due process of law. (Cal.Const., art. I, § 7.) Plaintiff apparently claims such interest based on an alleged contractual relationship which, plaintiff contends, defendants cannot dispute having demurred. 1 But, as will be seen, defendants are not...
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