Williams v. Crabb

• Decision Date: 06 May 1902
• Docket Number: 800.
• Citation: 117 F. 193
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. CRABB et al. [1]
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

117 F. 193

WILLIAMS v. CRABB et al. ^[1]

No. 800.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

May 6, 1902

S. S Gregory and Frank Crozier, for appellant.

Levy Mayer, for appellees.

Before JENKINS and GROSSCUP, Circuit Judges, and BUNN, District Judge.

BUNN District Judge.

This was a suit in equity, brought by the appellant, a citizen of Michigan, against the appellees, citizens of Illinois, to set aside the will of one Ellen Williams, a sister of the appellant, for fraud and undue influence, and also to set aside and cancel a deed of certain real estate situate in the city of Chicago, made by Ellen Williams to the appellee Christopher C. Crabb, on the like grounds of fraud and undue influence, and have him charged with a trust in relation to the real estate alleged to be held under the will and deed. There is other incidental relief prayed for in the bill, as the appointment of a receiver, but these are the grounds of the action and the principal relief sought, the purpose of the suit being to recover from Crabb a one-half interest in the real estate so held by him, and to set aside as a cloud upon the complainant's title the will and deed alleged to have been obtained by fraud. The allegations of the bill are, in substance, as follows: That on September 2, 1896, at the city of Chicago, Ellen Williams died, unmarried and without issue, leaving as her sole heirs at law her brother the complainant, John Jay Harvey Williams, and her sister Helen Alexander; that at the time of her death she was seised in fee of certain described real estate, situate in Chicago, of much value; that for some time prior to her death the land was held by the Chicago & South Side Rapid Transit Company under a lease purporting to have been executed by Ellen Williams on June 15, 1892, and that lots and parcels of land were still in possession of the South Side Elevated Railroad Company under a lease dated October 1, 1897, executed by the defendant Christopher C. Crabb, who claims to hold the premises under the will of Ellen Williams and under a warranty deed executed to him by Ellen Williams, the company paying therefor an annual rant of $6,165; that at the time of her death Ellen Williams was also seised in fee of certain other lands in chicago, now occupied and in possession of a person known and styled as 'Nellie Tuttle,' under a lease to her by defendant Crabb, who claims title to the land by virtue of the last will and testament of Ellen Williams; that on January 8, 1894, a deed by Ellen Williams, dated on December 13, 1893, was filed of record in the recorder's office of Cook county, purporting to convey such lands in fee to defendant Crabb. The bill further charges that, although the title to the lands appears of record in the defendant Crabb, the purchase price thereof was paid by him out of the funds of Ellen Williams, and on her behalf and by her direction, and that the title thereto was held in trust by Crabb for Ellen Williams, as he, the said Crabb, had admitted to divers persons; that a house, costing $95,000, was built by Crabb upon the premises, and paid for out of the funds of Ellen Williams, and that he held the lands in trust for the use and benefit of Ellen Williams, upon a mere naked legal title without equity; that after the death of Ellen Williams, Crabb seized, and still holds possession and enjoys, the rents and profits of the said premises; that the will of Ellen Williams, under which defendant Crabb claims to hold the land, dated May 19, 1896, was on September 20, 1896, admitted to probate before the probate court of Cook county, Ill., and admitted to record as the last will and testament of Ellen Williams, and letters testamentary issued thereon to Crabb, as the executor, without bonds, as directed in the will. The will is set out verbatim in the bill, the effect of which is to devise all of the testatrix's estate, real and personal, to Christopher C. Crabb, and to appoint him her sole executor, with request that he be not required to give any bond or security as executor. That on the 17th day of August, 1896, there was filed in the recorder's office of Cook county a warranty deed by Ellen Williams, dated on May 19, 1896, purporting to convey to Crabb the premises known as No. 47 Congress street and No. 2131 Dearborn Street, in Chicago, Ill., setting out the deed and description of the land in full. The bill further charges that the writing purporting to be the last will and testament of Ellen Williams was not such; that she was not aware of the contents, but that the same was procured by the fraud of the defendant Crabb, and should be set aside and annulled; that prior to the making of the will Crabb was, and for many years had been, the attorney in fact and confidential agent and adviser of Ellen Williams, and the manager of her business affairs, and was intrusted with the care and custody of her property; and that he, starting as her agent some years before, in small matters, gradually assumed and took upon himself the entire control of her business and affairs, and was so trusted and acquired such influence over her mind that she was almost entirely excluded from any participation in the management of her own estate, and was almost entirely controlled and dominated in the conduct of her estate by Crabb, who, having such control, retained and instructed his own solicitor to draw up the will, directing him to make himself (Crabb) the sole executor, without bonds, and to vest her entire estate in him upon her death. Similar allegations are made in regard to the procurement of the deed to Crabb, that it was obtained from Ellen Williams by the same fraud and undue influence. Then follow allegations to the effect that early in her life Ellen Williams, who was living with her parents in humble circumstances, had been led astray by one much above her station, left her home, and led an immoral life, and for many years conducted, under the name of 'Lizzie Allen,' a house of prostitution in Chicago; and that the defendant Crabb, then a clerk in a dry goods store in Chicago, became acquainted with her, and fastened himself upon her and her estate, and became a parasite in such house of prostitution, managing and directing it for her; that Crabb, for many years before her death, professed to be her lover, and passed much of his time in her apartments; that while so pretending and deceiving Ellen Williams he was sustaining relations with a person calling herself 'Frankie Leland,' who now claims to be his wife; that upon Ellen Williams' death Crabb removed her from her house of prostitution, and installed therein as keeper the said Frankie Leland, who entered into the private apartment of Ellen Williams, and conducted the house of prostitution for the benefit of the defendant Crabb for some months, when Crabb, claiming to own the same, sold all the furniture, fixtures, etc., to Nellie Tuttle, a public woman, for a large sum of money, who is now conducting the business under contract with Crabb. Wherefore the complainant asks that an issue be made whether the writing so admitted to probate be the last will and testament of Ellen Williams or not, and that the said warranty deed to Crabb be declared null and void, and set aside, and that an undivided one-half of the premises by declared to vest in complainant in fee simple. The defendants Christopher C. Crabb and Frankie Leland appeared, and filed their demurrer to the amended bill, the principal grounds insisted upon being: (1) That the bill was multifarious in seeking to set aside a will and a deed and to declare a trust, and asking for a partition of the property; (2) that Helen Alexander, the sister of complainant, and his coheir, was indispensable party to the bill, and alleged in the bill to be a citizen and resident of the state of Illinois; (3) that the federal court was without jurisdiction of the case made by the bill. The court below sustained the demurrer, and dismissed the bill, upon what ground does not clearly appear, no opinion being filed.

It is claimed by the appellant's counsel that all of the grounds of the demurrer except the one of multifariousness was overruled by the court, but the record shows that the bill was dismissed for want of equity. That in this case must mean for want of jurisdiction, as upon the merits of the allegations no question has been or could be made against the sufficiency of the bill to make a case for setting aside both the will and the deed. And, granting the want of jurisdiction to set aside the will for fraud, it is clear that the court would have jurisdiction to set aside the deed. The bill shows an equitable case for setting aside the deed for fraud, and, if within the jurisdiction of the court, the complainant should not be dismissed out of court because a greater measure of relief is demanded than he is entitled to, unless there have been joined irreconcilable and inconsistent causes of action. In the original bill Helen Alexander was joined as one of the defendants, the same demurrer being put in; but being a citizen, as was alleged and is conceded, of the state in which the suit is brought and where the defendants reside, it was thought that the court would not have jurisdiction of the suit, for want of proper diverse citizenship of all the parties, and therefore the complainant amended his bill, omitting his sister as a defendant, and not joining her as a complainant. The principle question argued in this court was the one of jurisdiction, it being urged with earnestness and force that, the case involving the setting aside of a will already allowed and admitted to probate by the probate court of Cook county, the United States circuit court has not jurisdiction of the case for the purpose of setting it aside. It is, no doubt,...