Williams v. Davidson, G-140

• Decision Date: 14 October 1965
• Docket Number: No. G-140,G-140
• Citation: 179 So.2d 387
• Parties: Robert Timothy WILLIAMS, a minor joined by his father and next friend, Ferrell Williams, Appellants, v. James Franklin DAVIDSON, Sr., and Cliff Fields Motors, Inc., a corporation, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 387

179 So.2d 387

Robert Timothy WILLIAMS, a minor joined by his father and next friend, Ferrell Williams, Appellants, v. James Franklin DAVIDSON, Sr., and Cliff Fields Motors, Inc., a corporation, Appellees.

No. G-140.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Oct. 14, 1965.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 10, 1965.

Philip D. Beall, Pensacola, for appellants.

Beggs, Lane, Daniel, Gaines & Davis, and Harrell, Caro, Middlebrooks & Wiltshire, Pensacola, for appellees.

CARROLL, DONALD K., Judge.

The plaintiffs in an automobile negligence action have appealed from a final summary judgment entered by the Circuit Court for Escambia County in favor of the corporate defendant.

The ultimate question for determination in this appeal is whether, at the time of such entry, there was sufficient competent evidence before the court from which a jury could have lawfully found that the said corporate defendant was liable in damages to the plaintiffs.

The evidence that had been adduced by the parties at the said time established the following facts that are pertinent to the consideration and determination of the above question.

At about noontime on January 12, 1964, the minor plaintiff, Robert Timothy Williams, then four years old, ran into the street in a community near Pensacola in the said county and collided with a Volkswagen automobile, which was being driven by the 17-year-old son of the individual defendant, James Franklin Davidson, Sr., the latter being hereinafter referred to as Davidson.

On Saturday, January 11, 1964, the day before the said accident, Davidson had gone to the place of business of the corporate defendant, Cliff Fields Motors, Inc., hereinafter referred to as Fields Motors, for the purpose of trading automobiles. He selected a 1958 Volkswagen, the vehicle involved in the above accident, and decided to trade in his Triumph sportscar. Under a written agreement which he made with Fields Motors, Davidson was to pay $895 for the Volkswagen; he was allowed a credit of $395 for the said Triumph, which was traded in; and he was also to pay $26.67 for sales tax and the license tag. The local banks, however, were closed at this time, which was sometime in the afternoon of that Saturday, so Davidson delivered the Triumph, paid for the said tax and tag, and stated that he would pay the $500 cash difference to Fields Motors when the banks opened on the following Monday, January 13.

The above terms of the agreement between Davidson and Fields Motors were incorporated in a written statement executed by both parties on the said Saturday, including Davidson's promise to pay the said balance of $500 on the following Monday, which payment he in fact did make on that date, though without mentioning the accident that had occurred on the intervening day, Sunday, as described above.

On February 20, 1964, the said minor plaintiff, joined by his father and next friend, Ferrell Williams, filed this negligence action against Davidson only on account of the injuries sustained by the minor plaintiff in the above-described accident on January 12, alleging in their complaint that Davidson was the owner of the automobile which struck the minor plaintiff. In his answer to the complaint Davidson admitted such ownership. However, on June 15, 1964, the plaintiffs amended their complaint by joining Fields Motors as a party defendant and by alleging that an automobile of Davidson 'and/or' Fields Motors struck the minor plaintiff.

About two months later Fields Motors filed in the cause a motion for a summary judgment in its favor, predicated upon the fact that it was not the owner of the automobile involved in the case. On November 13, 1964, the Circuit Court entered the summary final judgment appealed from herein, granting the said motion and adjudicating that the plaintiffs take nothing by their action against Fields Motors. This judgment did not, of course, affect their rights in the cause against the remaining defendant, Davidson.

The summary judgment proceedings in the trial courts of this state are authorized under the provisions of Rule 1.36 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 F.S.A. The key provision of that rule reads as follows: 'The judgment or decree sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or decree as a matter of law.'

In a myriad of cases the Florida courts have construed and applied the justquoted provision and the other provisions of the said Rule 1.36. Among the rules established therein is the general rule that in accordance with the above-quoted key provision, if the enumerated types of evidence presented by the parties under the issues framed by the pleadings is such that, if the said evidence had been presented to a jury, the jury could not lawfully conclude therefrom and hold that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff in the cause, and if the said evidence shows that the defendant is entitled to a judgment in its favor 'as a matter of law,' the trial court, after holding the hearing contemplated by the said rule on the defendant's motion for a summary judgment, may and should grant the motion and enter such a summary judgment for the defendant; if, however, the said evidence (even though uncontradicted) is susceptible of conflicting inferences...