Williams v. Davis

• Decision Date: 06 July 2021
• Docket Number: NO. 14-20-00112-CV,14-20-00112-CV
• Citation: 628 S.W.3d 946
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals
• Parties: Ricky Lynn WILLIAMS, Appellant v. Lorie DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice; and Debra Gibbs, Assistant Director, Classification and Records, Appellees

628 S.W.3d 946

Ricky Lynn WILLIAMS, Appellant

v.Lorie DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice; and Debra Gibbs, Assistant Director, Classification and Records, Appellees

NO. 14-20-00112-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

Opinion filed July 6, 2021

Ricky Lynn Williams, pro se.

Penelope Maley, Austin, for Appellees.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Jewell and Poissant.

Kevin Jewell, Justice

Appellant Ricky Lynn Williams, an inmate in custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice ("TDCJ"), appeals a judgment dismissing his lawsuit against the agency's former director and former assistant director. Williams's claims arise from a detainer lodged against him in Texas by a Louisiana sheriff. Williams alleges his constitutional rights have been violated because appellees have failed to provide him "information" underlying the detainer as well as counsel to challenge it. He filed an internal grievance, but it was returned to him with the notation that his complaint was "not grievable." He then filed the present lawsuit.

Invoking Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 14, appellees moved to dismiss Williams's suit because he allegedly failed to comply with that chapter's exhaustion of remedies and filing requirements¹ and because he lacks standing. The trial court granted appellees' motion and dismissed the suit for "failure to comply with" Chapter 14.

On appeal, Williams argues that Chapter 14's exhaustion and filing requirements do not apply to this case because his complaint is not grievable under TDCJ's inmate grievance policy, as prison officials determined. We need not reach his argument, however, because we conclude that we may uphold the trial court's dismissal on alternative jurisdictional grounds, as we explain below.

We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Background

Williams is an inmate currently serving a twenty-year sentence at TDCJ's Terrell Unit in Rosharon, Texas. He alleged that the Sheriff's Office in Saint Martinville, Louisiana, filed a detainer against him with the TDCJ.² A "detainer" is a request filed by a criminal justice agency with the institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking that the prisoner be held for the agency or that the agency be advised when the prisoner's release is imminent. Fex v. Michigan , 507 U.S. 43, 45, 113 S.Ct. 1085, 122 L.Ed.2d 406 (1993) ; Carchman v. Nash , 473 U.S. 716, 719, 105 S.Ct. 3401, 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985). A copy of the detainer is not included in our record, but according to Williams the detainer is based only on an arrest warrant, not any existing indictment, information, or outstanding conviction.³

Williams contends that he is entitled to appointment of counsel to assist him in defending against the detainer. Williams wrote a letter to appellees—Lorie Davis, Director of TDCJ, and Debra Gibbs, Assistant Director of Classification and Records of TDCJ—seeking "information" on the charges against him so Williams could obtain counsel, but he received no response. Williams also submitted an offender grievance form, in which he requested the detainer be removed from TDCJ records if the Louisiana sheriff who lodged the detainer did not remove him from TDCJ custody within sixty days. Prison officials determined that "the issue presented was not grievable" and returned the form to Williams.

Williams then filed an "Original Complaint and Petition for Writ of Mandamus," asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and the Texas Constitution's Bill of Rights. He sued appellees in their individual and official capacities. Williams also filed an inability-to-pay affidavit. In his petition, Williams alleged appellees have a practice of accepting detainers while providing prisoners neither counsel nor the "necessary information" to challenge them. He alleged that appellees' failure to provide him with the detainer's "underlying basis" or with counsel deprives him of his federal and state constitutional rights. He also claimed to have suffered mental and physical pain and to have been deprived of parole review provided to those inmates who do not have detainers lodged against them. As relief, Williams sought: (1) a writ of mandamus directing appellees to provide him the detainer lodged against him; (2) a writ of mandamus directing appellees to provide him with counsel to defend against the detainer; (3) declaratory and injunctive relief; and (4) actual and exemplary damages.

Appellees filed a motion to dismiss Williams's suit under Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 14, applicable to inmate litigation. They asserted several grounds for dismissal. Appellees argued that Williams failed to exhaust available administrative remedies and failed to satisfy certain filing prerequisites because he did not file a copy of his grievance or the statutorily required affidavit. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 14.005(a) ; see also Garrett v. Borden , 283 S.W.3d 852, 853 (Tex. 2009) ; Wallace v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice-Institutional Div. , 36 S.W.3d 607, 610 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). Additionally, appellees contended that the case should be dismissed under section 14.003 because it has no basis in law or in fact. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 14.003(a), (b). In this section of the motion, appellees argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Williams's petition for writ of mandamus and that Williams failed to allege an injury-in-fact and otherwise lacked standing.

In a response, Williams asserted that his claims are not subject to section 14.005's filing and exhaustion requirements because those requirements apply only to claims that are subject to the inmate grievance system, and prison officials determined his claims were "not grievable." In a reply, appellees did not dispute that prison officials found Williams's complaint not grievable but argued that they did so in error. In any event, appellees urged the trial court to dismiss the lawsuit pursuant to section 14.003.

The trial court signed an order dismissing Williams's suit "for failure to comply with Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code." Williams appeals.

Analysis

The parties commit much discussion to whether section 14.005's filing prerequisites apply and have been satisfied, but we need not address those questions because we conclude the trial court's order may be affirmed on alternative grounds. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

Appellees contest the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit, including Williams's standing. We address challenges to the trial court's jurisdiction first. See Norris v. Triumph Hosp. of E. Houston, L.P. , No. 14-13-00431-CV, 2014 WL 2631069 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 12, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.) ; Gardner v. Stewart , 223 S.W.3d 436, 438 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2006, pet. denied) ("Before we consider the Gardners' sole issue, we first address the question of whether the Gardners' pleadings and action were effective to invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court.").

A. The trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Williams's requests for mandamus and injunctive relief.

In their motion to dismiss, appellees argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Williams's request for mandamus relief. According to appellees, a district court may issue a writ of mandamus to enforce its own jurisdiction, but it has no constitutional or statutory jurisdiction to exercise supervisory control via mandamus over state prison officials. Tex. Const. art. V, § 8 ; Tex. Gov't Code § 24.011 ; Martinez v. Thaler , 931 S.W.2d 45, 46 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied). Though appellees asserted this argument in the trial court, they have not advanced it in their brief on appeal. But, as we are duty-bound to determine, sua sponte , whether jurisdiction exists,⁴ and because we must address jurisdictional questions regardless whether appellees filed a brief at all,⁵ we consider the question.

This court and others (including the Third Court of Appeals from which this case was transferred to our court)⁶ have held that a district court has mandamus jurisdiction only to enforce its own jurisdiction. See Barker v. Livingston , No. 14-12-00254-CV, 2012 WL 3866505, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 6, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op); Martinez , 931 S.W.2d at 46 ; Walker v. Jenkins , No. 03-18-00235-CV, 2018 WL 3059962, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin June 21, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) ; Sims v. Smith , No. 03-12-00242-CV, 2014 WL 2094200, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin May 14, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) ; Garrett v. Williams , 250 S.W.3d 154, 159 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) ; see also Winfrey v. Chandler , 159 Tex. 220, 318 S.W.2d 59, 61 (1958). A district court has no constitutional or statutory jurisdiction to exercise supervisory control over prison officials absent an attempt by such officials to interfere with the district court's already pending jurisdiction. Martinez , 931 S.W.2d at 46. In Barker , we affirmed the dismissal of a TDCJ inmate's trial court suit seeking a writ of mandamus. As we stated, "the purpose of appellant's petition for writ of mandamus in the trial court was not to protect the trial court's jurisdiction, but to instigate litigation against appellee." Barker , 2012 WL 3866505, at *3 (citing Winfrey , 318 S.W.2d at 61 (holding a district court must have actual jurisdiction of a matter if it seeks to enforce its jurisdiction by its writ power); Martinez , 931 S.W.2d at 46 ). Therefore, we held that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to order the relief requested in the inmate's petition for writ of mandamus. Id. ; see also Tex. Gov't Code § 24.011 ; Winfrey , 318 S.W.2d at 61 ; In re Smith , No. 12-21-00011-CR, 2021 WL 500199, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Feb. 10, 2021, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

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