Williams v. Department of Transp.

• Decision Date: 18 October 2000
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.00-D-1077-N.
• Citation: 119 F.Supp.2d 1249
• Parties: Andre WILLIAMS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ALABAMA DEP'T OF TRANSP. et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

119 F.Supp.2d 1249

Andre WILLIAMS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ALABAMA DEP'T OF TRANSP. et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No.00-D-1077-N.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

October 18, 2000.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

G. Keith Clark, Clark & Nelms, Montgomery, Lloyd W. Gathings, II, Gathings, Kennedy & Associates, Montgomery, AL, Mark Kennedy, Gathings, Kennedy & Associates, Montgomery, AL, Misha Y. Mullins, Gathings, Kennedy & Associates, Montgomery, AL, for plaintiffs.

Peter S. Fruin, Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., Montgomery, AL, Jim R. Ippolito, Jr., Alabama Department of Transportation, Legal Division, Montgomery, AL, Catherine Wolter Main, Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., Montgomery, AL, Jarred O. Taylor, II, Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., Birmingham, AL, H. Thomas Wells, Jr., Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., Birmingham, AL, Gilda Branch Williams, Alabama Department of Transportation, Legal Division, Montgomery, AL, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DE MENT, District Judge.

Before the court are two motions to dismiss, filed by both Defendants separately on September 12, 2000. Plaintiffs responded on September 27, 2000. After careful consideration of the arguments of the parties, relevant law, and the record as a whole, the court finds that the motions are due to be granted in part and denied in part.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) and 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976). Neither party contests personal jurisdiction or venue.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss attacks the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Therefore, the court assumes that all factual allegations set forth in the complaint are true, see United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 327, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991); Powell v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir.1990), and construes all factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989). Generally, "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." In re Johannessen, 76 F.3d 347, 349 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)).

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The issue presented is whether Plaintiffs can maintain a citizen suit against the Alabama Department of Transportation ("ALDOT") and its director, Mr. G.M. Roberts ("Roberts"), for actions that allegedly have contaminated some soil and an entire plume of groundwater beneath their residential subdivision. On August 8, 2000, after giving Defendants the proper notice required by statute, Plaintiffs filed suit under the citizen suit provisions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA"). See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1). Plaintiffs are seeking injunctive and other relief deemed appropriate by the court.

ALDOT maintains several maintenance shops, supply yards, and research facilities in the area surrounding Plaintiffs' home. Plaintiffs allege that since at least the early 1970s, ALDOT has violated state and federal law by inappropriately disposing of tetrachloroethylene and trichloroethylene ("TCE"), two probable carcinogens that ALDOT uses to clean and degrease various materials and products. As a result, TCE has seeped into the groundwater at levels exceeding the maximum allowable standards by a magnitude of hundreds or thousands of times. Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that ALDOT's actions are increasing and ongoing.

ALDOT and Roberts state that any violations that may have occurred have ceased. They also state that they are involved in a joint investigation with the Alabama Department of Environmental Management ("ADEM"), which they assert will lead to appropriate remedial measures. However, it seems that ADEM is not moving at a rapid pace. As of September 29, 2000, its investigative file did not include or address a report conducted by ALDOT's environmental consultants earlier this summer. In addition, it is undisputed that ADEM has not presently filed any formal lawsuit or entered into any consent decree with ALDOT.

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that it is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. They also ask the court to invoke the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, abstain from addressing the issues raised, and leave resolution of this matter to ADEM and other state administrative agencies. Thus, the first issue the court must address is whether sovereign immunity bars Plaintiffs' claim. If not, the court must ask whether it should abstain from addressing this matter. As explained below, the court finds that the Eleventh Amendment deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction with respect to ALDOT, but not Roberts. The court then turns to Roberts' abstention argument, and finds that abstention is inappropriate in this case.

A. ALDOT's Eleventh Amendment Defense

The court first considers Defendants' Eleventh Amendment arguments. The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Notwithstanding the language of the Eleventh Amendment, sovereign immunity applies even to suits brought by a state's own citizens. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15-18, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890). The Eleventh Amendment also bars suits against state agencies that act on behalf of the state and, therefore, can assert the state's immunity. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 142-46, 113 S.Ct. 684, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993).

In this case, ALDOT is a department of the Alabama state government. See Morgan v. Alabama, 5 F.Supp.2d 1285, 1296 (M.D.Ala.1998) (citing ALA. CODE § 23-1-20 (1975)). Alabama has not waived its sovereign immunity. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 14. Absent waiver, ALDOT is immune from suit unless Congress has abrogated its sovereign immunity. Thus, the court must ask whether Congress: (1) has "unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate the [state's] immunity"; and (2) has "acted pursuant to a valid exercise of power." Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (citations and quotations omitted). The answer to both questions is "no."

First, RCRA does not unequivocally express a congressional intent to abrogate ALDOT's Eleventh Amendment immunity. In fact, by its very terms, the statute operates within the Eleventh Amendment. It provides that

any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf—(1)(A) against any person (including (a) the United States, and (b) any other governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) ... or (B) against any person, including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution.

42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (emphasis supplied).

Second, Congress would not have acted pursuant to a valid exercise of power even if it had clearly intended to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. Congress enacted RCRA pursuant to its Article I Commerce Clause powers. See Rowlands v. Pointe Mouillee Shooting Club, 959 F.Supp. 422, 426 (E.D.Mich. 1997); United States v. Rogers, 685 F.Supp. 201, 202 (D.Minn.1987). Prior to Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73, 116 S.Ct. 1114, the Supreme Court had held that Congress could abrogate a state's sovereign immunity by enacting legislation under the Commerce Clause, see Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19-20, 109 S.Ct. 2273, 105 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (plurality opinion), or the Fourteenth Amendment, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976). However, Union Gas has been overruled, see Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73, 116 S.Ct. 1114, and it is now well settled that Congress' Article I legislative powers cannot trump a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 120 S.Ct. 631, 643 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636, 119 S.Ct. 2199, 144 L.Ed.2d 575 (1999). In addition, Congress cannot use the Commerce Clause to exact a constructive waiver of a state's sovereign immunity. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 682-83, 119 S.Ct. 2219, 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999). Plaintiffs do not contend that Congress has exacted a waiver under some other relevant constitutional provision. See, e.g., Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 494-500 (11th Cir.1999) (discussing waiver in exchange for receiving federal monies authorized under the Spending Clause). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' complaint against ALDOT is due to be dismissed.

B. Roberts' Eleventh Amendment Defense

However, with respect to Roberts, the Motion is due to be granted in part and denied in part. On one hand, basic principles of equity, comity, and federalism restrain federal courts from enjoining state officials on the basis of alleged violations of state law. See Pennhurst St. Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); Burch v. Apalachee Community Mental Health...