Williams v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 30 October 2007
• Docket Number: No. 04-71064.,No. 04-71841.,04-71064.,04-71841.
• Citation: 523 F.Supp.2d 602
• Parties: Freddie WILLIAMS, Jr., Plaintiff, v. DETROIT BOARD OF EDUCATION, Kenneth Burnley, Lavonne Sheffield, and John Does I and II, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

Page 602

523 F.Supp.2d 602

Freddie WILLIAMS, Jr., Plaintiff, v. DETROIT BOARD OF EDUCATION, Kenneth Burnley, Lavonne Sheffield, and John Does I and II, Defendants.

No. 04-71064.

No. 04-71841.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

October 30, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Benjamin Whitfield, Jr., Cynthia J. Gaither, Benjamin Whitfield, Jr. Assoc., Detroit, MI, for Plaintiff.

Jean-Vievre T. Adams, Detroit Public Schools, Jerome R. Watson, Brian M. Schwartz, Miller, Canfield, Joseph G. Sullivan, Gina Smith-Gallant, Detroit Board of Education, Detroit, MI, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

PATRICK J. DUGGAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Freddie Williams, Jr. ("Plaintiff") filed these consolidated lawsuits after Defendants terminated him as principal of Trombly Alternative High School ("Trombly") in January 2002, and allegedly forced him to retire from his position as a tenured teacher in April 2002. Presently before the Court is Defendants' renewed motion for summary judgment, filed after the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the matter to this Court. The motion has been fully briefed and, on September 5, 2007, this Court issued a Notice informing the parties that it is dispensing with oral argument pursuant to Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(e) (2).

I. Factual and Procedural Background¹

Plaintiff was employed by the Detroit Public Schools, first as a teacher commencing in May 1978, and then as a school administrator at various locations commencing in 1993. In 1997, Plaintiff became the principal at Trombly.

Beginning in early 2000, the Detroit Board of Education ("Board") began receiving complaints about Plaintiff. Specifically, individuals reported that Plaintiff was misappropriating school district funds and equipment. Around March 30, 2001, the school district initiated an audit of Trombly to investigate the allegations against Plaintiff. An audit report was prepared in December 2001. On December 18, 2001, the Detroit News published an article about Plaintiff which described the conclusions about his misdeeds that were set forth in the Board's audit report.

Plaintiff subsequently filed these consolidated lawsuits alleging that Defendant violated various state and federal laws when they terminated Plaintiff and when they disseminated to the press the results of the school audit purportedly showing that Plaintiff misappropriated public school funds and equipment for his own benefit. Defendants subsequently moved for summary judgment with respect to all of the claims in Plaintiff's complaints. With respect to Plaintiffs defamation claim, Defendants argued that they were protected by Michigan's shared interest privilege.

This Court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment and `dismissed Plaintiffs lawsuits with prejudice on September 9, 2005. Plaintiff filed an appeal. On March 5, 2007, the Sixth Circuit reversed the Court's decision with respect to Plaintiff's defamation claim but affirmed with respect to Plaintiff's remaining claims. Williams v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., et al., 226 Fed.Appx. 446, 2007 WL 663348 (6th Cir.2007) (per curtain). In its decision, the Sixth Circuit indicated specifically that, upon remand, Defendants "may move again for summary judgment on other grounds." Id. at 448.

II. Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The central inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). After adequate time for discovery and upon motion, Rule 56(c) mandates summary judgment against a party who fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The movant has an initial burden of showing "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the movant meets this burden, the non-movant must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). To demonstrate a genuine issue, the non-movant must present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find for the non-movant; a "scintilla of evidence" is insufficient. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512.

The court must accept as true the nonmovant's evidence and draw "all justifiable inferences" in the non-movant's favor. See id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The inquiry is whether the evidence presented is such that a jury applying the relevant evidentiary standard could "reasonably find for either the plaintiff or the defendant." See id.

III. Defendants' Arguments

Defendants raise a number of arguments in support of their renewed motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's defamation claim. First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to plead the claim with particularity. Specifically Defendants contend that, throughout the tortured procedural history of this case, Plaintiff never has indicated exactly which of Defendants' statements support his defamation claim. Next, Defendants contend that Michigan's statutory fair reporting privilege, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2911(3), precludes Plaintiff's defamation claim as their dissemination of the audit report was a "fair and true" report of matters of public record. Third, Defendants argue that, as principal of Trombly, Plaintiff was a public figure or at least a limited public figure and therefore Plaintiff must show that Defendants acted with actual malice to prevail. Defendants contend that Plaintiff lacks evidence of actual malice. Fourth, Defendants contend that they are protected by a qualified privilege. Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot sustain his burden of establishing that the alleged defamatory statements were false.

IV. Applicable Law and Analysis

The elements of a cause of action for defamation are: "(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff (2) an unprivileged communication to a third party; (3) fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of the publisher; and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication." Rouch, v. Enquirer & News of Battle Creek, 440 Mich. 238, 251, 487 N.W.2d 205, 211 (1992) (citing Locricchio v. Evening News Ass'n, 438 Mich. 84, 115-16, 476 N.W.2d 112 (1991)).

A. Whether Plaintiff Has Sufficiently Pled His Defamation Claim

A plaintiff must plead a defamation claim with specificity. Royal Palace Homes, Inc. v. Channel 7 of Detroit, 197 Mich.App. 48, 52, 495 N.W.2d 392, 394 (1992). The plaintiff cannot rely on general, conclusory allegations to support a defamation claim, but must specifically identify the statements alleged to be defamatory. Id. at 52-54, 57, 495 N.W.2d. at 394-95. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to identify specific defamatory statements by them — as opposed to statements by the Detroit News and Detroit Free Press — to support his claim. Plaintiff responds that he set forth Defendants' defamatory statements in paragraphs 47(a)-(r) of his Amended Complaint.

In paragraphs 47(a)-(r) of his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff lists many of the charges against him (although not all) that he claims the Board alleged in its audit report. Plaintiff, however, fails to specify which statements within the charges he claims are false. Plaintiff's attachment of the newspaper articles to his Amended Complaint does not cure any deficiency in his pleadings, as he does not specify which statements within the article are false and, in any event, the articles are not Defendants' statements. Thus it appears that Plaintiff has failed to identify the exact defamatory words that support his defamation claim.

Nevertheless, the Court does not conclude that the deficiencies in Plaintiff's pleading warrant summary judgment at this time. Despite the fact that this case has been pending for years and that Defendants previously moved for summary judgment, they never before argued that Plaintiffs defamation claim was insufficiently pled. Had Defendants raised this argument earlier, Plaintiff likely would have sought and the Court likely would have granted him leave to amend his complaint to specifically identify the allegedly false statements by Defendants that support his defamation claim. As the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on other grounds, see infra, it sees no reason for Plaintiff to correct the deficiency now.

B. Whether Michigan's Fair Reporting Privilege Precludes Plaintiff's Defamation Claim

Michigan law provides a privilege from damages in a defamation action for statements that constitute a "fair and true" report of matters of public record:

... Damages shall not be awarded in a libel action for the publication or broadcast of a fair and true report of matters of public record, a public and official proceeding, or of a governmental notice, announcement, written or recorded report or record generally available to the public, or act or action of a public body, or for a heading of the report which is a fair and true headnote of the report....

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2911(3). Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs defamation claim because their dissemination of the audit report, a public record discussing Plaintiffs misappropriation of school...