Williams v. East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 24 October 1892
• Citation: 16 S.E. 303,90 Ga. 519
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. EAST TENNESSEE, V. & G. RY. CO.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

16 S.E. 303

90 Ga. 519

WILLIAMS v. EAST TENNESSEE, V. & G. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Georgia

October 24, 1892

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Where the legislature chartered a railroad company, and provided that its principal office should be in the city of Atlanta, and where a foreign railroad company has obtained possession and control of the railroad of the former, and is exercising franchises granted in the charter, and has an office in the city of Atlanta, an action for personal injuries may be instituted against it in the city court of Atlanta, although the injury was done in another county of this state, through which the road runs.

2. Section 3406 of the Code, which provides that a railroad company may be sued in any county where the injury occurred is permissive and cumulative, and not exclusive.

Error from city court of Atlanta; HOWARD VAN EPPS, Judge.

Action by Josephine Williams, next friend, against East Tennessee Virginia Georgia Railway Company, for personal injuries. From a judgment dismissing the action, plaintiff brings error. Reversed.

F. R. & J. G. Walker, for plaintiff in error.

Dorsey Brewster & Howell, for defendant in error.

SIMMONS J.

The cause of action was personal injuries from the running of the defendant's trains in the county of Paulding, in this state. The action was brought in the county of Fulton and in the city court of Atlanta. The plea to the jurisdiction was to the effect that the defendant was a foreign corporation and in this state could be sued only in the county in which the case of action originated, jurisdiction in that county being admitted to exist under the statute, which declares that "all railroad companies shall be liable to be sued in any county in which the cause of action originated, by any one whose person or property has been injured by such railroad company, their officers, agents, or employes, for the purpose of recovering damages for such injury," etc. Code, § 3406. It is clear that this statute is not exclusive, but is merely permissive and cumulative. Its language is not restrictive, for it says such companies "shall be liable to be sued," etc., and not that they shall or must be. Besides, as to resident corporations it could not be restrictive consistently with the constitutional requirement that actions of this kind "shall be tried in the county where the defendant resides." Article 6, § 16, par. 6, Code, § 5172. Unless otherwise provided by statute, all corporations are to be regarded as residing where their principal office or place of business is located, and as subject to be sued there, though their residence may extend to other places where business is conducted under their corporate franchises. It was contended, however, that, as the principal office of this corporation was in the state of its creation, express legislation was necessary to subject it to suit at any other place, and that the statute permitting suit in the county of the injury is the only legislation which could subject it in cases of this kind. In our opinion, no such legislation was necessary for this purpose. Our Code declares that "a citizen of another state passing through this state may be sued in any county thereof in which he may happen to be at the time when sued." Section 3416. A corporation is for some purposes a citizen, and, if present, is no less subject to the jurisdiction than any other citizen of another state. Besides, a corporation, though a citizen of but one state, may be a resident also of other states. This court, in Insurance Co. v. Carrugi, 41 Ga. 660, held that "a foreign corporation doing business in this state is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, if it can be served with process;" and our laws provide for the service of process upon foreign as well as domestic corporations. Code, § 3369 et seq. The test of jurisdiction in personam is whether the corporation is so far present as that service can be effected, and it is to this extent present where its officers or agents are present, and have an office and are engaged in the conduct of its business. When thus engaged in the exercise of its franchises in a state other than that of its creation, it cannot be said that the corporate entity is confined to its principal office in the latter. In fact, for the purpose of being sued, it may be treated as a resident of each state in which it does business under state laws. Reno, Non-Res. (1892.) § 120, and cases cited. It is said that "when a foreign corporation, by its officers, comes within the jurisdiction of another state, and there engages in business, it becomes subject to the laws of the latter state, and to the process of the courts; and where such corporation, by its officers, is guilty of a wrong or commits a trespass within the state, it cannot escape the consequences of its illegal acts by setting up that it holds its existence under a foreign government." Boone, Corp. § 74. The decisions of the supreme court of the United States touching this question are discussed by Mr. Justice HARLAN of that court, and the following conclusions stated, in a recent case in which he presided as circuit justice,--U. S. v. Railroad Co., (February, 1892,) 49 F. 302: "Those cases undoubtedly hold that a corporation cannot throw off its allegiance or responsibility to the state which gave it existence, and that its primary legal domicile or habitation--that is, its citizenship--is in such state; consequently, for the purposes of suing and being sued in the courts of the United States, it is to be deemed a citizen of the state by whose laws it was made an artificial person. But neither those cases nor any case in the supreme court of the United States directly decides that a corporation may not, in addition to its primary legal habitation or home in the state of its creation, acquire a habitation in, or become an inhabitant of, another state, for the purposes of business, and of jurisdiction in personam. "If it be said that inhabitancy in a state, in its strict legal sense, implies a permanent, fixed residence in that state, the answer is that a corporation of one state, operating, by agents, a railroad *** in another state, with its consent, or under its license, may be regarded as permanently identified with the business and people of the latter state, and, for the purposes of its business there, to have a fixed residence within its limits. *** It does there just what it would do if it had received its charter from that state." It is to be "deemed an inhabitant of the latter state for all purposes of jurisdiction in personam by the courts held there, although a corporation is, and while its corporate existence lasts must remain, a...