Williams v. Edwards
| Decision Date | 28 March 1933 |
| Docket Number | Case Number: 20448 |
| Parties | WILLIAMS v. EDWARDS |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
¶0 1. Appeal and Error--Liability on Supersedeas Bond--Condition for Payment of "Condemnation Money and Costs" Held to Refer Only to Money Judgment.
In an action on a supersedeas bond conditioned for the payment of the "condemnation money and costs," such condition refers only to a money judgment and cannot be enlarged by constructions or reformation of the instrument to include depreciation in value of personal and real property or damages for waste committed or the value of the use and occupancy of real property concerned in the judgment in the basic action.
2. Same--Estoppel of Obligors to Deny Existence or Amount of Money Judgment Though Incorrectly Described in Bond.
The principal and sureties on an appeal or supersedeas bond are bound by the recital of facts in the bond, and where the bond recites that a money judgment for a certain amount, stating the amount, was rendered in the action and the bond is conditioned to supersede such judgment as a money judgment for that amount, the obligors on such bond are estopped to deny the existence or amount of such judgment even though the recital therein incorrectly describes the judgment. Provided, however, that the obligees on such bond are limited in their recovery on the bond to the amount which they would have been able to recover had the recital been correct and the conditions of the bond stated in proper terms.
3. Estoppel--Scope of Protection Under Doctrine of Estoppel.
The doctrine of estoppel is not intended to work a positive gain to a party; its office is to protect a party from loss which but for the estoppel he would have suffered, and in determining the extent to which he is entitled to claim an estoppel it is essential to determine the extent of the detriment he has suffered.
4. Same--Appeal and Error--Obligors on Supersedeas Bond Held Estopped by Recitals to Deny that Judgment Superseded Was Money Judgment for Certain Amount.
Record examined, and held, that by reason of a recital in a supersedeas bond the defendants are estopped from denying that the judgment rendered in the basic action was a money judgment for $ 29,014 and from asserting that the money judgment therein rendered was only for $ 1,014, and that the trial court erred in limiting the recovery to the last amount, plus interest and costs.
Appeal from District Court, Oklahoma County; T. G. Chambers, Judge.
Action by Ben F. Williams against Cora E Edwards et al. on supersedeas bond. From judgment limiting the amount of recovery, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions.
Wilson & Wilson and Homer Cowan, for plaintiff in error.
Russell G. Lowe and W. M. Bowles, for defendants in error.
¶1 This is an action on a supersedeas bond executed for the purpose of superseding a judgment of the district court of Oklahoma county. On the trial of the issues the lower court rendered judgment granting in part and denying in part the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, which was overruled; thereafter he perfected his appeal to this court. Reversed, with directions to grant a new trial.
¶2 The record is complicated and includes a number of legal proceedings connected with the case at bar, as well as considerable oral testimony. We shall as far as possible limit the statement of facts to those matters essential to a determination of the legal questions herein involved. For the purpose of convenience the parties will be referred to as they appeared in the lower court.
¶3 The supersedeas bond on which this action is based was executed on the 4th day of September, 1922, and read as follows:
¶4 This bond was given in connection with case No. 30863 in the district court of Oklahoma county, in which case Annabelle Edwards was the plaintiff and Cora E. Edwards et al. were the defendants. A brief analysis of the facts in connection with that case is necessary to a proper understanding of the judgment therein rendered. It appears that Annabelle Edwards and W. L. Edwards were married at Galveston, Tex., in August, 1918, and remained husband and wife until the death of W. L. Edwards in April, 1921. During a portion of their married life they lived in Ranger, Tex., where, by their joint effort, they accumulated property of the value of approximately $ 50,000; about $ 40,000 of which was in money when they left Texas in 1920. During his lifetime, W. L. Edwards controlled and managed this property. A great deal of the funds were invested in property in Oklahoma after he returned to Oklahoma in 1920, and the property thus acquired was taken in the name of Cora E. Edwards, who was also known as Mrs. J. H. Edwards, the mother of W. L. Edwards. After the death of W. L. Edwards, his wife, Annabelle, commenced suit in the district court of Oklahoma county, same being cause No. 30863, above referred to, against J. H. Edwards and Cora E. Edwards personally and against the estate of W. L. Edwards for the purpose of recovering her proper share of the property owned by herself and her former husband, W. L. Edwards, the theory of her suit being that under the laws of Texas she was owner of an undivided one-half interest therein.
¶5 The case was tried in the district court of Oklahoma county, and in addition to a general judgment the court entered of record certain special findings of fact and conclusions of law. The substance of the findings made and the judgment rendered was that the plaintiff Annabelle Edwards was an owner of an undivided one-half interest in and to the property controlled by W. L. Edwards and held in the name of Cora E. Edwards, and that she was entitled to an accounting for rents and profits amounting to a sum sufficient to bring the total value of her interest to $ 29,014. A summary of the conclusions reached by the trial court in that case was expressed in conclusion No. 7, which read as follows:
¶6 In accordance with the finding of facts and conclusions of law, the gist of which is expressed in the quotation above, the court entered judgment on each of the four items mentioned.
¶7 The first portion of the judgment decreed that the plaintiff in that case, Annabelle Edwards, was the owner of the real estate known as the "Shoup" property, and declared that Cora Edwards was holding the naked legal title of that property. The court ordered that Cora E. Edwards convey the property to Annabelle Edwards within 20 days by appropriate conveyance and that, if she failed to convey the property, the decree should be filed with the county clerk and should operate as a conveyance thereof.
¶8 The second portion of the judgment declared Annabelle Edwards to be the owner of the note known as the "Ivy" note and the mortgage securing the same, and further declared that Cora B. Edwards held the naked legal title thereof.
¶9 The third portion of the judgment decreed the plaintiff Annabelle Edwards to be the owner of an undivided interest in certain diamonds and fixed the extent of that interest by its value in the sum of $ 5,000. The judgment gave the plaintiff the right of possession of the diamonds until her claim should be satisfied. It further provided that a sale of the diamonds should be had to satisfy the lien. It did not decree, however, in connection with this lien upon the diamonds, a personal liability on the part of any person.
¶10 The fourth portion of the judgment was for a money judgment against the defendants in the sum of $ 1,014, with interest from the 10th day of July, 1922, at the rate of six per cent. per annum. This was the only money judgment rendered in the action. The journal entry of judgment shows that motion for new trial was overruled in August, 1922, and the defendants required that the court fix the amount of a supersedeas bond to supersede and stay the judgment, and thereupon the court fixed the amount of the supersedeas bond to be given by the defendants in the sum of $ 30,000, to be conditioned "in the manner provided by law."
¶11 The supersedeas bond above set forth was then executed, and an appeal was perfected to this court. Pending the decision on the appeal in this court, the defendants in that cause...
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