Williams v. Finlayson

• Decision Date: 21 February 1905
• Citation: 49 Fla. 264,38 So. 50
• Parties: WILLIAMS et al. v. FINLAYSON.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

38 So. 50

49 Fla. 264

WILLIAMS et al. v. FINLAYSON.

Florida Supreme Court, Division B.

February 21, 1905

Error to Circuit Court, Jackson County; Lucius J. Reeves, Judge.

Action by W. E. Williams and D. M. Short against J. A. Finlayson. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs bring error. Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. It is not erroneous for a circuit judge to refuse to give a requested instruction, even though it embodies a correct proposition of law, where the facts upon which it was predicated would not make it applicable.

2. Where the sheriff, the defendant in the circuit court, had seized goods in the hands of the plaintiffs under writs of attachment issued against the vendor of plaintiffs, based on the ground that the transaction between the plaintiffs and their vendor was fraudulent as to the creditors of the vendor, and the plaintiffs had replevied the goods, on the trial of the action of replevin, there being evidence tending to show that the plaintiffs had paid a fair value for the goods, and there being no circumstances which would raise the legal presumption that the transaction was fraudulent, the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it was fraudulent was on the sheriff.

3. Where the plaintiffs in the circuit court brought an action of replevin against the sheriff to recover certain goods seized by him under attachments issued against the vendor of plaintiffs, on the ground that the transaction between the plaintiffs and their vendor was fraudulent as to the creditors of the latter, and the evidence was not such as to raise the legal presumption that the transaction was fraudulent, and it becomes necessary under the evidence to apply section 1991, Rev. St. 1892, the following instruction to the jury would be proper, viz.: 'If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiffs purchased the goods in controversy in good faith, and that they paid Hutto (their vendor) a reasonably fair market value for them, without any knowledge on their part of any fraudulent intent on the part of Hutto (if such intent existed) to thereby defraud his creditors, or to hinder and delay them in the collection of their valid claims, and without knowledge on their part of such facts and circumstances as would have put as ordinarily prudent person upon inquiry, and which, if followed up, would have led to the discovery of such fraudulent purpose on the part of Hutto, then the jury should find a verdict for the plaintiff; but, on the contrary, if the plaintiffs purchased the goods of Hutto, even though they paid Hutto for them their fair market value, yet if Hutto at the time had a purpose to defraud his creditors, or to hinder and delay them in the collection of their debts, and the plaintiffs knew of such purpose, or if they had knowledge of such facts or circumstances as would have induced an ordinarily prudent person to make inquiry, and which inquiry, if made with reasonable diligence, would have led to the discovery of such fraudulent purpose of Hutto, and plaintiffs did not make such inquiry, then the jury should find a verdict for the defendant.'

COUNSEL Liddon & Smith, for plaintiffs in error.

C. L Wilson, for defendant in error.

OPINION

HOCKER J.

The plaintiffs in error replevied certain merchandise from the defendant in error, who was sheriff of Jackson county. To the declaration a plea of not guilty was filed, issue joined thereon, and at the fall term, 1903, a trial was had, and a verdict and judgment was rendered for the defendant. The plaintiffs in error seek to reverse this judgment.

The first assignment of error is based on the refusal of the trial court to give the following instruction to the jury: 'If the seller, Hutto, was the head of a family, and sold his entire property to any one, which property would have been exempt to him by the law, them he had a right to sell said exempt property, unless the attacking creditors prove that the amount due them, said creditors, was for the purchase money thereof.' It is stated in the bill of exceptions that this instruction was predicated on the statement of facts which the evidence tended to prove, viz., that C. I. Hutto, the plaintiffs' vendor, had a wife and grown son living in Holmes county Florida; but the evidence also proved the stock of goods was worth more than $1,000, and that said purchase money was unpaid on a portion of said stock of goods and part of the indebtedness for said stock was due. Even if the requested charge contains a correct proposition of law it seems to be perfectly evident that the facts...