Williams V. Gideon-Anderson Lumber Co.

• Decision Date: 10 August 1920
• Docket Number: No. 2532.,2532.
• Citation: 224 S.W. 51
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. GIDEON-ANDERSON LUMBER CO.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

224 S.W. 51

WILLIAMS v. GIDEON-ANDERSON LUMBER CO.

No. 2532.

Springfield Court of Appeals. Missouri.

August 10, 1920.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Pemiscot County; Sterling H. McCarty, Judge.

Suit by Ira Williams against the Gideon-Anderson Lumber Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Ward & Reeves, of Caruthersville, for appellant.

B. L. Guffy, of Hayti, Mo., for respondent.

STURGIS, P. J.

This suit involves a small sum, $12, but is not free from doubt, or easy of solution. It is a suit for four days' labor, alleged to be due plaintiff from the defendant, and for which plaintiff obtained judgment, first in a justice of the peace court, and again on appeal to the circuit court.' In bringing suit the plaintiff had in mind, and says his lawyer suggested to him, the provisions of Laws of Missouri of 1913, p. 175., allowing a penalty against corporations for not promptly paying discharged employés. However, neither the pleadings allege, nor does the evidence support, the facts in regard to the request in writing necessary to authorize a judgment for such penalty. The verdict of the jury and the judgment are for the amount of the wages due only.

It appears that there were two companies, the defendant, Gideon-Anderson Lumber Company, and the Gideon North Island Railroad Company, closely associated in business, having the same officers, and using the same office for the transaction of their business. The plaintiff, a common laborer, knew little or nothing of the different companies, and thought there was only one concern, this defendant, for which he was working. The claim is made here, and was in the circuit court, that he was in the employ of the railroad company. The defendant lumber company owned and operated a large sawmill, and the railroad company owned a tram or log road connected therewith, and over which the logs were shipped to the mill. It is a fair inference from this record that this is all the railroad was used for. There is no dispute as to plaintiff being discharged, and that there was due him at that time the wages now sued for. The real defense made in both the justice and the circuit courts is that plaintiff had been paid the wages due him through a merchant named Brown. The defendant claimed that, when plaintiff was discharged, a mutual agreement was made by which Brown was to pay plaintiff the amount due him, either in money or merchandise, as plaintiff might choose, and the defendant would settle with Brown; that this arrangement was fully consummated, and plaintiff fully paid. The plaintiff denied any such arrangement, and, while admitting that he obtained goods from this merchant of more value than the wages due him, says that same were purchased on his own credit, and that he owes Brown therefor. Plaintiff's evidence is that Brown not only did not pay him on behalf of defendant in the manner stated, but denied that he had been reimbursed by defendant for so doing, and advised the plaintiff that the only way to get his Money from defendant was to bring this suit. This issue was submitted to the jury; the instruction given for defendant being as follows:

"The court instructs the jury that, if you find and believe from the evidence in this case that plaintiff and J. P. Gibbons, as the representative of the defendant, and W. E. Brown had an agreement under and by which the said AV. E. Brown agreed to pay the plaintiff all that was due and owing to him for work and labor due him by the defendant, and plaintiff agreed to accept and receive the payment for his work from said W. E. Brown, and that thereafter, and before the institution of this suit, the said W. E. Brown paid plaintiff in money and merchandise all that defendant owed him for work and labor, then you will find the issues herein for the defendant."

The defendant, by its argument and brief, practically admits that the finding of the jury in plaintiff's favor on this issue is binding, and unless some error was committed, in overruling its demurrer to the evidence, in admitting improper evidence, or in giving and refusing instructions, the judgment should be affirmed.

As to the admission of improper evidence: The plaintiff was allowed to prove in the circuit court by the justice of the peace, Hickerson, before whom the case was previously tried, that J. P. Gibbons, the representative of the Gideon-Anderson people, stated at the justice trial that the defendant company owed the money, but owed it to the merchant, Brown, or rather had paid it through...