Williams v. Goodwin

• Decision Date: 30 August 1974
• Citation: 41 Cal.App.3d 496,116 Cal.Rptr. 200
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: George F. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RIVER LAKES RANCH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION et al., Defendants, Edith Goodwin, as Executrix of the Estate of J.L. Price, Deceased, et al., Defendants and Respondents. * Civ. 14302.

Page 200

116 Cal.Rptr. 200

41 Cal.App.3d 496

George F. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RIVER LAKES RANCH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION et al., Defendants Edith Goodwin, as Executrix of the Estate of J.L. Price, Deceased, et al., Defendants and Respondents. ^*

Civ. 14302.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Aug. 30, 1974.

Panattoni & Farrell, Sacramento, by Leonard Panattoni, for plaintiff-appellant.

Leon McCaslin, Yuba City, for defendants-respondents Goodwin and Ghiglieri.

Peters, Fuller & Rush, Chico, for defendant-respondent Ryan.

Alfred E. Frazier, Red Bluff, for defendant-respondent Case.

PUGLIA, Associate Justice.

Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of nonsuit rendered after the trial court entered orders granting the motions of each defendant for nonsuit and discharging the jury.

The disposition of this appeal requires the resolution of a question which to our knowledge has never received the attention of an appellate court in this state. The question to be determined is whether strict liability is imposed upon a defendant for personal injury inflicted upon a plaintiff on plaintiff's land by trespassing livestock in possession or control of defendant. For the reasons set forth Infra we conclude that strict liability is imposed when plaintiff's injuries are such as might reasonably be expected to result from an intrusion by the kind of livestock involved.

The facts necessary to a consideration of the issues raised herein have been distilled from the record in the spirit of the rule governing appellate review of a judgment of nonsuit. That rule requires the reversal of such a judgment when a review of the record yields substantial evidence which, if believed by the finder of fact, would justify a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The reason for the rule derives from the allocation to the jury of the fact determination function except in those relatively rare cases where, as a matter of law, the plaintiff has not made out a case and would not be entitled to a judgment in his favor. (McCall v. Otis Elevator Co. (1963)219 Cal.App.2d 22, 25, 33 Cal.Rptr. 44.)

On May 6, 1969, plaintiff George Williams, while working in his garden adjacent to his house trailer, was attacked, knocked down and trampled by a Black Angus bull, sustaining the injuries which prompted this action for damages. At the time plaintiff was employed upon a land development project by Sutherland Construction Company as a timekeeper and nightwatchman. All of the real property occupied or used by plaintiff and defendants or otherwise concerned in this action is located in Tehama County and, at the time of the incident in suit, was owned by River Lakes Ranch Development Corporation and Macco Corporation, hereinafter referred to collectively as the 'developers.' ¹ Plaintiff's employer was engaged on behalf of the developers on a construction project on the property.

The developers had purchased a parcel of real property of approximately 7200 acres from Dr. Price, since deceased. ² Thereafter the developers extended grazing rights on portions of the property to the Price estate in consideration for which the estate was obligated to remove the hay from and to keep cattle upon the property. The purpose of the latter consideration was to create a pastoral atmosphere, thus enhancing the attractiveness of the property to prospective purchasers. These rights were terminable by and subject to the right of the developers to control and develop the land. In turn the estate, through defendant Goodwin, and its ranch foreman, defendant Ghiglieri, entered into separate agreements with defendants Case and Ryan for the pasture of their cattle on the property at a rental fee of $5 per head per month. At the time of the attack on plaintiff approximately 36 Black Angus bulls were contained in a single pasture pursuant to the rental agreements. One-half of the bulls belonged to defendant Case and the other half to defendant Ryan.

Plaintiff resided in a house trailer on land adjacent to this pasture. This trailer was located approximately 400 yards from another house trailer which served as the construction project office in which plaintiff did most of his work. Plaintiff's trailer had been placed upon the property by the developers for his use. He was permitted to live there and to plant and cultivate approximately one acre adjacent to the trailer as a vegetable garden. Plaintiff raised the vegetables for his own consumption and that of other employees on the project. The seeds were purchased by plaintiff who was reimbursed for the expense by the developers. At the time of the attack on plaintiff the garden was almost ready to produce its first harvest.

The garden area was intersected by a driveway leading to plaintiff's house trailer. The driveway provided access only to plaintiff's trailer and was used by him and by people who came to visit him. To facilitate irrigation of his garden, plaintiff had dug a trench across the driveway. The driveway was not used in moving cattle from one place to another.

The pasture containing defendants' bulls was separated from the land used by plaintiff by a fence in which there was a gate. Several times before the attack on plaintiff defendants' bulls had escaped through the fence. In some of these instances the bulls had gotten into plaintiff's garden. Plaintiff had notified the developers on these occasions and employees of the developers with plaintiff's assistance had returned the bulls to the pasture. On one such occasion an employee of the developers had repaired the fence through which the animals escaped.

On the evening of the attack plaintiff was working in his garden. As he was leaning on a garden hoe in the driveway next to his house trailer, he heard an animal hit the fence close by. Moments later a Black Angus bull charged plaintiff. Plaintiff attempted unsuccessfully to fend the animal off with the hoe. The bull knocked plaintiff down, trampled him and dragged him along the driveway as a result of which plaintiff sustained personal injuries. Finally plaintiff escaped to his house trailer and the bull retreated toward the gate in the fence enclosing the pasture. During the incident the bull invaded plaintiff's garden and damaged some plants. The following morning the gate was observed open and lying on the ground.

While the complaint is not included in the record on appeal, it appears that plaintiff alleged liability on two theories, namely negligence and strict liability for injuries inflicted by animals of dangerous propensities actually or constructively known to the possessors thereof. At trial, without objection by the defendants, plaintiff expanded his theories of liability to include strict liability for damage by trespassing livestock.

In ruling on the motion for nonsuit the trial court found the evidence of negligence and known dangerous propensities insufficient to submit the question of liability to the jury on either of those theories. In considering plaintiff's third theory of liability the trial court assumed without deciding that a defendant in control of livestock is strictly liable for a plaintiff's personal injuries inflicted by the livestock as a consequence of a trespass upon land possessed by plaintiff. Nonetheless the trial court was of the view that the evidence was insufficient to show that the plaintiff 'was within the scope of the type of person who is protected' by the above stated rule. The trial court further observed, 'I don't think that Mr. Williams is the person that is indicated as having a right of recovery on the basis of strict liability for trespassing cattle, because I don't believe he fits in the category of a possessor of land . . . and the evidence, looking at it most favorably to Mr. Williams, I feel does not support that theory of the case. . . . ( ) This was, after all, a small portion of a very large land holding. I don't believe he had the right of exclusive occupancy of the area where he was living. The accident occurred, if it did occur, on the driveway, and, as a matter of fact, I think if they wanted to drive the whole herd of cattle through there they had that right and authority to do so.'

I

As previously stated, the first question to be resolved in this appeal appears to be a matter of first impression in this state to the extent that it involves the applicability of the common law rule of strict liability for personal injury, as distinguished from property damage, caused by trespassing livestock.

The doctrine of strict liability for harm done by animals has developed along two separate and independent lines: (1) Strict liability for damages by trespassing livestock, ³ and (2) strict liability apart from trespass (a) for damages by animals of a species regarded as inherently dangerous, ⁴ and (b) for damages by animals of a species not so regarded but which, in the particular case, possess dangerous propensities which were or should have been known to the possessor. ⁵ (Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) pp. 496--503; Harper & James, Law of Torts (1956) pp. 821--845.)

By common law the owner of cattle was required to keep them confined to his own close and, it was said, was liable in damages irrespective of negligence or fault for all injuries resulting from their being permitted to range at large. (Prosser, Torts, supra, pp. 496--497; Harper & James Torts, supra, pp. 821--822; see also, Hahn v. Garratt (1866) 69 Cal. 146, 149, 10 P. 329.) Historically, the possessor of wandering livestock was so identified with his cattle that their trespass was regarded as his own and liability was assessed as if the defendant had trespassed in person. (Prosser, Torts, supra, p. 496; Harper & James, Torts, supra, p. 822.) The Restatement of Torts pays obeisance to this ancient fiction in defining the liability of a possessor of trespassing livestock as coextensive with his liability for 'intentionally' driving his cattle on another's...