Williams v. Grogan
| Decision Date | 14 February 1958 |
| Citation | 100 So.2d 407 |
| Parties | Charlie Frank WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. George GROGAN et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
M. H. Jones, Clearwater, for appellant.
Louis C. Deal, Loveland, Earle & Deale, St. Petersburg, for appellees.
Appellant Charlie Frank Williams who was plaintiff below seeks reversal of a final decree dismissing his bill of complaint which sought enforcement of an alleged parol agreement by his deceased mother to leave certain property to him and in the alternative to impress a trust on the assets of his mother's estate.
The determining point is the matter of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the alleged parol agreement or the alleged trust.
It appears from the record that Charles A. Williams died intestate February 18, 1953 leaving as his sole heirs his widow, Annie M. Williams, and their son appellant Charlie Frank Williams. On December 23, 1953 Annie M. Williams executed a will specifically devising various parcels of real estate to various specific devisees, all of whom were made defendants below, and are now appellees here. The property which she devised constituted a part of the assets of her deceased husband's estate. On January 28, 1954, under circumstances to be related hereafter, Charlie Frank Williams executed and delivered to his mother a deed by which he conveyed to her 'All of my right, title and interest in and to the Estate of Charles A. Williams, Dec'd, my father, whether same be real or personal property of whatsoever nature and wheresoever situate.' Annie M. Williams died June 28, 1955 leaving the will above mentioned. Complaint in the instant suit was filed August 29, 1955.
By the complaint Charlie Frank Williams alleged an oral agreement with his mother made early in January, 1954. By this agreement, so he alleges, he agreed to convey to his mother all of his interest in the estate of his deceased father in exchange for her promise that at her death she would leave to the appellant the entire estate inherited by them from her deceased husband which had not been disposed of during her lifetime. Charlie Frank alleged further that the will of his mother by which she devised various specific assets to other beneficiaries was a breach of her alleged agreement to die intestate so that he would inherit all of the estate. He sought specific enforcement of the agreement and in the alternative requested the Chancellor to impress a trust in his favor on all of the assets of his mother's estate. The Chancellor heard the evidence and concluded that the plaintiff Charlie Frank Williams 'has failed to meet the burden by offering clear and convincing proof of the allegations in his bill of complaint.' At final hearing the bill of complaint was dismissed and the final decree entered accordingly. Reversal of this decree is now sought.
The appellant contends here that the evidence adequately sustained his claim that his mother had made the oral agreement and that her subsequent failure to die intestate was a breach of the agreement which justified specific enforcement thereof.
The appellees, who are the executor and specific devisees under the will of Annie M. Williams, contend that the appellant failed to carry the burden of proof sufficiently to establish the alleged oral agreement.
We mention at the outset that if there was no such oral agreement by the mother as contended by the appellant-son, this record is devoid of any evidence of consideration moving from the mother to the son for the execution of the deed dated January 28, 1954. All parties seem to concede that the mother paid the son nothing of value for the conveyance of his obviously substantial interest in his father's estate unless it be, as the son contends, that she promised to die intestate.
On the matter of the alleged agreement between the mother and the son the evidence was conflicting. The Chancellor heard all of it and he evidently chose to believe the witnesses who testified for the appellees. It was his responsibility to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and we cannot see that he committed error in concluding that the appellant had failed to establish his position by 'clear and convincing proof.' We, therefore, find that there was no error in the holding of the Chancellor that the alleged oral agreement should not be specifically enforced.
However, a careful examination of the record leads us to the conclusion that the ultimate decree dismissing the complaint was afflicted with error. In reaching this conclusion we disregard the testimony of witnesses offered by appellant and give full weight and credence to the testimony of the witnesses offered by the appellees.
It will be recalled as pointed out above that absent some such oral promise as contended for by the appellant, there was absolutely no consideration whatever for the execution of the deed by the appellant to his mother. According to the testimony of the late John C. Blocker, who was a highly respected member of the Bar of this Court and attorney for Annie M. Williams, the execution of the deed came about under the circumstances which we now summarize. Mr. Blocker, testifying for the appellees, stated that he had drawn the will of the late Annie M. Williams and was familiar with its contents. He testified that it had come to his attention that appellant Charlie Frank Williams was a 'wild' young man, that he was running around the city in a high-priced car keeping company with a woman much older than himself and had caused his mother considerable concern. He stated that Charlie Frank had no public liability insurance...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Wooten v. Rhodus
...may be found in property not held as tenancy by the entireties. See e.g. Doing v. Riley, 176 F.2d 449 (5th Cir.1949); Williams v. Grogan, 100 So.2d 407 (Fla.1958); Poe v. Estate of Levy, 411 So.2d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Roffe v. Roffe, 404 So.2d 1095 (Fla. 3rd DCA It is clear that a forme......
-
Hallam v. Gladman
...to support the creation and declaration of a constructive trust. The plaintiff cites and relies upon the case of Williams v. Grogan, Fla., 1958, 100 So.2d 407, 409, to support the proposition that, when a person stands in a position of trust and confidence, a wrongful withholding of propert......
-
Key v. Trattmann
...a resulting trust arises not ex contractu but by operation of law, the statute of frauds does not pertain. See, e.g., Williams v. Grogan, 100 So.2d 407, 410 (Fla.1958) ("A trust which is created by operation of law is not within the statute of frauds and may be proved by parol evidence."); ......
-
Lee v. Wiand
...that one should not be permitted to be unjustly enriched under such circumstances at the expense of another." Williams v. Grogan , 100 So. 2d 407, 410 (Fla. 1958). Florida courts consistently list the following as elements of a constructive trust, to be proven by clear and convincing eviden......
-
Business & commercial cases
...can be based on parol evidence. Elvins v. Seestedt , 148 Fla. 408, 4 So.2d 532 (1941), and cases cited therein; Williams v. Grogan , 100 So.2d 407 (Fla.1958); and Varnes v. Dawkins , 624 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). This exception to the parol evidence rule is consistent with and may well......