Williams v. Halford

• Decision Date: 05 December 1905
• Citation: 53 S.E. 88,73 S.C. 119
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. HALFORD.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

53 S.E. 88

73 S.C. 119

WILLIAMS v. HALFORD.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

December 5, 1905

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Colleton County; Purdy Judge.

Action by Julia Williams and another against J. R. Halford and others. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal. Reversed.

Howell & Gruber, for appellants. Griffin & Padgett, for respondents.

JONES J.

This case has been in this court twice before. 64 S.C. 396, 42 S.E. 187; 67 S.C. 296, 45 S.E. 207. The action is brought under section 2368, Civ. Code 1902, by the widow and son of James J. Williams, alias J. J. Halford, to set aside certain conveyances of his property by said Williams to his paramour Jane Crosby, and by her to his illegitimate children, in violation of said statute, and for partition and accounting. Besides a general denial, the defendants set up title by adverse possession and plead the statute of limitations. The case, on the second appeal, having been remanded for a new trial upon the issue of title and for any further proper proceedings, was submitted to Judge Purdy without a jury. Judge Purdy rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs adjudging that they were entitled to three-fourths of the property so conveyed, amounting in value to $1,025, and decreeing for a sale and partition of the property, unless defendants within 30 days elect to pay plaintiffs three-fourths of said valuation, or $768.75, with interest from November 21, 1896, together with one-fourth of the costs. The exceptions of defendants to this decree raise three questions.

1. The first exception is as follows: "That the presiding judge was in error in failing to pass upon the objections interposed by the attorneys of the respective parties to portions of the evidence taken in the previous trial, such testimony being received in evidence by agreement of the attorneys subject to such objections." This exception is based on agreement between counsel, made before the trial, as follows: "It is agreed between counsel that the testimony as introduced on the previous trial in November 1902, and as contained in the case for trial in the Supreme Court, shall be received as evidence for the respective parties in the approaching trial, subject to the same objections as made and noted on the previous trial, and also subject to any motion or motions which either side may see fit to make just as though such testimony was being offered for the first time," etc. Under this agreement the testimony taken on the previous trial was submitted to Judge Purdy with other evidence, but it does not appear that any objection to testimony was otherwise called to the attention of Judge Purdy. Judge Purdy, as it appears from the case, although making no rulings as to such testimony during the trial or in his decree, duly considered and passed upon every objection to testimony in arriving at the judgment rendered. The record before us contains nothing from which we can say that Judge Purdy committed reversible error. In the absence of any showing to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the circuit judge in reaching his conclusions, discarded all incompetent testimony. It is the duty of counsel, when they desire the court's ruling upon testimony, to present their objection thereto, when it is offered, so that the court may know the ground of objection and that a specific ruling is desired. The mere presenting of a mass of written or printed testimony under the agreement of counsel that the testimony is taken subject to objection does not meet the requirement, and does not require that the court make a specific ruling on each objection on pain of committing reversible error. The case is not like Grollman v. Lipsitz, 43 S.C. 338, 21 S.E. 272, wherein objection was made to the introduction of certain affidavits offered, on ground that they were not in reply, and the court allowed them to be read, stating that he would pass upon them when he came to consider the motions on the merits, which the court failed to do, thereby committing reversible error. The case falls rather within the rule stated in Ross v. Jones, 58 S.C. 11, 35 S.E. 402, 36 S.E. 1, the syllabus of which states that "a circuit judge in deciding a law case, a jury trial being waived, is not required to embody in his decree or judgment what testimony he regarded as competent or as incompetent, or upon what testimony he based his findings of fact, especially when it does not appear that any special objections to testimony were argued before him." This exception is therefore overruled.

2. The second, third, and fourth exceptions are as follows: "(2) That the presiding judge was in error in holding as a matter of law that neither the plea of adverse possession nor the statute of limitations can avail in this case; whereas, he should have held that such defenses were available if supported by the facts. (3) That the presiding judge was in error in holding and deciding that the plaintiffs could not have brought suit until after the death of James J. Williams, alias Halford; whereas, he should have held that their right of action accrued, if at all, at the time of the execution and delivery of the conveyances complained of to the defendants and their mother. (4) That the presiding judge was in error in holding and deciding that if any of the alleged gifts by the said J. J. Williams, alias Halford, had been set aside during his life time, that title thereto would have revested in him, and that he could thereupon during his life have disposed of such property to suit his interest or fancy, and no one could have complained; whereas, he should have held that if such alleged gifts had been set aside, the same would have been in favor of the legitimate wife and children, and that title thereto would not have revested in the said Williams, alias Halford."

These exceptions are directed to the following portion of the decree of the circuit court: "From the foregoing, it follows that neither the plea of adverse possession nor the statute of limitations can avail. The plaintiffs could not sue until after the death of Williams, alias Halford, and if any of these gifts and conveyances had been set aside during the lifetime of the said Williams, alias Halford, title would have been revested in him, and he could have disposed of the property during his lifetime to suit his interests or fancy, and no one could have complained." We think that the court erred in holding that plaintiffs could not have brought suit until after the death of James J. Williams, and that he erred, further, in holding that, if any of said gifts had been set aside during his lifetime, title thereto would have revested in him, to be disposed of as he pleased. This view is a misconception of the nature of the claim which the lawful wife and children have with respect to the property conveyed, in violation of section 2368. That section reads: "If any person who is an inhabitant of this state, or who has any estate herein, shall have already begotten, or shall hereafter beget, any bastard child, or shall live in adultery with a woman, the said person having a wife or lawful children of his own living, and shall give, or settle, or convey, either in trust or by direct conveyance, by deed of conveyance, or by deed of gift, legacy, devise, or by any other ways or means whatsoever, for the use and benefit of the said woman with whom he lives in adultery, or of his bastard child or children, any larger or greater proportion of the real clear value of his estate, real or personal, after payment of his debts, than one-fourth part thereof, such deed of gift, conveyance, legacy or devise made, or hereafter to be made, shall be null and void, only in favor of wife and legitimate children, for so much of the amount or value thereof as shall or may exceed such fourth part of his real and personal estate."

In construing this statute, it has been held that the claim is entirely personal to the lawful wife and children to call upon the mistress or illegitimate children for the amount or value of what said mistress or children received over the one-fourth part of the donor's or testator's estate that the legal title of the mistress or bastards is good and perfect, subject only to...