Williams v. Harris
| Decision Date | 16 June 1944 |
| Docket Number | 6689 |
| Citation | 106 Utah 387,149 P.2d 640 |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
| Parties | WILLIAMS v. HARRIS, Warden |
Appeal from District Court, Third District, Salt Lake County Clarence E. Baker, Judge.
Habeas corpus proceeding by Gwen Williams against John E. Harris Warden of Utah State Prison. From a judgment denying the writ and remanding petitioner to defendant's custody petitioner appeals.
Affirmed.
Duncan & Duncan, of Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Grover A. Giles, Atty. Gen., and Herbert F. Smart, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
MOFFAT, J., deceased.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the District Court of the Third Judicial District for Salt Lake County. The trial court, after admitting evidence in support of the petition for writ of habeas corpus, denied the writ and remanded the petitioner, the appellant here, back into the custody of John E. Harris, Warden of the Utah State Prison, defendant in the original action and the respondent here.
The facts with which the court is concerned, as shown by the transcript, are neither complicated nor in dispute. The appellant, with three other young men, was charged with the crime of burglary in the second degree in the District Court of the Second Judicial District in and for Weber County. On the 12th day of December, 1932, plaintiff herein, one of the defendants in the above case, entered a plea of guilty. He waived time for passing of sentence and the court then stated:
On the 6th day of February, 1933, appellant appeared in court with Mr. Childs and the latter made a favorable report regarding the boy's conduct. At this time the District Attorney stated to the court: "I do not want your Honor to lose jurisdiction of the boys." The court then made another order suspending imposition of sentence until April 24, 1933, and on that date made a similar order. Several of these were made from a definite date to a definite date. From the record it also appears that after making the first report with Mr. Childs, this young man was released upon his own recognizance.
The last time appellant was before the court prior to the revocation of the order of probation was September 25, 1933, at which time the court made a further order of suspension of imposition of sentence until December 18, 1933. On the 22nd of October, 1933, appellant was brought before the court in Weber County and appeared before the judge who had made the previous orders. Then the court asked appellant regarding his plea to the charge of burglary and if he had not been sentenced to the Utah State Prison recently for a crime committed in Utah County while under the court's order of probation. Appellant admitted that this was correct. The judge then sentenced appellant to be imprisoned for a term of not less than one nor more than twenty years.
In this action appellant contends that the trial court in Salt Lake County which refused to release him upon the hearing on the writ of habeas corpus erred for the reason that the court in Weber County was without jurisdiction when it imposed the sentence of imprisonment as stated above; that the trial court was without jurisdiction, it having suspended imposition of sentence and having placed the appellant on probation for a definite period, and appellant having complied with all the conditions of this probation, was entitled to his discharge, and that orders of the court of Weber County were made after the expiration of the term of appellant's probation, and were without any specific purpose or object and without any reference or relation to appellant's further probation, and void.
We readily accept the proposition that if the District Court of Weber County had no jurisdiction to pronounce sentence, the Court of Salt Lake County entertaining the writ of habeas corpus should have sustained the writ and released appellant from the State Prison.
The statute, which was in force and effect, and which is now controlling in 105-36-17, U. C. A. 1943, is as follows:
This statute was enacted by the Legislature in 1923. Prior to the enactment of this statute, the courts in this jurisdiction had inherent power to suspend sentences only for some definite period and for some specific temporary purpose. Long before the passage of the present statute, this court held that trial courts could suspend sentence temporarily for stated period from time to time. See People v. Blackburn, 6 Utah 347, 23 P. 759. In this latter case the court held that trial courts have no power wholly to relieve convicted persons from sentence; that only the pardoning power can do that. In the Matter of Flint, 25 Utah 338, 71 P. 531, 95 Am. St. Rep. 853, this court held that a suspension of sentence for an indefinite period is in effect an exercise of the functions of the pardoning power which belongs exclusively to the Board of Pardons, a separate and distinct department of the State government. This principle of law was again stated in the case of Reese v. Olsen, 44 Utah 318, 139 P. 941.
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LeBeau v. State
...that the exercise of such discretion is not to be overridden on appeal absent a showing of abuse. Baine, 347 P.2d at 556 ; Williams, 149 P.2d at 642.¶ 77 The sentencing judge's discretion as to the considerations relevant to sentencing is not unlimited. But its limits are found in the terms......
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State v. Perea
...For example, sentencing judges may choose to suspend all or part of a sentence. SeeUtah Code § 77–18–1(2)(a); Williams v. Harris, 106 Utah 387, 149 P.2d 640, 642 (1944) (noting that “[t]he right to suspend imposition of sentence ... is a discretionary right”). Even under Utah's indeterminat......
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Lebeau v. State
...that the exercise of such discretion is not to be overridden on appeal absent a showing of abuse. Baine, 347 P.2d at 556; Williams, 149 P.2d at 642. ¶ 77 The sentencing judge's discretion as to the considerations relevant to sentencing is not unlimited. But its limits are found in the terms......
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...cross-examination is often as enlightening as is the examination in chief.' The Zolantakis case was followed in Utah in Williams v. Harris, 106 Utah 387, 149 P.2d 640 (1944) and Thompson v. Harris, 106 Utah 32, 144 P.2d 761 (1943). 3 The idea that suspension of sentence gives to the defenda......