Williams v. Hartshorn

• Decision Date: 17 October 1946
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. HARTSHORN.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

296 N.Y. 49

69 N.E.2d 557

WILLIAMS

v.HARTSHORN.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 17, 1946.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Action by Wallace Williams, as administrator of the estate of Robert Williams, deceased, against Grace Hartshorn to recover for death of plaintiff's decedent. From an order of the Appellate Division, 270 App.Div. 875, 61 N.Y.S.2d 127, which affirmed by a divided court an order of the Supreme Court at Special Term, Warner, J., presiding, 57 N.Y.S.2d 895, denying defendant's motion to dismiss amended complaint on ground that court did not have jurisdiction of the subject of action, defendant appeals by permission of the Appellate Division. The question whether Appellate Division erred as matter of law in making its order of affirmance is certified.

Orders reversed and complaint dismissed. Question certified answered in the affirmative. Percy R. Smith and Edmund S. Brown, both of Buffalo, for appellant.

Albert E. Hollis, of Harnell, for respondent.

FULD, Judge.

The question here posed is this: Is the administrator of a partnership employee, who died as a result of injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment, precluded from maintaining a common-law action for negligence against the partner who owned the premises where the partnership business was carried on and where the employee was killed?

The Workmen's Compensation Law, Consol.Laws, c. 67, was designed to assure to the workingman a protection against loss of earning power through injury sustained in his employment, irrespective of how that injury occurred or what brought it about. After imposing this new and comprehensive liability upon the employer, the statute accords to him, in return therefor, relief from any and all other liability ‘on account of such injury or death.’ Workmen's Compensation Law, s 11; see Barrencotto v. Cocker Saw Co., 266 N.Y. 139, 142, 194 N.E. 61. Further evidence of the legislative intent to make compensation the comprehensive and exclusive remedy for such injury as regards the employing organization is found in section 29, subdivision 6, of the statute, which precludes common-law actions based upon ‘the negligence or wrong of another in the same employ.’ Cf. Mittman v. Meyerson, 19 N.Y.S.2d 575.

Regardless of his status as owner of the premises where the injury occurred, an employer remains an employer in his relations with his employees as to all matters arising from and connected with their employment. He may not be treated as a dual legal personality, ‘a sort of Dr. Jekyl and Mr. Hyde.’ Per Guy J., Winter v. Peter Doelger Brewing Co., 95 Misc. 150, 153, 159 N.Y.S. 113. Accordingly, defendant, as employer, was absolved from ‘any other liability whatsoever, * * * at common law or otherwise on account of such * * * death.’ Workmen's Compensation Law, s 11; see, also, Winter v. Peter Doelger Brewing Co., Inc., 226 N.Y. 581, 123 N.E. 895, affirming 175 App.Div. 796, 162 N.Y.S. 469;DeAntonis v. Catalano, 256 App.div. 10, 9 N.Y.S.2d 438;Park v. Union Mfg. Co., 45 Cal.App.2d 401, 114 P.2d 373. Decision by this court in the Winter case points the conclusion here. Plaintiff, employed as a delivery man by defendant brewing company, was injured in the course of his usual work while delivering beer to a saloon. Though the premises were located at some distance from the brewery, they were owned and controlled by defendant, and it was defendant's own...