Williams v. Hays

• Decision Date: 02 November 1894
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. HAYS.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

143 N.Y. 442

38 N.E. 449

WILLIAMS

v.HAYS.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 2, 1894.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, first department.

Action by Paul Williams against William Hays. From a judgment of the general term reversing a judgment for defendant, he appeals. Reversed.

For former opinion, see 19 N. Y. Supp. 61.

Peckham, Gray, and O'Brien, JJ., dissenting.

George A. Black, for appellant.

William W. Goodrich, for respondent.

EARL, J.

The defendant and others. among whom were Parsons and Loud, were joint owners of the brig Sheldon. By an arrangement between the defendant and the other owners, he took the vessel to sail on shares. He was to man the vessel, to pay the crew, and to furnish the supplies; and he was to have one-half of her earnings, after certain deductions, for his share, and the other owners were to have from him the other half, after certain deductions, for their share. He was to have the absolute control and management of the vessel, and became her owner pro hac vice. Webb v. Peirce, 1 Curt. 113; Fed. Cas. No. 17,320; Thorp v. Hammond, 12 Wall. 416; Somes v. White, 65 Me. 542. The defendant, under the arrangement between him and the other owners, in no sense became their agent or servant. In Webb v. Peirce, it was held that where a master hires a vessel on shares under an agreement to victual and man her, and employ her on such voyages as he thinks best, having thereby the entire possession, command, and navigation of her, he thereby becomes her owner pro hac vice, and the relation of principal and agent does not exist between him and the owners. The other cases are to the same effect. The defendant thus became the charterer or lessee of the vessel, and was responsible to the other owners for due care in her management, and so the trial judge held. The case of Moody v. Buck, 1 Sandf. 304, which holds that one co-owner of a vessel, who takes and navigates her for his own benefit, is not liable to his co-owners for her loss by his carelessness, even if correctly decided upon the facts there existing, is not applicable to a case like this, where the co-owner takes the vessel, not in his right as co-owner, for the purpose of using his own, but under an agreement with the other owners whereby he became the charterer, lessee, or bailee of the vessel, and thus bound to some duty of care and fidelity. There can, however, be no question that that case was incorrectly decided, and the rule laid down therein is not consonant with reason or justice. I cannot find that it has ever been followed as authority in any subsequent case, and it is in conflict with many authorities. Sheldon v. Skinner, 4 Wend. 529;Chesley v. Thompson, 3 N. H. 9; Herrin v. Eaton, 13 Me. 193; Martyn v. Knowllys, 8 Term R. 145; Guillot v. Dossat, 4 Mart. (La.) 203; Dom. Civ. Law, § 1489; 1 Pars. Mar. Law, 95; Ford, Merc. Shipp. 35, 45; Cooley, Torts, 328, 659.

The Sheldon was loaded with ice, and started from the coast of Maine for a southern port. She soon encountered storms, and the defendant, for more than two days, was constantly on duty; and then, becoming exhausted, he went to his cabin, leaving the vessel in charge of the mate and crew. He took a large dose of quinine, and laid down. The mate found that the rudder was broken and useless, and that the vessel could not be steered. He caused the captain to come on deck. He refused to believe that the vessel was in any trouble, and refused the help of two tugs, the masters of which saw the difficulty under which his vessel was laboring, and successively offered to take her in tow. They cautioned him that his vesselwas gradually and certainly drifting upon the shore, and in broad daylight she did drift upon the shore, without any effort upon the part of the defendant or any of his crew to save her, and she became a total wreck. Parsons and Loud had insured their interest in the Phoenix Insurance Company, and it paid them the loss. It thus became subrogated to their claim, if any, against the defendant for his negligence or misconduct in the management of the vessel, and it assigned that claim to the plaintiff. He, standing in the shoes of Parsons and Loud, brought this action against the defendant to recover damages for the loss of the vessel, alleging that it was due to his carelessness and misconduct. The defendant claims that from the time he went to his cabin, leaving the vessel in charge of his mate and crew, to the time the vessel was wrecked, and he found himself in the life-saving station, he was unconscious, and knew nothing of what occurred, that in fact he was, from some cause, insane, and therefore not responsible for the loss of the vessel. The case was submitted to the jury on the theory that the defendant, if sane, was guilty of negligence causing the destruction of the vessel, but, if insane, was not responsible for her loss through any conduct on his part which, in a sane person, would have constituted such negligence as would have imposed responsibility.

The important question for us to determine, then, is whether the insanity of the defendant furnishes a defense to the plaintiff's claim, and I think it does not. The general rule is that an insane person is just as responsible for his torts as a sane person, and the rule applies to all torts, except, perhaps, those in which malice, and therefore intention, actual or imputed, is a necessary ingredient, like libel, slander, and malicious prosecution. In all other torts, intention is not an ingredient, and the actor is responsible, although he acted with a good and even laudable purpose, without any malice. The law looks to the person damaged by another, and seeks to make him whole, without reference to the purpose or the condition, mental or physical, of the person causing the damage. The liability of a lunatic for his torts, in the opinions of judges, has been placed upon several grounds. The rule has been invoked that, where one of two innocent persons must bear a loss, he must bear it whose act caused it. It is said that public policy requires the enforcement of the liability, that the relatives of a lunatic may be under inducement to restrain him, and that tort feasors may not simulate or pretend insanity to defend their wrongful acts, causing damage to others. The lunatic must bear the loss occasioned by his torts, as he bears his other misfortunes, and the burden of such loss may not be put upon others. In Buswell on Insanity (section 355) it is said: ‘Since, in a civil action for a tort, it is not necessary to aver or prove any wrongful intent on the part of the defendant, it is a rule of the common law that, although a lunatic may not be punishable criminally, he is liable in a civil action for any tort he may commit.’ In Cooley on Torts (page 98) the learned author says: ‘A wrong is an invasion of right, to the damage of the party who suffers it. It consists in the injury done, and not commonly in the purpose or mental or physical capacity of the person or agent doing it. It may or may not have been done with bad motive. The question of motive is usually a question of aggravation only. Therefore, the law, in giving redress, has in view the case of the party injured, and the extent of his injury, and makes what he suffers the measure of compensation. * * * There is consequently no anomaly in compelling one who is not chargeable with wrong intent to make compensation for an injury committed by him, for, as is said in an early case, ‘the reason is because he that is damaged ought to be recompensed.’' And at page 100 he says: ‘Undoubtedly, there is some appearance of hardship, even of injustice, in compelling one to respond for that which, for want of the control of reason, he was unable to avoid; that it is imposing upon a person already visited with the inexpressible calamity of mental obscurity an obligation to observe the same care and precaution respecting the rights of others that the law demands of one in the full possession of his faculties. But the question of liability in these cases, as well as in others, is a question of policy; and it is to be disposed of as would be the question whether the incompetent person should be supported at the expense of the public, or of his neighbors, or at the expense of his own estate. If his mental disorder makes him dependent, and at the same time prompts him to commit injuries, there seems to be no greater reason for imposing upon the neighbors or the public one set of these consequences, rather than the other; no more propriety or justice in making others bear the losses resulting from his unreasoning fury, when it is spent upon them or their property, than there would be in calling upon them to pay the expense of his confinement in an asylum, when his own estate is ample for the purpose.’ In Shearman and Redfield on Negligence (section 57), it is said: ‘Infants and persons of unsound mind are liable for injuries caused by their tortious negligence; and, so far as their responsibility is concerned, they are held to the same degree of care and diligence as persons of sound mind and full age. This is necessary, because otherwise there would be no redress for injuries committed by such persons; and the anomaly might be witnessed of a child, having abundant wealth, depriving another of his property without compensation.’ In Reeves' Domestic Relations (page 386), it is said: ‘Where the minor has committed a tort with force, he is liable at any age; for in case of civil injuries, with force, the intention is not regarded, for in such case a lunatic is as liable to compensate in damages as a man in his right mind.’ The doctrine of these authorities is illustrated in many interesting cases. Bullock v. Babcock, 3 Wend. 391;Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615;Krom v. Schoonmaker, 3 Barb. 647;Conklin v. Thompson, 29 Barb. 218;Cross v. Kent, 32 Md. 581; Neal v. Gillett, 23 Conn. 437 Huchting v. Engel, 17 Wis. 230;Brown v. Howe, 9 Gray, 84;...