Williams v. Hobbs

• Decision Date: 06 February 2012
• Docket Number: Nos. 10–2465,10–2712.,s. 10–2465
• Citation: 662 F.3d 994
• Parties: David WILLIAMS, Plaintiff–Appellee/Cross–Appellant, v. Ray HOBBS, Chief Deputy Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Defendant,Greg Harmon, Warden, East Arkansas Regional Unit, ADC; Marvin Evans, Jr., Warden, Tucker Unit, ADC; Grant Harris, Warden, Varner Unit, ADC; Tommy James, Jr., Assistant Warden, Maximum Security Unit, ADC; Tim Moncrief, Assistant Warden, Varner Unit, ADC, Defendants–Appellants/Cross–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

662 F.3d 994

David WILLIAMS, Plaintiff–Appellee/Cross–Appellant,

v.Ray HOBBS, Chief Deputy Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Defendant,Greg Harmon, Warden, East Arkansas Regional Unit, ADC; Marvin Evans, Jr., Warden, Tucker Unit, ADC; Grant Harris, Warden, Varner Unit, ADC; Tommy James, Jr., Assistant Warden, Maximum Security Unit, ADC; Tim Moncrief, Assistant Warden, Varner Unit, ADC, Defendants–Appellants/Cross–Appellees.

Nos. 10–2465

10–2712.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: March 29, 2011.Filed: Dec. 2, 2011.Rehearing En Banc Denied Feb. 6, 2012.*

Shawn J. Johnson, AAG, argued, Christine A. Cryer, AAG, on the brief, Little Rock, AR, for appellant/cross-appellee.

Michael Scott Moore, argued, Little Rock, AR, for appellee/cross-appellant.

Before LOKEN, SMITH, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

David Williams, an inmate in the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC), filed the instant lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, inter alia, that his approximately 14–year detention in administrative segregation (“Ad. Seg.”) ¹ violated his procedural due-process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because the periodic reviews of his detention were not meaningful. We previously reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment against Williams, concluding that Williams had asserted a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Williams v. Norris, 277 Fed.Appx. 647, 648–50 (8th Cir.2008) (unpublished per curiam). We further concluded that ADC's written Ad. Seg. review policies accorded Williams all the process that he was constitutionally due, but we remanded the case for a fact determination of whether the defendants—five prison officials—conducted Williams's review hearings in a meaningful manner. The district court held a bench trial on the matter and found that four of the five defendants had in fact denied Williams due process by conducting meaningless Ad. Seg. review hearings. Consequently, the district court awarded Williams $4,846 in nominal damages—$1 for every day that Williams lived in Ad. Seg.—but denied Williams's prayer for punitive damages. Presently, the defendants appeal the district court's findings that they conducted meaningless Ad. Seg. review hearings and its nominal-damages computation. Williams cross-appeals, urging that the district court erred in failing to find the fifth defendant liable and in denying Williams compensatory and punitive damages. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand the district court's nominal-damages award as improperly computed. We affirm the remainder of the district court's disposition.

I. Background

A. Williams's Institutional History with ADC

In 1981, Williams began serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole following his conviction for murder. In 1982, just one year after commencing his prison sentence, Williams was convicted of murdering a fellow inmate and thereafter served 30 days in punitive segregation and one and one-half years in Ad. Seg. Subsequently, in July 1983, the ADC released Williams into the general population at the Tucker Maximum Security Unit (“Tucker Max”), where he continued serving his life sentence without major incident until 1995. In December 1995, a fellow inmate attacked and injured Williams while Williams was performing his assigned duties in Tucker Max's kitchen. Prison officials believed that this attack stemmed from Williams's suspected drug “trafficking and trading” activities at Tucker Max, and that the altercation may even have resulted from a “drug deal gone bad.”

In December 1995, immediately following this attack, ADC officials placed Williams in Ad. Seg.—ostensibly for his own protection—where he ultimately remained continuously, and without interruption, for nearly 14 years until March 13, 2009.² In contrast, Williams's attacker served only 56 days in Ad. Seg.

B. Overview of ADC's Ad. Seg. Policy

Throughout Williams's time in Ad. Seg., ADC maintained essentially the same written policy on the administration of Ad. Seg. and uniformly provided that

[t]he Institutional Classification Committee ... may place an inmate in administrative segregation if his/her continued presence in the general population poses a serious threat to life, property, self, staff, or other inmates. Also, inmates who threaten the security or orderly running of the institution may be segregated.

ADC's Ad. Seg. policies mandated that Williams be afforded: (1) a hearing before the Classification Committee; (2) notice of that hearing at least 24 hours prior thereto; and (3) an opportunity to appear at the hearing and make any statement desired and present documentary evidence, including witness statements. At the conclusion of these proceedings, the Classification Committee recommends by majority vote whether an inmate should be placed (or, if applicable, remain) in Ad. Seg. The inmate must “be advised of the reasons of his/her administrative segregation in writing and a copy of the reasons will be maintained in the inmate's institutional file. All decisions may be subject to review and approval or disapproval by the Warden or his/her designee.” Additionally, the Classification Committee must review the status of an inmate confined in Ad. Seg. every 30 days. The Classification Committee is routinely composed of the warden, assistant warden, chief of security, a member of mental health, and a “classification officer.” The warden, however, possesses complete authority to approve or deny the Classification Committee's recommendation. Also, Mental Health staff must independently review the inmate's status every 30 days. Finally, ADC's Ad. Seg. policies provide as follows:

No inmate shall remain in a segregation classification for more than one year unless he has been personally interviewed by the Warden at the end of one year and such action is approved by him. At the end of the second and each additional year that an inmate remains in a segregation classification, he must be personally interviewed by both the Warden and the Deputy/Assistant Director, who will then determine whether or not continuation in that status is necessary and/or appropriate.

C. The Instant Lawsuit

On February 16, 2005, Williams filed the instant lawsuit pro se in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. Williams alleged that his continued confinement in Ad. Seg. violated his constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Williams sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and sought equitable relief as well as monetary damages. On August 22, 2006, the district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, but, on appeal, this court affirmed in part and reversed in part that decision. Williams, 277 Fed.Appx. at 650. Specifically, we affirmed the district court's conclusion that Williams was not denied his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause because “Williams made no showing that parole-eligible inmates, death-row inmates, or other categories of inmates were treated differently, despite being similarly situated, in a manner that bore no rational relation to any legitimate penological interest.” Id. at 650. Nevertheless, we concluded that Williams's 13–year confinement in Ad. Seg. “constitutes an atypical and significant hardship, ... and thus he had a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 648 (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483–87, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995)). Proceeding from this initial step in the two-step due-process inquiry, this court explained that,

[o]nce a liberty interest is established, the next question is what process is due. We conclude that, for an [A]d[.] [S]eg[.] inmate, the Constitution requires no more than the process Williams received—reviews at 60–day intervals at which Williams could make statements and present evidence, and annual meetings with a warden— provided such reviews were meaningful.

We conclude, however, that there remains an unresolved fact issue on this record as to whether Williams actually received meaningful reviews, rather than sham reviews, as he contends.

Id. at 649 (emphases added) (internal citations omitted).

Accordingly, we remanded Williams's case for further proceedings consistent with our opinion. Consequently, on April 6, 2009, the magistrate judge commenced a bench trial, but after receiving only three witnesses, “held the case in abeyance for the purposes of appointing counsel to represent [Williams], and to address the issue of the absence of one of [Williams]'s requested witnesses.” Williams, 721 F.Supp.2d at 828. Subsequently, on April 29, 2009, the district court appointed counsel to represent Williams, and the magistrate judge conducted a three-day bench trial on February 2–4, 2010.

Following the bench trial and court-ordered post-trial briefing, the magistrate judge issued its “Proposed Findings and Recommendations,” finding therein “that the reviews conducted under the auspices of these defendants were not ‘meaningful’ and therefore, that [Williams]'s due process rights were violated by his continued incarceration in [Ad. Seg.] from 1999–2009.” ³ Id. at 841. Based on the magistrate Judge's analysis, the only defendant immune from liability is Defendant Chief Deputy Director Ray Hobbs (“Dir. Hobbs”). The magistrate judge “f[ound] that his participation in five director's reviews over the course of plaintiff's stay in [Ad. Seg.] was not sufficient to impose liability in this matter.” Id. Finally, with respect to damages, the magistrate judge found: (1) that Williams was not entitled to compensatory monetary damages because he failed to show any physical injury that resulted from his time in Ad. Seg., a showing that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) sets as a prerequisite for the recovery of compensatory money damages, id. at 841; (2)...